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ABSTRACT 
 
This PhD focuses on transgender subjectivity and explores the ways in which 
trans is negotiated and compromised by and within social space, with 
particular attention to the dynamics and socio-cultural norms through which 
the transgendered body that identifies beyond the gender binary is mediated.  
 
The existence of trans subjectivity develops in opposition to institutionalised 
heteronormativity; its problematic social location and identification make it a 
phenomenon which strongly relies on movement and spatiality. Part of what 
makes trans so compelling is not so much its breach of the ‘natural body’, but it 
is the unique form of self-description it carries within itself which retains the 
potential of opening up a new narrative and alternative possibility for the very 
notion of gender and for all LGBT advocacy and its relations to space. 
 
My theoretical framework is influenced by the work of Gilles Deleuze. I look at 
trans as a mode of unified affirmation and not as a product of negotiation 
(medical and/or legal). Difference for Deleuze is not an empirical condition but 
an ontological constitutional principle. Through this, I elaborate a conceptual 
framework of understanding wherein transgender subjectivity is articulated in 
terms of utopianism. The utopianism I refer to is not wishful hope, rather, it is 
the material embodiment here and now of that mode of futurity transgender 
subjectivity evokes. Futurity contains within itself the seed for producing the re-
energisation of thought and ‘ethical space’ does not only entail the inclusion of 
what is real and tangible but must also account for what is possible, because 
what is possible is real.  
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A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing 
at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. 
And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, 
sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias. 
 
(Oscar Wilde) 
 
 
 
 
It is not the elements or the sets which define the multiplicity.  
What defines it is the AND, as something which has its place between the 
elements or between the sets. 
AND, AND, AND – stammering. 
 
(Gilles Deleuze) 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
 
“The aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, 
 but to find the conditions under which 
something new is produced (creativeness)”1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Studies on the transgendered body, on trans identity, on being queer have 
been present as academic disciplines for decades. Trans communities have 
been expanding in several sectors of society and have gradually found 
ways to gain a wider degree of socio-political and cultural recognition due 
to both growing academic interest and to the increasing number of media 
representations that have without a doubt contributed to making trans 
subjectivity not only more accessible, but they have also helped, if only 
partially, relocate trans outside of that paradigm of mental health and 
sexual deviancy it was for so long associated with not only culturally, but 
also within specialised academic studies.2 Even though trans identities and 
ways of identifying with trans are generally more available, being trans 
remains a highly controversial position to find oneself in at various degrees 
pretty much anywhere in the world: not only does it come with various 
forms of social, cultural and political discriminations leading sometimes to 
more severe forms of violence, but it presents the individual with an 
ongoing set of challenges and compromises. On the one hand the urge to 
belong to the gender of choice, which often leads up to body alterations, on 
the other hand, the all too complex issue of transferring one’s individuality 
onto a category, that of trans, which comes with assumptions and 
                                                
1 Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet, Dialogues, Trans. by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987) p. Vvii 
2 See Susan Stryker’s account of CLAGS, 1995 in The Transgender Reader (Taylor & 
Francis, 2006) 
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implications that see trans always in the same fashion of body-mind 
misalignment, wrong body, perversion and psychiatric disorder. These 
identifications, supported and reinforced by cultural norms, produce 
normative models that re-direct the self in certain direction and stimulate 
one’s identity accordingly3. The increase of the multi-gendered and multi-
sexed societies of today, then, call for a new inclusive evaluation of gender 
that accounts for the ever-evolving possibilities of subjectivity.   
 
However, the institutionalisation of the term transgender as an ‘umbrella 
term’4 to encapsulate all forms of gender understandings that differ from 
what is thought to be gender norm and the inclusivity it calls for, have 
perhaps in some ways ceased to account for the specificity of the singular, 
thus offering a unifying vision of transgender as an associate of that 
category allowing generalising assumptions about trans individuals. Early 
studies of transgenderism describe trans individuals as “miserable souls” 
that “plough their lonely and unhappy run path through life”.5 In both 
theoretical and medical literature trans identity has been framed within a 
paradigm made of minority stress6, sense of awkwardness or discomfort, 7 
                                                
3 Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2002) 
4 The term ‘transgender’ first came into use in the mid-nineties and encompasses a variety 
of gender identifications: not just the small percentage that seeks gender reassignment 
(See: Femke Olysager and Lynn Coway, ‘On the Calculation of the Prelevance of 
Transsexualism’, presented at the WPATH 20th International Symposium, Chicago, 
Illinois, September 6, 2007), but also those who only partially seek bodily manipulation, i.e. 
take hormones, or simply identify with the opposite gender.  
5 John Hoenig, 'Etiology of transsexualism' in Betty W. Steiner (Ed.) Gender Dysphoria: 
Development, Research, and Management  (New York: Plenum, 1985) 
6 ‘Minority Stress’ is a term that expresses the social anxiety and stress provoked by 
experiences of prejudice, social hostility, rejection and homophobia. It first referred to 
homosexuality and the antigay stand and stigmatisation of LGB individuals, but the 
definition can today be extended to LGBTQ. Although transsexuality, like homosexuality, 
is no longer listed as a mental disease in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM), the stigma lives on and minority stress underlines chronic anxiety and 
discomfort deriving from social structures, norms and regulations that stigmatise certain 
biological, general, social or non social characteristics of a given minority, i.e. LGBTQ 
individuals. See Crocker J. ‘Social Stigma and Self-esteem: Situational Construction of Self-
worth’ in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1999; 35:89–107; Cole SW, Kemeny ME, 
Taylor SE, Visscher BR. ‘Accelerated Course of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection 
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self-dislike due to genitalia being “organ of hate and disgust”8, or 
dysfunctional mental health9. This has painted an image of negative 
emotions such as rage, loneliness, denial, self-refusal, pain which has been 
widely reflected in fictional transpositions where the transgender character 
is more often than not confined to the role of the disturbed, damaged, 
unstable or even violent and psychotic. This has not only pathologised the 
image of trans, as many have noticed,10 but has also turned it into a 
phenomenon, a sort of thing that requires special laws and special political 
investment to tackle and manage. 
 
My investment in this project is twofold: First, I am interested in looking at 
how the single transgender individual marks their own position inside and 
outside the boundaries of a category which often offers institutionalised 
and manufactured images of transgender identity and communities. What 
happens when trans resist the politics of identification that define and put 
forward certain social and political imaginaries? In other words:  
transgender as a category has the power to cross binary understandings of 
male and female and retains by definition a disruptive force which 
questions and challenges the very notion of gender as we know. Why does 
it then abide by the political and institutional “agenda” that operates for the 
displacement and normativisation of such potential, instead of actualising 
that force collectively? Could it not be more fruitful for a society on a 
collective level and more empowering for citizens on a private level, if we 
engaged with the challenges and complexities offered by the presence of 
                                                                                                                                   
in Gay Men Who Conceal their Homosexual Identity” in Psychosomatic Medicine, 
1996a;58:219–231; Crocker J, Major B, Steele C. ‘Social stigma’ in Gilbert D, Fiske ST, 
Lindzey G, editors. The Handbook of Social Psychology. 4. Boston: McGraw-Hill; 1998. pp. 
504–553 
7 Betty W. Steiner et al., Gender Dysphoria: Development, Research, Management (New York: 
Plenum 1985) 
8 Harry Benjamin, 'The Transsexual Phenomenon' in The International Journal of 
Transgenderism (1966) 
9 Billy Jones and Marjorie Hill, Mental Health Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
Communities (Amer Psychiatric Pub 2002) 
10 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (Taylor & Francis 2004) p.76 
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such a multi-faceted and multiple subjectivity? This is the first set of 
questions that I will attempt to answer.  
 
The second concern of this research - which is the condition by which the 
above formulations may be actualised - is the map of a new framework of 
understanding which accounts for the specificity of the single transgender 
individual - and of all the non gender-aligned subjectivities – and in that 
particular specificity finds an ally to put forward an affirmative way of 
unfolding its own singular narrative through individualisation instead of 
identification. Only by letting individualities appropriate and shake up the 
category - and ceasing to treat categories as given unquestionable entities 
thrown upon us from above - can we begin to formulate ethics of equality 
and inclusion that finally allow transgender to express itself and to 
participate actively in the discursive advancement of their subjectivity.  
 
≈ 
 
The term utopia is coined out of two Greek words: ou which means not and 
topos which means place.11 A no place, an imaginary place, nowhere. It also - 
though incorrectly - refers to the Greek term eu which means good, thus 
giving utopia a further connotation: the good place that does not exist12. 
The term was first used in 1516 by Thomas More13 and it is the picture of an 
imaginary island whose socio-political systems enjoy utmost perfection and 
efficiency. From here stems the association of utopia with fantasy and the 
idea that what is utopian has no relevance to real political life and thought. 
                                                
11 Oxford Dictionary of English: An imagined place or state of things in which everything 
is perfect. The opposite of dystopia. Origin: mid 16th century: based on Greek ou 'not' 
+ topos 'place'; the word was first used in the book Utopia (1516) by Sir Thomas More. 
12 Moritz Kaufmann: “What is a Utopia? Strictly speaking, it means a ‘nowhere Land’, 
some happy island far away, where perfect social relations prevail, and human beings, 
living under an immaculate constitution and a faultless government, enjoy a simple and 
happy existence, free from the turmoil, the harassing cares, and endless worries of actual 
life” Utopias (Kegan Paul: London 1879) 
13 Thomas More, Utopia (Penguin Classics 2007) 
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Accordingly, utopianism studies in the last century have for the most part 
highlighted such a limitation: utopia has been declined in terms of mere 
expression of fantastical transcendence, unrealistic hope, wishful dreams of  
“the construction of imaginary worlds, free from the difficulties that beset 
us in reality”.14 
 
So, what we have is utopia as the designation of something that is of the 
future, “the capacity to imagine a future that departs significantly from 
what we know to be a general condition in the present”.15 Something to 
come, something to approach with a degree of hopefulness, anticipation 
and expectation.  Almost a promise of something that will be, an event for 
which to prepare and get ready. In what follows I will argue that this notion 
of utopia as something of and from the future is emptied of its generative 
power. The idea of futurity attached to utopia, although it confers that 
hopeful push that can be seen as an proactive incentive, it can also be a 
deterrent that de-potentialises the active transformative force of utopia 
itself because of the connotations of something that is ‘not-yet’ and 
probably will never be. That ‘not-yet’ 16 is a moment of interruption that 
triggers a motion of expectation for something that might never happen or, 
if it does happen, it might never match that utopian expectation that it itself 
had pre-set.  
 
On the contrary, I contend that in order for utopia to be a generative force, 
it needs to be located in the present and be framed as an impulse of the 
now. My argument is that it is possible to think of an ethical utopianism 
that feeds from the materialism of everyday life and manifests itself as an 
act of the present, in the present and for the present. In such a vision I wish 
to put forward there is certainly a push towards the future, for the force of 
life itself presupposes an endeavour directed beyond the present; an 
                                                
14 Ruth Levitas, The concept of utopia (Peter Lang 2010) p.3 
15 John Friedman, ‘The Good City: In Defence of Utopian Thinking’ in International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 24, Issue 2, 460-472, June 2000 p. 462 
16 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope  (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press 1986) 
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underlying ideal of a ‘what is next’ that is imbedded in the very origin of 
utopianism. I place emphasis on the here and not the there, on the urgency of 
the now rather than on a conditional negotiation for a then for which we 
always seem to get ready but that never seems to come fully or, if it does 
come, it is never what we expected. “Only the present exists”, says Gilles 
Deleuze.17 Only if the radius of utopia can operate in the now, can it 
produce that active impulse that has the capacity to provoke 
change/difference/becoming. 
 
The work of Gilles Deleuze, as well as the work of Deleuze together with 
Félix Guattari, offers a radically new way for investigating the social and 
political stances through which transgender is understood and regulated. It 
is an alternative way of contextualising common notions of desire, self-
production and subjectivity through the ‘deterriotorialisation’ of ‘common 
sense’, the redefinition of the status quo that traditionally blocks (or slows 
down, or disciplines) change – that movement which for Deleuze 
constitutes the essence of life itself. The philosophy of Deleuze in the 
context of this research, then, will help outline a mode of thinking – an ethic 
- which allows for a new evaluation of utopianism, one that is deeply 
imbedded in the spatial configuration of a present that happens now. It is 
already happening. 
 
Conceptually, utopia takes us exactly there, into the world of the ethereal, 
of the ungraspable, of the abstract.  We are in the realm of a possibility that 
is located outside of the subject’s faculty, of something that is palpable yet 
not real, it is not here and not now. In one word: something transcendental. 
Deleuze’s dislike for the philosophy of transcendence is well-documented.18  
This alone could be a good enough reason not to have Deleuze and utopia 
in the same sentence. Such dislike comes from Deleuze’s objection that 
                                                
17 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (London, New York: Continuum: 2004) p. 105 
18 In 1963 Deleuze wrote Kant Critical Philosophy, which he later called ‘a book on an 
enemy’.  
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identity is representational. Deleuze explains that it was through Descartes 
and Kant that philosophy developed on the doxa of the transcendental 
mode of recognition. “It was Kant [who] seemed equipped to overturn the 
Image of thought”.19 For Kant, the ‘I’ object always depends on an idea of 
an a priori ‘I’, the ‘I’ subject from which Kant derives the principles of pure 
understanding. With Kant, says Deleuze, “difference becomes an object of 
representation always in relation to a conceived identity. And judged 
analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude”.20 If, for Kant, 
identity is the result of that initial thought of the I object that represents it’s 
a priori thinking ‘I’, Deleuze, by contrast, offers “a fundamental 
encounter”,21 which is the ontological occurrence of being by means of 
difference. The problem of recognition and the implications it has on 
transgender subjectivity is paramount and will be focus of extensive 
analysis in chapter 3.	   
 
In this research, I contend that through the work of Deleuze it is possible to 
redefine the very notion of utopia – and thus utopianism – to the point that 
it collimates with the Deleuzian notion of superior empiricism,22 a mode of 
being which activates “real” experience and reconnects with the unique and 
multiple passions in our world, “where the abstract does not explain but 
must itself be explained”.23 In one word, the world of possibilities, through 
which it is possible to understand the multiplicity of singularity. I have here 
employed the term possibility in two similar contexts, yet their significance 
is fundamentally different: we will be able to see how the very definition of 
possibility changes through Deleuze and becomes ‘real experience’. No 
longer something to hope for, but rather, the empirical manifestation – 
actualisation in Delezian terms - of a passion that is already happening. 
 
                                                
19 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p. 134 
20 Ibid. p. 138. 
21 Ibid. p. 139 
22 David Lane, On the ‘Utopianism’ of Deleuze’s Thought (June 2008) 
23 Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet, Dialogues, op. cit. p.vii 
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This research wishes to overcome the imperialism of categories - “the one 
that becomes two”24 - and instead aims to embrace the understanding of 
subjectivity as a mode of multiplicity. The principle of multiplicity – 
foundation of Deleuze’s thought - is a heterogeneous one made of 
connections, affects and active forces. When we talk of multiplicity, as we 
will understand, we are referring to a structure of possibilities that 
encompasses “all the possible states that a system can have”25 and whose 
heterogeneous action cuts through the regimes of dialectical relationships 
where “one operates in the object, the other in the subject”,26 it expands 
beyond that stiff circle of recognition and encounters chaos.  
 
Subjectivity, in this vision, does not rely on identification but on 
individuation, which is a creative process through which one has the 
possibility of becoming nothing other than what one is. Transgender has the 
unique potential to supersede the body/mind configuration simply because 
its orientation obliterates that split and opens to relations that must 
necessarily reconsider and challenge the feminist reliance on sex/gender 
(anatomy/social) in favour of an individual and creative relationship with 
gender. Such relationship changes according to the individual and struggles 
to be fairly represented by the logic of categorical identities. It needs to be 
considered as the relational encounter with oneself and therefore with 
multiplicity, that is, the exposure to interferences – the lines – affects and 
relations. It is not the “one that becomes two, then of the two that become 
four”,27 it “has neither subject nor object”28 and stands “beyond any 
opposition between the one and the subject”.29 No longer ideas, positions 
and morals, for these operate in the structured realm of “biunivocal 
                                                
24 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (London, New York: Continuum 
2004) p.5 
25 Manuel DeLanda, 'Space: Extensive and Intensive, Actual and Virtual' in Ian Buchanan 
and Gregg Lambert (eds) Deleuze and Space  (Edinburgh University Press 2005) p. 83 
26 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus Op. cit. p.6 
27 Ibid. p.5 
28 Ibid. p.9 
29 Ibid. p.170 
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relationships”;30 but concepts, affects and ethics that travel by means of 
“abstract lines”31 that “traverse like arrows”32 and, most importantly, in the 
dynamical space of the outside. Out of the binary, out of dichotomies, out of 
any parallelisms, out of any hierarchies, and straight in the middle of chaos 
where other multiplicities are encountered and transformed in a constant 
mode of becoming. 
 
≈ 
 
Influenced by the medical tradition, transsexuality has traditionally been 
associated with the idea of the ‘wrong body’ that explains transsexual 
embodiment as an error, where the body (biological sex) is not in agreement 
with gender identity.33 The desire for re-embodiment for those who feel so 
tragically misrepresented by their bodies is still in control of medical 
technologies, which creates a great deal of cultural anxiety and 
misunderstanding around transsexual practices.34 Furthermore, the 
historical tension between medical and social science as to the true 
aetiology of transsexuality has created further discrimination against this 
‘category’ and has consequently split the debate into those who understand 
transsexuality as a biological inborn trait and those who, on the contrary, 
have argued that it is a condition that is connected to psychological issues 
like personality disorder and, as such, it needed to be treated, often even 
through forced treatments, such as drugged detention, electroconvulsive 
therapy or psychosurgery such as lobotomy.  
 
Medicine has thus tended to explain transsexuality as “an illusion, a 
fabrication whose explanation must therefore be sought in terms other than 
                                                
30 Ibid. p.9 
31 Ibid. 
32 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus Op. cit. p.9 
33 See The International Journal of Transgenderism, Volume 5, Number 2, April - June 2001 
http://www.symposion.com/ijt/cauldwell 
34 See Phyllis Burke, Gender Shock: Exploring the Myths of Male and Female (New York: 
Doubleday 1996) 
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the putative ‘thing’ itself”.35 With the exception of some sexologists such as 
Harry Benjamin,36 who strongly supported the view that transsexualism 
was a form of intersex condition rather than a psychological pathology, 
most of the early medical literature on gender identity seems to be oriented 
to creating a trajectory between gender dysphoria and mental instability, 
and the approach to gender issues research was usually influenced by a 
psycho-pathological tradition. Harry Benjamin, was one of the first 
endocrinologists and sexologists to recognise the complexities of gender 
identity and to offer an alternative to the psychological approach; in The 
Transsexual Phenomenon (1966), he argued that treating gender identity 
disorders through psychotherapy, attempting to ‘fix’ the deviance and 
curing the disorder is highly improper, as the mind cannot be adjusted to 
the body.  According to Benjamin, the condition of transsexuality was such 
that the only possible ‘cure’ was the conversion, and to assume that 
psychotherapy can fix the mind is to harm the patient.37 He wrote: 
“Intersexes exist, in body as well as in mind. I have seen too many 
transsexual patients to let their picture and their suffering be obscured by 
uninformed albeit honest opposition”. Benjamin set a new path for the 
understanding of gender dysphoria: his work has helped understand that 
gender identity dysphoria is not a delusional reaction to societal norms and 
should therefore be treated separately from other mental disorders. 
Although there is no clear explanation on what exactly causes gender 
identity disorders, thanks to Harry Benjamin’s work, it is now believed that 
it is a non-delusional, deep-seated, biological condition that must be treated 
with sex reassignment.38 
 
                                                
35 Richard Ekins, Dave King, Blending Genders: Contributions to the Emerging Field of 
Transgender, Vol.1, Number 1 (The International Journal of Transgenderism 1997) 
36 In 1977 the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA) was 
established to create the ‘standards of care’ for ‘The Hormonal and Surgical Reassignment 
of Gender Dysphorica Persons’. 
37 Harry Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon, op. cit.   
38 Anne Vitale, Notes on Sexism in the Male-to-Female Transsexual, October 1997 
http://www.avitale.com/MTFSexism.htm 
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The term ‘transexual’ was allegedly coined in 1949 by neuro-psychiatrist 
David Cauldwell who used the term ‘psychopatia transexualis’ to refer to 
“individuals who wish to be members of the sex to which they do not 
properly belong”39. Quite incredibly, however, decades before David 
Claudwell officially named ‘transsexuality’, the German physician and 
sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld published in 1922 a sexual pathologies 
manual 40 which contains the first testimony of surgical treatment of  
Rudolph and Felix, two people effected by ‘inversion’ who had respectively  
a bilateral mastectomy and a penectomy.41 In Transvestism and Sex Role 
Inversion 42 (1961), Dr. Daniel C. Brown speaks of transsexualism as a term 
related to ‘sex role inversion’, specifically meaning that this type of invert 
wants or receives surgical alteration of his genitals. He also uses ‘inversion’ 
to explain practices linked with transvestism, transsexualism, and 
homosexuality. Inversion is here understood as that embodied condition 
where individuals identify with the opposite sex. 
 
These and other cases inversion show how, through medicine and sexology, 
transsexual identity was slowly becoming evident in the late nineteenth 
century and throughout the twentieth. Of course, one cannot deny that the 
transsexual narrative is not very tightly linked to the medical tradition 
because of the nature of the transition itself. Yet the embodiment 
experience, that is, the act of appropriating and inhabiting the body, 
requires a whole different framework of significance in the ‘making’ of a 
new subjectivity (transsexual subjectivity) which existed before being 
constructed through technology.  
 
                                                
39 David O. Cauldwell, 'Psychopathia Transexualis' in Sexology, 16 (1949) p.275 
40 Magnus Hirschfeld, 'Sexualpathologie' in Sexual Zwischenstufen Vol 2 (1922) 
41 Originally published in Sexual Pathologie: Ein Lehrbuch Für Artze und Studierende (1922) 
and cited in Ira Pauly, 'Adult Manifestations of Female Transexualism' in Transexualism and 
Sex Reassignment, ed. Richard Green and John Money (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press 1969) p.59 
42 Daniel C. Brown, 'Transvestism and Sex Role Inversion' in The Encyclopedia of Sexual 
Behavior (Hawthorne Books 1961) 
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The first known case of ‘gender inversion’ – as it was then named – goes 
back to 1864 when a German female wrote a letter to sexologist Karl 
Westphal saying that she wished to be a man. This is considered to be the 
first example of ‘female inversion’.43 A case study followed in 1869 and 
Doctor Karl Westphal published a research where the phenomenon of 
‘Contrary Sexual Feeling’ was described not as a form of deviant 
homosexuality but as a type of transsexuality. This diagnosis comes when 
the concepts of transgender and transsexual did not exist and indeed marks 
the first medical attempt to address the issue of being differently gendered 
(transgender) and confronting the desire to change sex. This suggests that 
even before transsexuality emerged as a subject on its own, ‘inversion’ 
operated in territories that would later be embraced by transsexual 
discourses.  
 
From the case histories presented by Westphal, Cauldwell, Hirschfeld and 
others, it appears that transsexuality – ‘inversion’ still – was to some extent 
considered to be an embodied and inborn condition, given also the 
modalities of its manifestation which were not directly visible or tangible 
on the body. Despite that, it was still approached as a psychiatric disease. In 
the 1900s, following the first sex-change cases of Christine Jorgensen (1922) 
and Michael Dillon (1928/29), the term ‘inversion’ was slowly replaced by 
the term ‘transsexual’.  The concomitant association of transsexual practices 
with psychopathological discourses also marked the beginning of a new 
narrative for transgender.  
 
                                                
43 Female inversion here refers to a woman who felt to be a man since childhood. Inversion, 
as the desire to belong to the opposite sex, opened up a terrain for both ‘feminine men’ and 
‘female masculinities’. Female Inverts  were usually described as boyish, nervy, having 
deep voices and the ability to whistle (Ellis, 1897). For a full account on the history of 
female inversion and ‘female masculinities’, see Claudia Breger, 'Feminine Masculinities: 
Scientific and Literary Representations of "Female Inversion" at the Turn of the Twentieth 
Century' in Journal of the History of Sexuality 14, 1/2, pp.76-106 (University of Texas Press 
2005) 
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Since the 1960s and the 1970s there has been a proliferation of trans 
literature that has covered a variety of approaches, yet it has always ended 
up confronting the same historical debate on transsexuality (and later 
transgender) behaviour within a clinical context. On the one hand, 
researchers (sexologists, psychiatrists, endocrinologists) have tried to find a 
cause and a cure for transsexuality and gender dysphoria in general, which 
has led to a number of theories and fabrications on the body and the psyche 
of transsexuals as being congenitally deviant. Furthermore, a new 
awareness of gender dysphoria discourses has also led to a refusal of that 
preponderant medical-psychiatric literature, and the social engagement 
with gender diversity has originated a series of debates on what it actually 
means to be trans, and the different ways people who identify as trans 
negotiate their position in every day discourse. 
 
It is important to understand the difference between the terms ‘transgender’ 
and ‘transsexual’, as they are often used interchangeably but refer in fact to 
two distinctive sexual identities. ‘Transsexual’ refers to a drastic and total 
opposition between biological sex and gender identity where the physical 
body does not represent the gender identity. In order to align the external 
body with the ‘inner body’ and fulfil the desire to be and function (not only 
appear) as members of the opposite sex, transsexuals undergo medical 
treatments such as hormone replacement therapies or gender re-
assignment. The term ‘transsexual’ does not indicate sexual orientation, i.e., 
preferences for a partner of the same or opposite gender. Transsexuals may 
in fact identify as gay, lesbian, straight or asexual. ‘Transgender’ is a more 
general term which includes various types of gender ambiguity: behaviour, 
visual embodiment, enactments, identity.44 ‘Transgender’ is based on a 
more modern vision of gender identities as diverse and multiple therefore 
hardly identifiable within a female/male gender binary paradigm.  
                                                
44 The terms embodiment and enactments are here understood as tangible or visible bodily 
manifestations of an inner condition. More specifically, ‘gender embodiment’ refers to a 
certain way of physically presenting oneself, a way that represents an internal sexual and 
gender identity. 
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≈ 
Within radical feminist theory, the transgender subject has often been 
blamed for perpetuating gender roles divisions in society. The presence of 
transgender in feminist spaces has been much criticised and many post-
modern feminist theories have emphasised the constructiveness of the 
transsexual body and the medical nature of its origin and have seen this 
condition as a threat to the development of the female position in the 
hierarchy of society. In The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male, 45 
for example, Janice Raymond argues that “all transsexuals rape women’s 
bodies by reducing the real female form to artefact, appropriating this body 
for themselves”.46 Raymond paints a picture where the transsexual is 
portrayed as an infiltrate whose ambition is to enter women’s narrative and 
deprive the category (of women) of its socio-political power with the only 
aim to affirm patriarchal values. Medical technologies, as a consequence of 
that, would be guilty of promoting the perpetuation of this patriarchal 
establishment. 
 
Raymond’s critique is concerned with two main questions: first, she argues 
that medical practices ‘construct’ women according to men models: 
“Transsexuals are living out two patriarchal myths: single parenthood by 
the father (male mothering) and the making of woman according to man's 
image”.47 Second, she claims that transsexuality’s only aim is to ‘colonise’ 
women, “feminist identification, culture, politics and sexuality”.48 Through 
the production of transsexuality, medical sciences have created an 
alternative (non natural) woman category which attacks and threatens 
biological women. She goes on to explain that the mutilation of the penis in 
transsexuals is then to be considered only a further act of appropriation of 
women’s narratives. 
                                                
45 Janice Raymond, The Transexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male (Boston: Beacon 1979) 
p.104 
46 Raymond, The Transexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male Op. cit p.104 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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“Because (MTF) transsexuals have lost their physical ‘members’ 
does not means that they have lost their ability to penetrate 
women – women’s mind, women’s sexuality. Transsexuals 
merely cut off the most obvious means of invading women, so 
that they seem non-invasive”.49 
 
 
Besides being characterised by a distinctive narrow-mindness towards the 
transsexual subject in her lack of consideration of gender diversity beyond , 
Raymond’s account never really attempts to analyse transsexuality’s 
implications on gender. Moreover, her argument fails to include a 
comprehensive examination of a range of people. Rather, it is merely 
concerned with fighting against the transsexual category as a whole. 
Perhaps a more complete consideration of the implications of social 
categories (such as class and race) might have on the construction of a 
medical condition would have made her analysis more theoretically solid. 
Raymond was not alone in her hostility: in fact the dispute between radical 
feminists and transsexual individuals had begun in 1973 in Los Angeles 
when, at the West Coast Lesbian Conference, key speaker Robin Morgan 
proclaimed:  
 
“I will not call a male “she”; thirty-two years of suffering in this 
androcentric society, and of surviving, have earned me the title 
“woman”; one walk down the street by a male transvestite, five 
minutes of his being hassled (which he may enjoy), and then he 
dares, he dares to think he understands our pain? No, in our 
mothers’ names and in our own, we must not call him sister”.50 
 
And again: 
 
“Where the Man in concerned, we must not be separate fingers 
but one fist … I charge him as an opportunist, an infiltrator, and 
a destroyer – with the mentality of a rapist. And you know who 
he is. You can let him into your workshops – or you can deal 
with him”.51 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
50 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/woman-2 
51 Clarke A. Pomerleau, Califia Women: Feminist Education against Sexism, Classism, and 
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In Changing Sex, Bernice Hausman52 examines the relation between 
trassexuality and endocrinology and points out a dependence of the 
transsexual on medical technologies. Hausman argues that “transsexuals 
must seek and obtain medical treatment in order to be recognised as 
transsexuals. Their subject position depends upon a necessary relation to 
the medical establishment and its discourse”.53 Her idea is that medical 
technology conceptualises the category of transsexual by creating the 
cultural condition necessary to produce demand for sex-change, thus 
fabricating  ‘subjects’ (through a series of physical interventions) which 
identify themselves as transsexuals. This ‘construction’ is at the base of the 
concept of ‘gender identity’ which, in Hausman’s view, is cultural rather 
than natural. “It is through an analysis of the emergence of transsexualism 
in relation to the developing medical technologies of ‘sex change’ that we 
can trace the introduction of ‘gender’ as a term referring to the social 
articulations of sexed identity”.54 
 
By stating that ‘transsexual’ is a constructed gender category, Hausman 
invests medical practices with ideological power, yet she fails to explain 
what makes doctors decide whether to construct females or males. 
Moreover, it seems that Hausman’s account , and in particular the stress she 
puts on the idea of ‘constructed  identity’ as opposed to ‘natural identity’, 
de-legitimaises the condition of  transsexual, as it dismisses transsexual 
subjectivity as ‘non authentic’ or better, not as authentic as ‘real men’ and 
‘real women’, thus portraying transsexual subjects as “modern technology’s 
experiments”55 with no authority over their feelings (because not authentic) 
                                                                                                                                   
Racism (The University of Texas Press 2013) p.28 
52 Bernice Hausman, Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender 
(Durham: Duke University Press 1995) 
53 Hausman, Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender, op. cit. p.1 
54 Ibid. p.196 
55 Jay Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narrative of Transsexuality (Columbia University Press 
1998) p.8 
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and placing them in opposition to nontranssexuals (who, on the contrary, 
are regarded as authentic, real, non constructed, authoritative, worthy).  
 
Similarly, Dwight Billings and Thomas Urban (1982)56 understand 
transsexualism as a ‘mutilation’ where gender-disturbed individuals are 
forced by the medical establishment to undergo a political process of re-
construction which only serves to regulate power. They argue that 
transsexuality is a constructed product “sustained in medical practice and 
marketed in public testimony”.57 Furthermore, in their view, sex 
reassignment surgery tends to depoliticize social gender practices and 
classify physical and mental care as a social regulatory force. 
 
These accounts (Janice Raymond, Bernice Hausman, Dwight Billings and 
Thomas Urban) show a similar perspective that tends to sidestep 
discussions on trans embodiment and the relationship between body and 
the self. Rather, they are concerned with systems of power and the way in 
which power impacts on collectiveness through the single body. What 
seems to be common to these critiques is a general idea that transgender 
subjects (the fabrication of transgender identities by medical technologies) 
function within a constructed (and controlled) system of power which 
perpetuates gender binary classifications and promotes radical separatism 
between transgender and non-transgender. Moreover, especially in 
Raymond’s account, biological women are considered to be oppressed by 
transsexual and this victimism automatically places them and their 
narratives onto a dominant position thus obscuring transgender discourse. 
 
In this context, I would like to take into consideration Claudine Griggs’ 
experience. In her boo-diary, S/He, Changing Sex and Changing Clothes, 58 she 
                                                
56 Dwight Billings and Thomas Urban, 'The Socio-Medical Construction of Transsexualism: 
an Interpretation and Critique' in Social Problems, 29 (1982) pp.266-282 
57 Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narrative of Transsexuality, op. cit. p.266 
58 Claudine Griggs, S/He, Changing Sex and Changing Clothes (Berg Publishers: Oxford, New 
York 1998) 
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detaches herself from the cultural debate around transsexuality and rejects 
the need for the emergence of a transsexual identity arguing that “it is 
better to be scorned as an effeminate man or masculine woman than to be 
sexually indecipherable”.59 Her account is invested with personal meaning 
and it is often almost impossible to discern her critical views from her anger 
and social frustration when she writes: “while I accept my transsexualism 
as fact, I do not expect that I shall ever be dispassionate about it. I am not an 
advocate of sex change procedures. I know that sex reassignment is 
necessary for some individuals with gender dysphoria in much the same 
way as a radical mastectomy is necessary for some individuals with breast 
cancer… The best recommendation, though pointless, is don’t get cancer 
and don’t be transsexual”60. Nonetheless, Griggs’ report highlights a human 
condition of impotence and terror which exists regardless of the 
medical/social science discussion, and perhaps it suggests that future 
studies on transsexuality should not focus on that debate, rather, they 
should consider the subjectivity of individuals.  If transsexuality exists 
exclusively as a result of technologies, then the opposite can be equally true 
and in order to be able to undergo sex reassignment it is necessary to “to 
obtain the medical intervention I am seeking, I need to prove my 
membership in the category ‘transsexual’, prove that I have GID, to the 
proper authorities”.61  
 
Feminist theory’s concern on how gendered structures of power operate in 
society and how they influence our understanding of race, sexuality and 
class marks a significant contribution to queer theory and cultural studies in 
general. However, I believe that some of the most conservative feminist 
preoccupations with ‘preserving’ the female body from trans contamination 
under the assumption that biology is destiny  (Raymond, in particular, 
argues that transsexualism produces alternative women - as opposed to 
                                                
59 Griggs, S/He, Changing Sex and Changing Clothes, op. cit. p.3 
60 Ibid. 
61 Dean Spade, Mutilating Gender (Spring 2000) 
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biological women – that violate femininity and disrupt women’s identity)62 
and that femininity cannot be performed but only embodied as an innate 
condition only serves to create friction between two theoretical parties 
which could otherwise work towards the same goal. Transgender 
subjectivity does in fact contribute to the wider feminist project of 
denaturalising binary gender constructions by promoting an understanding 
of gendered bodies that challenges gender hegemony. The transgender 
constrained condition and the ongoing dichotomy between internal identity 
and external manifestation and reception should be a point of coalition 
rather than rivalry. As Braidotti, Grosz, Halberstam, Spade and other 
feminist scholars suggest, feminist theory should operate in alliance with 
trans theory to create an alternative narrative which transcends ideas of 
knowledge and power and instead looks at gender identity as a process of 
becoming rather than a systematic trajectory. Drawing on a post-stucturalist 
framework and faithful to a Spinozan monistic understanding of 
subjectivity, they introduce an idea of self based on the unification of mind 
and body rather than the hierarchical positioning of a mind that indorms 
the body. This is indeed a concern of this thesis and this research aims to 
unfold the layers of theoretical meaning that have been covering the 
material experience of transsexual. This will be fully examined in chapters 2 
and 5.  
 
In the early 1990s a new narrative started to unfold: the seminal work of 
Sandy Stone63 for the first time, in the turbulent political climate of those 
years, prompted transsexual individuals to no longer live in fear of their 
identities; hiding would only aggravate the difficulties of their status, 
rather, “reading oneself aloud”64 could be a weapon to self-empowerment. 
As the title suggests, The Empire Strikes Back, came as a response to Janice 
                                                
62 Raymond, The Transexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male, op. cit. p.100 
63 Sandy Stone, 'The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto' in Body Guards: The 
Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity , ed. Julia Epstain and Kristina Straub (New York: 
Routelegdge 1991) pp.280-304 
64 Ibid. 
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Raymond’s The Transsexual Empire and for the first time encouraged 
transsexuals to come out and write their own story, rather than hide behind 
gay and lesbian activism which, at that time, tended to hide transsexual 
issues. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle comment: “Stone exacts her 
revenge more than a decade later, not by waging an anti-feminist 
counterattack on Raymond, but by undermining the fundamentalist 
assumptions that support Raymond's narrower concept of womanhood, 
and by claiming a speaking position for transsexuals that cannot be 
automatically dismissed as damaged, deluded, second-rate, or somehow 
inherently compromised”.65 
 
“I could not ask a transsexual for anything more inconceivable 
than to forgo passing, to be consciously "read", to read oneself 
aloud--and by this troubling and productive reading, to begin to 
write oneself into the discourses by which one has been written--
in effect, then, to become a [look out-- dare I say it again?] 
posttranssexual”.66  
 
 
What Stone suggests is that the current discourse for transsexuality, be it 
medical, legal or even autobiographical, is in danger of rewriting a story 
that only partially fulfils its necessity for a new logic wherein to reposition 
itself. This happens, in Stone’s view, because the precarious present 
condition of this subjectivity necessitates an authoritative story that can cast 
a degree of certain on the future.67 I extend this to a broader consideration 
of transgender and concur by saying that a counter-discourse can only 
generate if we can get out of the paradigm of identity  - gender being at the 
forefront of this discourse – as an instrumental tool for political control. 
Stone’s innovative article opened up to “a gradual but steady body of new 
academic and creative work by transgender people has gradually taken 
shape, which has enriched virtually every academic and artistic discipline 
                                                
65 Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle, The Transgender Studies Reader (New York: Routledge 
2006) 
66 Stone, The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto, op. cit.  
67 Stone, The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto, op. cit. p.163  
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with new critical perspectives on gender”.68  
 
In the wake of this new vision, a series of new formulations have begun to 
populate the debate. The work of Leslie Feinberg69 and Kate Bornstein70 put 
forward the foundations for what was no longer transsexual studies, but 
transgender studies: a new inclusive way of looking at trans issue that 
brought together a variety of gender-variant people who did not identified 
in the binary system, which, until that moment, was the only paradigm 
used to contextualise transgender. The fact that for the first time trans 
people were talking about trans issues meant that a new story could finally 
begin to come through and capture the real lives of trans people as it is felt 
and experienced by trans people themselves. These new studies 
acknowledged that transgender are unable to take up neatly one of the 
other gender and that, because of this impossibility, there was a political 
attempt to force them into the male/female system and the medical 
regulations to resolve transsexuality were seen as the main way politics 
tried to naturalise transgender.71 Moreover, the fact that many transgender 
do not identify in the binary system does not mean that these individuals 
do not feel men or women. It means that their experience of manhood and 
womanhood is not aligned with that contained by normativity. They may 
only partially identify, or they may understand gender differently, as this 
thesis will show later, and to deem these subjectivities wrong suggests that 
what is not approved by the binary is not validated. This, however, creates 
a fracture within transgender communities because, as Namaste suggests,72 
many transpeople do identify within the binary and the rejection that goes 
on from others within the same communities becomes problematic to them, 
                                                
68 Ibid. 
69 Leslie Feinberg, Stone Butch Blues (San Francisco: Firebrand Books 1993) and Transgender 
Warriors: Making History (Boston: Beacon Press 1996) 
70 Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women, and the Rest of Us (New York City: 
Routledge 1994)  
71 Talia Mae Bettcher, 'Trapped in the Wrong Theory: Rethinking Oppression and 
Resistance' in Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol.39, no.21 (2014) 
72 Viviane K. Namaste, Sex Change, Social Change: Reflections on Identity, Institutions and 
Imperialism (Toronto: Women’s Press 2005) p.7 
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as it creates resistance and oppositions towards a binary they do not find 
oppressive. 73  
 
Alongside these considerations that highlighted how the category of 
transsexuality as it had thus far been considered was in fact populated by 
different subjectivities, and all with the same need for validation, Jay 
Prosser questioned the way in which gender had been theorised within 
queer theory. When Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity 
appeared in 199074, queer theory seemed to have finally found a theoretical 
outlet that considered gender no longer as a natural trait one is born into, 
but as a choice that could be made only by performing it. In other words: 
Drawing on Foucault’s discipline discourse and the regulative nature of 
power75, Butler maintains that gender is the expression of an internalised 
norm that is constructed rather than inborn and that the performance of 
gender is what creates that gender. This means that gender coherence, that 
is, female-feminine-attracted to men, is not an inborn instinct but the result 
of the repetition of that association in time. While this offered a new 
perspective of gender fluidity to queer theory, Prosser raises a concern with 
Butler’s theory. The paradigm according to which gender is a fluid act of 
performance, a mere construction legitimised by repetition and authorised 
by norm, does not do justice to those transsexual subjectivities who strive 
for a sense of unity and whose journey is one of integrity rather than 
displacement. Prosser wants to make sure that the theories on the 
constructedness of gender do not loosen the tension on the materiality of 
the body as the founding condition of the specificity of trans subjectivity. 
Moreover, to envision gender as an act one takes up and performs, too, 
means to delegitimise and invalidates the lived experience of those 
                                                
73  These variations within the same category led later on to a series of terminologies which, 
within the same community, define different degrees of gender identification, pre-
operation, post-operation, genderqueer, trans*. This, as Talia Mae Bettcher suggests, is an 
indication that theory was outdone by practice. (Talia Mae Bettcher, Trapped in the Wrong 
Theory: Rethinking Oppression and Resistance, op.cit. p. 385)  
74 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge 1990) 
75 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Vintage Book 1977) 
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transgender individuals for whom gender, on the contrary, is an irreducible 
question of matter. Far from an act they perform, it is the expression of the 
materiality of a body that cannot be reduced to a performance – it does not 
have that choice – but that is called, day-by-day, to confront the specificity 
of that skin.76 This aspect of the transgender lived experience and the 
irreducible corporeality of bodies will be analysed later through the life 
narratives of some transgender individuals who, every day, struggle to 
concile their problematic corporeality with a sense of self that, to them, is 
resolved  - integral, to use a term dear to Prosser - but which is constantly 
doubt, delegitimised and fragmented. 
 
≈ 
 
The construct of subjectivity as the result of a phenomenological 
constitution of meaning informed by bodily perception had already been 
the primary focus of Marcel Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy.77 He comments 
on the phenomenon of mixed-gender embodiment78 saying that “a patient 
feels a second person implanted in his body. He is a man in half his body, a 
woman in the other half.79 This brief remark contains the two main 
arguments worthy of attention. First of all, as Salamon notes, it refers to the 
trans individual as a patient, automatically locating trans in a clinical 
context. I add, however, that this can be justified by the fact that in 1945, 
                                                
76 Prosser, Second Skins: The Body Narrative of Transsexuality, op. cit. 
77 In Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty develops the notion of the body-
subject. He proposes the idea that consciousness is not the result of that mutually-informed 
relationship between body and mind, rather, a sort of distillate of what the body perceives 
in experience. Such perception is constitutive of consciousness, that is, its perspective (the 
perspective it gives on felt experience) is not a limit, but it is precisely what determines 
subjectivity. This leads to a theory of corporeity that, alternatively to the Cartesian Cogito, 
envisions the body as the primary condition of experience: no only a container that serves 
as a mirror to the mind, but a leading organ whose experience is constitutive of 
consciousness.  
78 The expression ‘mixed-gender embodiment’ is borrowed from Gayle Salamon, Assuming 
a Body. Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality”  (New York: Columbia University Press 
2010) p.43 
79 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , Trans. Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge 1962) p.88 
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when Merleau-Ponty was writing, transsexuality was still very much 
regarded as a psychiatric condition. Secondly, it is the normative neat 
distinction he makes between half man and half woman, indicating the 
phenomenological embodiment of the perfect binarism in terms.  Salamon 
reads this ambiguity not as phobic neglect of difference, but as a conscious 
decision to blur that divide between man and woman80 which should be 
regarded – Grosz concurs – as a “an attempt to destabilize the structure of 
binary oppositions…rather than valorize one of the other side”81 by 
occupying that space between body and mind, a movement that links the 
two and that he calls perception.  
 
Deleuze’s criticism of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology lies in the challenge 
posed by immanence.82 Such challenge, as expressed by Deleuze himself in 
“Empiricism and Subjectivity”83 and “What is Philosphy?”,84 stems from the 
fact that phenomenology cannot resolve the question posed by ontology. 
Grosz prudently says that for Merleau-Ponty the body is “both immanent 
and transcendent”85 insofar as it is not an object, but it is the condition and 
primary context of my experience and of my access to space, yet there is a 
condition of transcendence because the production of meaning is located 
outside the body, seen here as an instrument through which I experience 
knowledge.   This dislocation is, in essence, the main problem Deleuze finds 
in phenomenology. In the first instance, he understands phenomenology as 
a step backwards from the plane of immanence (“a study of the appearance 
of being to consciousness”)86, that is, it brings back thinking consciousness 
                                                
80 Gayle Salamon, Assuming a Body. Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality”  (New York: 
Columbia University Press 2010) pp. 43-55 
81 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies. Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Indiana University Press 
1994) p.93 
82 Leonard Lawlor, 'The End of Phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Marleau-
Ponty' in Continental Philosophy Review 31: 15-34 (1998) p. 15 
83 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: 
Columbia University Press 1991)  
84 Gilles Deleuze, What is Philosophy? (London, New York: Verso 1994)  
85 Grosz, Volatile Bodies. Toward a Corporeal Feminism, op. cit. p.86  
86 Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit. p.61  
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in the constitution of the subject. The subject undergoes a mediation with 
the agent that is supposed to give it perception (by means of experience). “ 
We ask: how can there be a given, how can something be given to a subject, 
and how can the subject give something to itself?”87 The relation that the 
body has to the objects it experiences is perspectival and it depends on 
perception, which means that it varies from object to object, but it always 
excludes (or limits) the experience of the body as self: “as for my body, I do 
not observe it itself: in order to do that it would be necessary to have the 
disposal of a second body which itself would not be observable”.88 The 
body-subject - “my being-to-the-world”89 – moves away from a Cartesian 
vision of the submissive body victim of the mind and emphasises the active 
role of the body in processing experience. Yet it presupposes that 
experience – that is, the creation of consciousness – generates from the 
perception of any given belief which reduces the totality of the plane of 
immanence to relative immanence (immanence relative to consciousness). 
“We are no longer satisfied with thinking immanence as immanent to a 
transcendent; we want to think transcendent within the immanent, and it is 
from immanence that a breach is expected”.90 This passage requires a 
deeper engagement that I will undertake in the second chapter. For now, it 
is important to consider that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, for Deleuze, 
does not resolve the dualism of the Cogito91 precisely because experience is 
mediated by a perception given outside of the subject. By contrast, 
subjectivity stems from “radical empiricism”92which can only happen in 
                                                
87 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, op. cit. p.87 
88 M. Marceau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit. p.107 
89 Grosz, Volatile Bodies. Toward a Corporeal Feminism, op. cit. p.87 
90 Deleuze, What is Philosophy? op. cit. p.47 
91 Cogito is René Descartes’ rationalist construction of the ‘I think therefore I am’ (Discourse 
on Method). Deleuze’s critique of the Cogito, as James Williams points out, “can be divided 
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92 Ibid. p. 47 
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pure immanence, the only condition for life and whose sole condition is 
“the habit of saying I.”93 
 
≈ 
 
The existence of trans – whether it is contextualised within a medical 
framework or, as we will see later, mediated by legal understanding - 
develops in opposition to a pressing ideal of heteronormativity and to 
institutions such as that of family; its problematic social location and 
identification make it a phenomenon that strongly relies on movement and 
spatiality. Part of what makes trans so compelling is not so much its breach 
of nature through the manipulation of the body and its biology, but the 
unique form of communication and self-description it carries within itself 
and which retain the potential of opening up a new narrative and 
alternative possibility for the very notion of gender and for all LGBT 
advocacy and its relations to space.94 As I have thus far anticipated in this 
introduction, the theoretical framework of understanding in my research is 
such that trans emerges as an independent figure and not as an identity 
formed on exclusion/inclusion mechanisms, nor on any dichotomised 
understanding of body/mind. The five chapters of this PhD will serve each 
to zoom into a particular aspect of trans subjectivity and consider the 
various challenges it represents while, at the same time, attempting to offer 
new trajectories for a theoretical consideration based on the material 
temporality of the now as the only possibility for an ethical present (and 
future) of equality.  
 
The first and second chapters are the methodological and theoretical 
foundations of this research.  The first gives an account of my theoretical 
and empirical methodology: In the first part of this chapter I explain why 
the work of Gilles Deleuze can lend itself to a consideration of utopian 
                                                
93 Ibid. p.4 8 
94 Judith Halberstam, Female Masculinity (Duke University Press 1998) 
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ethics as a mode of the present. These preliminary notions will be unpacked 
and taken further in the second chapter, where I rework certain notions of 
futurity, utopia, virtuality and negativity that are apparently distant but 
that, on the contrary, can become insightful tools for the reformulation of a 
notion of trans subjectivity that is released from the highly normative 
essentialism of medical and legal discourse.  Moreover, using the theoretical 
notions of utopianism associated to queer as recently formulated by Munoz, 
as well as elements from the anti-social turn in queer theory as my starting 
points, the chapter explores and at the same time assembles together a 
concept of utopian ethics and proposes an understanding of utopianism as 
an impulse of the now whose generative force can offer important ethical 
approaches in the understanding of the possibilities of transgendered 
subjectivity.  
 
The third chapter explores the static structure of the Gender Recognition 
Act 2014 (GRA).  The inability to account for the impulse of the now - for the 
utopianism of the material body - is, I argue, the main reason why the GRA 
cannot adequately respond to the demand for equality: I suggest that the 
law, as outlined in the GRA provision, presents a model which remains 
hanging in a not-yet purgatory and which does not account for the urgency 
and materiality of the present or the specificity of lived experience, thus 
missing the chance to really take into consideration the single subject and 
inevitably contains structural deficits which minimise the possibilities of 
justice. In my view, this happens mainly because the GRA is fundamentally 
constructed on monolithic notions of gender stability and authenticity, a 
vision based on the idea that identity is the result of a balanced political 
negotiation between body/mind alignment and socio-cultural norms and 
that such a paradigm is declined in clear-cut and univocal female/male 
terms. This, I argue, generates social sub-divisions and de-legitimation for 
those subjectivities that stand outside of this paradigm. The quest for 
justice, I conclude, cannot be juggled between a subject and an object, nor 
can it be the result of a mediation made of give and take politics. Rather, it 
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must be an immanent and unmediated condition of the self. This involves 
an understanding of subjectivity deeply immersed in an ontology of 
difference which donates the subject that unique sense of self necessary to 
sustain itself (rather than seek that support from the Other). 
 
Taking on certain notions of danger and vulnerability in the context of the 
deviant body raised in chapter three, the fourth chapter reflects on the 
distinction between public and private space in relation to trans subjectivity 
and, in particular, to those spatial compromises which are so present in 
trans narratives. Such notion of space needs overcome old hierarchies and 
definitions and must incorporate the idea that different subjectivities stand 
in different positions in relation to public and private and each one 
undergoes different processes of identification and location with space.  
Within this framework, I submit to close examination a space where the 
divide between public and private is not only very present, but constitutes 
the essence of the place itself: public toilets. Within the boundaries of this 
confined space, transgender is a point of debate and controversy: anxiety 
about gender diversity is often felt and expressed in public toilets and the 
‘truth about sex’95 (Foucault, History of Sexuality I, 1978) is nowhere more 
painfully acute and subject to surveillance than in these confined, sex-
segregated spaces. An analysis of public toilets gives me the opportunity to 
demonstrate how space is often appropriated and taken for granted by 
normative embodiment and how, on the contrary, trans subjectivity is 
characterised by the urge for constant renegotiation of both its own 
identification and the spatiality it occupies.   
 
The fifth and last chapter considers the disobedient body using the 
conceptual tool of the monster to map out the theoretical model within 
which diversity has traditionally be declined. The monstrous body, present 
in literature often as a folkloristic figure since the origins, is an 
extraordinary example of the economy of fear associated with certain non-
                                                
95 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality I: An Introduction (Pantheon Books 1978) 
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conforming traits. It is the embodied other against which the subject defines 
itself and a powerful site for conflict, symbolism, morality and assumptions 
based on contrapositions and essentialism. The chapter sketches out the 
image of the dissident body - the monster - with the aim not only to 
delineate a tendency in the ways in which our society engages with ‘figures 
of difference’96 which, as we will see, have systematically been pushed to 
the margins, but it also wishes to exorcise the Cartesian dualism 
body/mind - nowhere else more pressing than here - rethinking the 
possibilities of a body-assemblage that, in being both subject and object, 
body and matter, passions and psyche (that is, in being enough to itself), 
invests in difference as the only possibility for unity (unity as in self-
empowerment).  
 
Chapter Three, Four and Five will be followed each by an empirical 
intersection which aims to address and unpack the theoretical formulations 
of the chapters they follow by offering a pungent immersion into the lives 
of many transgender individuals who discuss their personal experiences in 
the first person, thus offering invaluable insight into the issues and 
struggles they face every day. These sections, which I have called ‘The 
Diary Sessions” are a concentration of the narratives of individuals who, in 
the first person, narrate what it is like to live life at odds with the 
conventional understanding of male and female. They present powerful 
stories which, each in its own ways, show us that utopianism is not a 
remote phenomenon that belongs to a remote future for which we must get 
ready and wait to happen; rather, it is a material condition of the now that 
is already actualised in the myriad choices we make every day in our lives. 
It is, rather, the categorical refusal of pre-packed definitions that feed onto 
the depotentialisation of the supremacy of the individual over itself and 
requires an ethical understanding of subjectivity which involves a deep 
                                                
96 Margret Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self (Sage 2002) 
p.1 
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understanding of immanent difference as the only possible condition for 
evolution.
 31 
Chapter One 
            How Might It Be? 
 
 
“Becoming is being, multiplicity is unity,  
change is necessity”.1 
 
 
 
 
The assumptions around gender today are very different to those of twenty 
years ago. The transgender body has emerged as a site of contradictions 
that embodies the idea of futurity.2 Futurity here is intended as a motion of 
becoming and possibilities - almost an impulse, never an ideology! – an 
affirmative movement capable of destabilising assemblage made of 
provocation and difference. My theoretical methodology is deeply 
influenced by the work of Gilles Deleuze. It is through Deleuze and 
through his work with Félix Guattari that I am able to trace what I call 
ethics of utopianism. It is through Deleuze and in particular through his 
notion of perpetual difference that I am able to look at trans as a mode of 
unified affirmation and not as a product of negotiation (medical and/or 
legal). And again, it is through Deleuze that I am able to reformulate a 
notion of immanent ethical space, a sustainable space of difference. 
Difference for Deleuze is not an empirical condition that differentiates A 
from B, but it is an ontological principle which constitutes the reason for A 
and B’s differences.3 This fundamental Deleuzian principle based on 
difference as an internal feature to every idea and on the possibility of 
multiple elements of differentiation in each idea is applied to the various 
                                                
1 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (London, New York: Continuum 2004) p. 178 
2 Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time & Place. Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New 
York and London: New York University Press 2005) 
3 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. 
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aspects of my research. Futurity contains within itself the seed for 
producing a vision that stretches out of the recognised limits of spaces and 
bodies. Ethical spaces not only entail the inclusion of what is real and 
tangible but must also account for what is possible, because what is 
possible not only is real, but is also in the ‘now’ and not in the ‘then’.  
 
Arguably, the main reason for the de-powering of queer and the gradual 
loss of it generative and subversive promise originates from the attempt to 
make it fit into a normative socio-political paradigm - or shall I say identity 
- that ticks all the boxes necessary to qualify for recognition.  “Getting stuck 
in identities that are often politically or medically engineered, the queer is 
drained of her transformative, contestatory power”, says Lynne Huffer.4 
This is also the focus of the so-called ‘antisocial turn’ in queer theory, that 
is, the belief that queer has bartered its powerful revolutionary potential for 
a comfortable first-row seat under the safety of identity politics. With no 
longer anything to resist against, queer has become just another polished, 
inoffensive identity that feeds into the dialectical game of normativity.5 
This signals a certain stagnation in the once-lively and somewhat anarchic 
configuration of queer-ness.  
 
A second, more general, preliminary reflection needs to be made: the body 
has throughout the good part of the history of philosophy remained 
articulated within a mind/body dichotomy: mind/matter, 
psychology/biology, reason/affects and so forth. This is not merely a 
                                                
4 Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press 2010) p.1 
5 This, as it is further explained later, is precisely the critique of Leo Bersani and Lee 
Edelman who, respectively, argue that “the rage for respectability” has deprived queer of 
its sexual specificity and that queer theory has treated diversity following a tolerance 
script, thus betraying the real vocation of queer which is fundamentally an “anti-
identitarian identity” made of “anti-communitarian impulses” (Leo Bersani, Homos, 
Harvard University Press, 1996). Only in the refusal of an imposed social and political 
order - identified by Edelman in the   normative reproductive futureness of children - can 
queer restore itself (Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Duke 
University Press 2004) 
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dualism of terms, but the foundation of a hierarchical and dialectical 
structure whereby polarities are placed in opposition to each other so to 
create an underlying structure of privilege and suppression, what Derrida 
defines as the violence of dualisms 6 and Deleuze sees in terms of “the 
unity of all faculties at the centre of the Cogito, in the State consensus 
raised to the absolute”.7 The singularity of the Subject and its Otherness as 
a conceptual paradigm through which to decode phenomena in life has 
produced, amongst other things, the metaphysical concept of nature as the 
primary unit to which everything else must be measured. This is an 
essentialism that, in setting up parameters and categories through 
representation, automatically creates binaries, oppositions and exclusion: 
once the opposition is created, it is only a matter of establishing which of 
the two represents what is good and what is bad to have a rough idea of 
the partition of its dialectics. Consequently, this also creates difference, 
which is not, as we will see later, the ontological Deleuzian difference, 
which is the fundamental condition of being, but rather a ‘different from’, 
that is, the articulation of a series of dichotomies that rely on the notion of 
negation to define their contrary. We will see throughout the chapters of 
this PhD how transgender subjectivity is always articulated in relation to 
the gender binary and always defined against what is not transgender. This 
is highly problematic not only because it constrains transgender to adopt a 
model that only partially represents it or that does not represent it at all, 
but also – and especially – because in doing, so it denies the specificity of 
individuals which is what transgender people claim. Later in this research I 
will explore the ways in which transgender, transsexuality, gender variant 
subjectivities are understood and mediated in various aspects of everyday 
life and what will strike is the absence of a space that allows individuals 
who identify beyond the binary to write their own narrative by 
appropriating their subjectivity and creating a space wherein it is possible 
                                                
6 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology  (John Hopkins University Press 1998) pp.42-43 
7 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus Op. cit. p.376  
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to signify for what they are, rather than for what the female/male 
normative has imagined for them.   
 
Deleuze’s dislike for essentialisms and the belief that all life is difference 
allows for a new perspective to unfold. Rather than trying to reach the real 
nature of being through the representation and identification with pre-set 
categories, Deleuze’s ontology of difference sees a direct relationship with 
the internal difference of things as such. “This form of distribution 
commanded by the categories seemed to us to betray the nature of Being 
(as a cardinal and collective concept) and the nature of the distributions 
themselves (as nomadic rather than sedentary and fixed distributions), as 
well as the nature of difference (as individuating difference).”8 To simplify: 
difference happens just by virtue of being, for being is already in the realm 
of difference. This research, in essence, claims that because difference is an 
essential condition of being and therefore of existence, transgender 
subjectivities must be understood in the specificity of their lived experience 
and in the materiality of their embodiments, each different from the other, 
and that it is precisely in this difference and because of it that this 
subjectivity exist.  
 
 
1.1 Why Deleuze? 
The study of being, ontology’s primary focus, is certainly fully embraced by 
Deleuze. Both Foucault and Derrida, however, each in their own way, 
approached their respective areas of philosophical enquiry ontologically. In 
this respect, Heiddeger’s notion of facticity represents a turning point in the 
approach to ontology. His notion of ‘being-in-the-world’, belonging to the 
world, according to which being in fully immersed in contingency and not 
transcendentally isolated from it, had opened up to new ontological 
approaches. Heiddeger repositions being in the dimension of ‘Dasein’, 
                                                
8 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p.269 
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being there, thus in a total position of co-existence all the physical and 
tangible phenomena of life.9 Being, then, is not an endeavour which takes 
place elsewhere (i.e. in the Cartesian mind), but in the space of Geworfenheit: 
thrown into the world. 
 
“What is meant by ‘Being –in’? our proximal reaction is to round 
out this expression to ‘Being-in’ ‘in the world’, and we are 
inclined to understand this Being-in as ‘Being in something’… as 
water is ‘in’ the class, or the garment is ‘in’ the cupboard. By this 
‘in’ we mean the relationship of Being which two entities 
extended ‘in’ space have to each other with regard to their 
location in that space… Being-present-at-hand-along-with is the 
sense of a definite location-relationship with something else 
which has the same kind of Being, are ontological characteristics 
which we call ‘categorial’”.10 
 
 
For Heidegger these categorical characteristics of being are not in Dasein11, 
for Dasein is an existential condition that prescinds and pre-exists any 
possible connotations attached to Being and it is precisely the condition 
that determines and defines those connotations. “Dasein’s character needs 
to be understood a-priori as being ‘grounded’ in the state of Being”.12 
Desein, as the condition of Being before it becomes Being, that is, as the pre-
condition of all future conditions is a space of primordial freedom in its 
outmost attempt to create a sense of positive and unifying affirmation in 
Being.13 
 
This notion of self-possessed Being was embraced by Continental 
                                                
9 George Steiner, Heidegger (The Harvester Press Limited 1978) 
10 Heidegger Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: 
Blackwell Publishing 2000) p.78 
11 Here Heidegger explicitly refers to authenticity and inauthenticity which, as it were, do 
not determine any lower or higher degree in Being, for Desein is a priori and exists in the 
realm of existentia, not essentia.  See Roy Hornsby, What Heidegger Means by ‘Being-in-the-
World’, http://royby.com/philosophy/pages/dasein.html 
12 Heidegger, Being and Time, op. cit. p. 78 
13 Craig M. Nichols. Primordial Freedom: The Authentic Truth of Dasein in Heidegger’s 
‘Being and Time’in Thinking Fundamentals, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, Vol. 
9: Vienna 2000 
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philosophy in various ways and applied to various aspects of the study of 
being. Foucault, for instance, while not developing a pure ontology of 
being in the same way as Deleuze did, has been concerned with what could 
be called a historical ontology. His interest is geared towards establishing 
what is historically human and what, on the contrary, is politically charged.  
Derrida, another philosopher who used the ontological method, questioned 
the characterisation ontology has on the rigid structure of language. Both 
Foucault and Derrida, however, have had to come to terms with the limits 
and consequent mediations between being and contingency. For Deleuze 
such limits are not to be considered fails in the ontological method: they 
become the very starting point of his own ontology: the structures of 
identification with pre-formed expressions will be stripped down 
altogether and what we will be left with is pure being. Life is no longer 
seen as an articulation of identities and representations, rather, as flux of 
self-signifying intensities. 
 
It should be also said that Deleuze himself rejects some ontological 
assumptions raised by realism. For example, he opposes transcendental 
phenomena that occur in an apparent independent manner outside of being 
which, by contrast, were largely accepted by a more idealistic wave of 
ontological thinkers.14 Such phenomena might be categories or essences 
whose identity transcends their being but are guaranteed existence just by 
that same category or essence, that is, of generalities secured by their being 
an entity. Deleuze’s ontology is characterised by a realistic understanding 
that phenomena in the world can be self-induced and, most importantly, 
fully independent from the mind. However, to reduce Deleuze’s ontology 
to a mere exercise of realism would be very limiting. It requires a more 
complex examination, for the innovation of his philosophy involves the 
restructuring of the whole system of knowledge. Deleuze argues that there 
                                                
14 Manuel DeLanda, Deleuze’s Ontology. A Sketch, 
http://www.situation.ru/app/j_art_1078.htm 
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are only specificities made of singular organisms each existing in pure 
autonomy and in difference. Categories intended as uniformed 
representational units cannot exist simply because their nominalist 
structure does not account for those singularities which, in their being 
singular and individual, are also universal, for their mode of being does not 
rely on processes of identification, rather, it works through processes of 
individuation. One example could be identity politics which, by definition, 
focus on the interest of social groups based on the assumption that the 
whole can account for the singular, thus ignoring specific differences 
internal to that group. With Deleuze, one could say that the singular can 
only account for its being and there is nothing outside of being that that 
singular unity can identify with, for its existence is only spelled by its own 
internal intensities, that is, the capacity of being, the extent to which being 
can be. So, if we consider that intensities determine individuation processes 
which are always multiple and different, we can understand that a system 
where these multiplicities and differences are dismissed in favour of 
identification cannot coexist.  
 
This passage needs to be explained further: First, it is important to 
understand affects in a not trivial way. Affects for Deleuze are not what we 
commonly understand as feelings or emotions. “Some translators, quite 
strangely, translate both in the same way. This is a disaster”,15 warns 
Deleuze. Feelings are personal and social practices that require an 
engagement of the subject with previous experience. In essence:  they are 
the outcome of that negotiation between previous sensations from which 
one draws the personal understanding to decode a present occurrence. By 
contrast, affects are non-conscious, pre-cognitive and pre-personal.16 They 
pre-exist the subject and are the inner drive that motivates movement. This 
                                                
15 Gilles Deleuze, Lecture Transcripts on Spinoza, Cours Vincennes, 24/01/1978 
http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=14&groupe=Spinoza&langue=2  
16 Brian Massumi, ‘The Autonomy of Affect’ in Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, 
Sensation (Durham & London: Duke University Press 2002)  
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is a notion that Deleuze inherits from Spinoza who, in Ethics (1677), makes a 
clear distinction between affectus and affectio. 
 
“By affect [affectum] I understand affections [affectiones] of the 
body by which the body’s power [potentia] of acting is increased 
or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the 
ideas of affections”.17 
 
So, the body does not produce affects directly, but is itself defined by the 
potentia (or intensity)18 in which it is capable of absorbing and releasing 
affects in its (free and non-hierarchical) encounter with other bodies. “The 
body doesn’t just absorb pulses or discrete stimulations; it infolds contexts, 
it infolds volitions and cognitions,19 and this happens in “state of suspense, 
potentially of disruption”20 where any form of affective contamination is 
possible. For Deleuze, then, a body is defined by the capacity to affect and 
to be affected, and affects are constitutive of bodies insofar as they 
constitute the determination of those bodies to encounter to affect other 
bodies and be affected.  
 
The total abandonment of any semiological, historical and political 
difference (or we should say identification) means that difference is only 
difference in itself, not different from any other thing, for there is nothing 
outside of itself with which to compare or contrast. Difference becomes a 
methodology of life21 which is not subjective, that is, does not belong to the 
subject, nor is it of the object, for this dualism is vanished (there is no 
object). Difference is the methodology of being expressed in a space and 
time that need to be reconsidered. 
 
This perspective – being as the essential principle of difference – opens up 
                                                
17 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics (Penguin Classics 1996) E3d3 
18 “The strength or duration of the image's effect” is identified with intensities by Massumi. 
19 Massumi, ‘The Autonomy of Affect’ in Parables for the Virtual, op. cit. p. 30 
20 Ibid. 
21 Elizabeth Grosz, “Bergson Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecoming” in Parallax, 2005, 
Vol.11, no.2, pp. 4-13 
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to a whole new way of thinking through events and phenomena in life, and 
pushes us to formulate problems differently, and in such a way that the 
question alone can stimulate a different approach in the pursuit of its 
answer.  The question through which I want to approach my analysis is 
then not formulated in terms of ‘what must transgender politics and 
legislations entail in order to be fully accommodate such a challenging 
subjectivity’, for this question would only reiterate a contorted dialectic of 
morals which would be saturated by the production of yet more categories 
of understanding. Rather, the question I want to pose is what might the 
transsexual body be when it is free to actively possess its subjectivity? 
What might it be if affects and desire were to be judged ethically rather 
than morally? And what might it be if trans subjectivities were put in the 
condition to re-write their own narrative in the first person (or in the 
many first persons that populate such a multi-faceted and ever-changing 
subjectivity), rather than – as we will see later – be mediated through a 
series of notions and values that are thrust onto them but that, often, do 
not represent who they feel themselves to be?  
 
The idea of a cosmological order to which a human life must conform and 
the hierarchies of dominance and submission resulting from that order 
always privileged the moral aspect of life, thus diminishing the concept of 
unity in favour of moral obligations and directions laid out by a 
transcendent being (God). We will see later that it is through the privileged 
morality of heteronormativity that transgender is understood and 
constructed22. When Nietzsche declared God dead - and with God also the 
understanding of a certain theological transcendence of life - it has been 
possible for the first time to reformulate all the questions that 
transcendence had hidden away: with no longer God to cater for our needs, 
we can now think of our lives beyond the boundaries that history has set 
up for us, free from “the idea of universal necessities in human existence 
                                                
22 See Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault. Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory, op. cit. 
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[which] show[s] the arbitrariness of institutions and show[s] which space of 
freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made”23. 
Foucault rejects the idea of the pure essence of being and his ontological 
question is approached historically: he believes that the constraints on our 
lives are to be located in a historical contingence that keeps us separated 
from ourselves. With Deleuze the question of being is taken to the limit: he 
creates an ontology which creates being as opposed to discover being24 as for 
Deleuze, the question of how one might live involves the creation of new 
forms of life, “how one might live to new vistas”25. Such an ontology not 
only rejects the opposition between creation of what there is and discovery 
of what there might be, but it also reaffirms the oppositional relationship 
between identity (natural) and difference  (acquired).  This is crucial to 
Deleuze’s ontology: it presupposes a concept of stability and identification 
which Deleuze rejects in toto. “Difference is behind everything, but behind 
difference there is nothing”.26 Accordingly, the failure of identification is 
the locus, the primordial reason, and the genesis of Deleuze’s ontology. 
This opens up to a whole new approach to the study of identity. Being 
becomes an act of differentiation that does not aim at identification nor at the 
stability claimed by categories, for stability is a concept that relies on 
nature. The tension which stems from the articulation between identity and 
the failure of that identification is released into an immanent chaos wherein 
principles, notions and forces flow freely. In other words:  this approach 
opposes ‘common sense’, “the standard upon which the majority is 
based”27. Against ‘common sense’, Deleuze places the schizophrenic, a 
subject that does not “think” change, but “knows” change” immanently.28 
This establishes a principle of equality whereby each being is by virtue of 
                                                
23 Michel Foucault, Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault  (University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1988) p.11 
24 Todd May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.16 
25 Ibid. p.17 
26 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p.57 
27 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, op. cit. p.322 
28 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: 
Continuum 2004) p.21 
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being different and it is not identity that encapsulates the essence of being, 
but difference does.   
 
As I have briefly explained in the introduction and will explore in depth in 
the next chapters, the focus of this research is to demonstrate how new 
forms of living and embodying gender beyond the binary are possible. 
Such forms, as we shall see later in the empirical interludes of this thesis 
through the life narratives of some transgender individuals, show that 
indeed gender can be understood in terms of difference and their lives – the 
experiences of their subjectivities in the spatiality of the everyday - are 
actual examples of a form of utopianism that already exists. It is happening 
here and now, and proves how these bodies – however marginal at times – 
retain a political force that is so highly disruptive for institutionalised 
discourses that it is ignored or deemed inferior through a series of 
normativising acts which I will analyse in the chapters that follow.  
 
Even though, as it has by now become apparent, my main theoretical 
approach in this thesis is drawn from the work of Gilles Deleuze, 
throughout the chapters I maintain a broader perspective on post-
structuralist ethics in their critique of essentialism, naturalism and 
overbridging skepticism for Western logocentrism and status quo. To do 
this, I find it useful to dip in and out the work of Michel Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida. The work of Foucault, and in particular his critique of 
power and the notion of disciplined and socially productive bodies, is 
relevant in the context of this research. Furthermore, his work on the 
abnormal body and the paradigm of biopower is applicable to my critique 
of the legal and medical industries that manage the transgender body in 
relation to the social, economic and political expectations and through 
which we have a mechanism of inclusion/exclusion.  
 
The application of Deleuze and Derrida may appear more problematic: 
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Deleuze is a self-confessed philosopher of immanence operating in the field 
of being, while Derrida’s engagement with ‘the Other’ makes him a 
philosopher of transcendence operating in the field of consciousness. One 
interested in the unity of being beyond the Cartesian dualism, the other in 
what transcends the subject. Deleuze comes from the tradition of Spinozan 
monism and Nietzschean metaphysics, while Derrida Kant and Levinas’s 
alterity. No doubt I am here putting it in a rather simplistic way, but it is 
only to give a concise view of the different traditions that inform the work 
of Derrida and Deleuze.  What I am interested in in the context of my 
research, is their notion of difference and how they operate in relation to 
various ideas of logocentrisms. Derrida’s intent of ‘overcoming 
metaphysics’ is a reaction to metaphysics seen as a closed structure, and his 
deconstruction is then a way of disclosing that structure which, because of 
its totality, only allows deconstruction from within.29 To overcome 
metaphysics is therefore an impossibility which determines the urgency to 
keep trying. A conceptual tool applied by Derrida is différance which alters 
the shape of any metaphysical notions of natural essence pre-existing 
being. Because, as I have said, the totality of metaphysics does not 
presuppose the existence of being outside of metaphysics itself, différance , 
as we will see more clearly in chapter 4, can only operate “in the interval 
between the closed totality of metaphysics and the formal transcendence of 
difference”.30 Now, Deleuze’s position is quite different in the fact that he 
does not engage with metaphysics in the way pursued by Derrida. Deleuze 
sees immanence within metaphysics and, unlike Derrida, he does not 
envision metaphysics as a closed structure, but rather, as a space where 
change can still happen and where different realities (virtualities) can still 
be reactivated. In essence, Deleuze’s metaphysics is becoming, and difference 
is not an instrument which penetrates a closed metaphysical structure in 
                                                
29 Daniel E. Smith, 'Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Trascendence: Two Directions in 
Recent French Thought' in Between Deleuze and Derrida edited by Paul Patton and John 
Protevi (London, New York Continuum, 2003) p. 48 
30 Ibid. p. 49 
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order to reinvigorate it, but is a constitutional essence of being which 
determines the immanent movement of becoming.  Being is becoming and it 
can only happen in difference.  
 
Taken singularly, the two approaches are fundamentally contradictory. As 
Smith puts it, “ Derrida sets out to undo metaphysics, Deleuze sets out 
simply to do metaphysics”31 – but the functionality they have within my 
research is complementary. This is why: Derrida’s condition of 
impossibility offers an understanding of the closed dynamics that manage 
transgender subjectivity. What I mean is, the concept of différance as an 
external agent that reaches the closed nucleus to alter its originality (or 
purity) allows for the emergence of an instrumental analogy with 
transgender identity, understood as the intruder that upsets the 
authenticity claimed by pure gender. I return to this in detail in chapter 4.  
Likewise, Derrida’s persistent confrontation with the Other and the 
relationship the Subject is called to have with an idea of alterity which is 
always outside of being, resonates with the articulation of transgender 
subjectivity within a paradigm made of dialectics and dichotomies. The 
Other happens in relation to an original idea of being, but always outside of 
it, which – in Deleuzian terms – is precisely non-being.  So, in a way, 
Derrida provides me with the conceptual tools I require to approach and 
theoretically decode the understanding of identity determined by a bifocal 
relationships between elements which, as it were, highlight a fundamental 
impossibility because always victims of a higher and unreachable ideal of 
nature, origin, purity.  
 
For Deleuze, by contrast, difference is in itself, it is not defined by a pre-
existing sameness and does not presuppose any mediation. “Difference 
must be articulation and connection in itself; it must relate different to 
                                                
31 D. E. Smith, 'Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Trascendence: Two Directions in 
Recent French Thought', op. cit. p.50 
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different without any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the similar, 
the analogous or the opposed. There must be a differenciation of difference, 
an in-itself which is like a differentiator [a Sich-unterscheidende] by virtue of 
which difference is gathered all at once rather than represented on 
condition of a prior resemblance, identity, analogy, or opposition”32. This 
suggests that difference only needs being in order to be, and it is difference 
(both internal and external) the singularity (the specificity) constitutive of 
its being. The understanding of difference as an immanent condition of 
being that does not need to be mediated or validated, but it is validated by 
itself, opens up to a completely new understanding of transgender: no 
longer hostage of a natural subject, of a pure gender, but finally lifted 
from the weight of an impossibility to be and validated in its unity only 
by virtue of being.  
 
It is then clear at this point that both Derrida and Deleuze, in their often 
distinct perspectives, provide me with the complementary notions I need to 
present my argument and elaborate my theory. Put crudely, however, I 
could some up by saying that it is through Derrida that I can contextualise 
current social and political phenomena and discern certain dynamics that 
constitute the relationship between subject , but it is Deleuze who gives me 
a perspective of utopianism, that is, a reading of being which finds its pure 
essence in the specificity - and at the same time in the multiplicity - of its 
being.33 
 
I opened this chapter by quoting Judith Halberstam who sees in 
transgender a challenging idea of futurity. To that I added that futurity 
should not be seen as an ideology, that is, the ungraspable notion of 
something that from there will one day come here to us, or even, an ideal to 
look up to. Rather, it should be considered as the material act of 
                                                
32 Deleuze , Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p.143 
33 See Paul Patton, John Protevi (eds.), Between Deleuze and Derrida (A&C Black 2003) 
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progressing towards something, of going there, where the going there is 
fully immersed in the present.   And it is precisely because of its happening 
in the present - here and now – that its political force becomes all the more 
disruptive and its direction all the more uncontrollable. This movement is 
generative because, as we will see especially in the next chapter, actualises 
what is virtual and makes it possible, and therefore real. I will explain why 
the work of Deleuze is essential for the elaboration of such a formulation. 
 
For Deleuze there is no past. Rather, there are linear recollections of 
memories that do not exist in reality but only in the present as memory. 
Past is “only a series of presents that become past, each yielding to another 
present”34. This notion of past in the present and present in the past in 
Deleuze is derived from Bergson: “the past and the present do not denote 
two successive moments, but two elements which coexist: One is the 
present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past which does 
not cease to be but through which all present pass ... The past does not 
follow the present, but on the contrary is presupposed by it as the pure 
condition without which it would not pass”.35 So this linear conception of 
time is expressed in the now. There is only the here and the now, the only 
difference is given by duration which, in itself, is difference. So, for the 
present to pass, there must be a past for it to pass into. Past and present are 
two elements of the same linear understanding of time: the present 
actualises the past and through that actualisation the past exists at any 
given moment.  
 
Now, two things are significant here: the first is the shift present-past (as 
opposed to past-present) which allows for a new formulation of the future 
and the role it has in this immanent configuration of time. The second 
important element is duration which not only determines difference itself, 
                                                
34 May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction , op. cit. p.46 
35 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism (Zone Books 2002) p.59 
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but its immanence also gives the present an extraordinary potential that so 
far had always been attributed to the future: the potential to create and 
actualise transformation and change. This, consequently, leads to a third 
crucial element that is the importance of the now not only for the 
actualisation of the past through memory - which as I have mentioned is a 
notion that Deleuze draws from Bergson - but also and especially as the 
condition not of the possible (which might become real but it isn’t real yet), 
but as the condition of the virtual, that is, what is already real “in so far as it 
is virtual”.36 The virtual, as we will see later, is not a pre-condition of the 
possible: it does not wait to be realised because it is already fully real.. For 
Deleuze the virtual - and not the possible - is the condition for real 
experience: virtuality does not pre-exist possibility but it constitutes the 
condition for the actual, that is, what is real. 
 
A form such as this assumes that the notion of the virtual becomes material 
and ceases to be dependent on possibility. It releases all the tension that 
comes with possibility and legitimates the now as the only possibility of the 
virtual (the real). It is precisely this idea of virtuality - a forward-looking 
impulse derived from the future but which becomes real in the present - 
together with the immanent state of difference that can lay out the 
foundations for the consideration of the transgendered body as a site of 
virtuality. That is, a body wherein difference is fully actualised in the now, 
whose utopianism comes from an idea of futurity that is there only to 
remind us of the direction, but that is fully rooted in the now does not need 
the privileged position of the future to be, for its duration - that is, its 
difference - is all it takes to determine its existence. With this form in mind, 
it is possible to really think of the transgender body as a utopia of the now, 
in the now and for the now. 
 
Throughout this research some themes that reoccur which I treat as 
                                                
36 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p.208 
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conceptual tools to delineate my theoretical framework and to propose my 
ideas. One such tool, as we have seen, is the notion of utopia, which will be 
fully contextualised and presented in the next chapter and around which 
model I will be able to propose my understanding of ethical utopianism. 
Another important over-bridging concept is that of the marginal. Certainly, 
the subject matter of this research lends itself well to various accounts of 
marginalisation and discrimination, which will be present in abundance. 
However, in this instance I would like to draw attention on the political 
significance of the term margin and, rather than concentrate on its most 
common connotation of passive exclusion - i.e. a minority of any sort that is 
marginalised - I want to focus on the ethical implications of being at the 
margins. I am aware that more often than not marginalisation is an 
imposed act of violence and it is difficult - when not impossible - to detach 
it from its deep injustice and give it any other validity. This is why I use the 
term margin and deliberately separate it from the term marginalised, 
though the etymology of the two is the same. Not merely minor spaces 
pushed aside by a normative ideology caught up in its absolutisms and 
unable to question itself, margins (intended here as spaces populated by 
minorities) are also spaces of resistance and regeneration whose highly 
political energy “becomes the relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come”.37 
There is a sense of urgency within margins that is non-representative and 
non-symbolic and becomes all the more absolute as it refuses mediation 
with majoritarian impositions and moves more and more towards the 
extremities. Minorities that populate marginal positions magnified by the 
intensity of the collective endeavour in the process of what Deleuze and 
Guattari frame with the notion of  ‘deterritorialisation’, a dynamic 
movement that breaks through established configurations refusing given, 
pre-set norms and, through the ‘lines of flight’, open up new configurations 
and assemblages that destabilise hegemonic majorities. Through Deleuze 
                                                
37 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (University of 
Minnesota Press 1986) p.18 
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and Guattari, then, it is possible to imagine marginal spaces as political 
territories with no borders that constantly change their configuration and, 
while rejecting all forms of pre-fixed identity, “in spite of skepticism ... 
forge the means for another consciousness ad another sensibility”.38  In 
accordance with this, although the marginal bodies of this research occupy 
underprivileged social positions and are often faced with discrimination in 
their day-to-day activities (and I do not intend to undermine such tragic 
reality) they still retain an affirmative and indispensible force that makes 
their diversity (minor being) an active trait of difference “which [pushes] 
deterritorialisation to such an extreme that nothing remains but 
intensities”.39 An approach such as this is able to offer a new, empowering 
vision of being-minor and allows for a re-evaluation of the aesthetics of the 
margins, no longer segregated dark allies in limbo waiting to be restored 
and made acceptable, but lively, strong enough sites capable of instilling 
change and subverting the normative force of the majority.  
 
 
1.2 Why Video Diaries? 
 
The highly theoretical approach I adopt throughout this research is 
informed by and originates in the empirical work to counterbalance its 
primary conceptual nature. My interest in autobiographies as a literary tool 
for analysis has pushed me towards the search and exploration of video-
diaries as unique and privileged point of access into the lives of those 
marginal subjectivities that, because of their problematic social location and 
the different nature of their identification, struggle to represent themselves. 
 
Biographers and historians have long used diaries as documents of relevant 
importance for telling stories and personal accounts. Plummer40 argues that 
the validity of the diary is now being acknowledged also by social science 
                                                
38 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, op. cit. p. 18 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ken Plummer, Documents of Life (London: Allen&Unwin 1983) 
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and the diary format is becoming more and more a common tool of 
research, especially when interested in personal accounts, behaviours and 
various aspects of individuals’ lives. In 1990, for example, the BBC 
launched Video Diary Series 41 which dealt with working-class everyday 
struggles. In more recent years, Channel 4 has produced a series entitled 
My Transsexual Summer,42 where seven transgender people were followed 
by cameras in their struggles and life-changing decisions regarding their 
gender identity and, through interviews and confessions in the first person, 
shared their experiences as transgenders.  
 
The methodological value of ethnography is accepted within the social 
sciences, it has been one of the most effective tools in qualitative analysis 
across a variety of disciplines for many decades. The term ‘ethnography’ 
derived from ethnos (people) and graphien (writing), and it consists of a 
descriptive methodology based on observation and analysis of peoples and 
cultures that share certain aspects of their lives, such as experiences, 
traditions, circumstances. Its original use combines element of sociology 
and anthropology and is an in situ observation of social phenomena over a 
period of time.43 
 
Video-ethnography, following the steps of the more traditional 
ethnographical approach, adds extra value by changing the dynamics 
between the parties involved in the research. No more the direct 
observation of living phenomena whilst they are happening, but the 
assimilation of visual media and technology which can help shed light on 
details or perspectives that could otherwise be missed. Moreover, video 
contents present the advantage of retaining footage which can be observed 
                                                
41 ‘Video Diaries’ was a BBC television programme produced by the Community 
Programme Unit in 1990. The series of programmes aimed to give members of the public 
the opportunity to tell their stories and show particular aspects of their lives.  
42 My Transsexual Summer, Channel 4, November 2011 
43Auto-Ethnography: Problems, Pitfalls and Promise, 
http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/3573/1/sobolewska_paper.pdf 
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over and over, thus enabling researchers to no longer rely only on their 
notes and memory, but allowing the possibility of a much more meticulous 
observation in a context that suffers less from possible time constraints.  
 
In my research, to video-ethnography I add yet another element, that of 
auto-ethnography. Auto-ethnography is a particular approach of 
ethnography that seeks to emphasise personal experience - auto - in order 
to better understand the ethno, that is, the cultural experience of 
individuals44. It is now a credited methodology across disciplines such as 
sociology, anthropology, psychology and pedagogy because of its highly 
self-reflective connotations which have proven invaluable in the study of 
personal phenomena and situations that would often remain undisclosed.45 
Auto-ethnography entails telling one’s own story, though it should not be 
regarded the same as autobiography in a literary sense, for it is not simply 
the telling of a life. It is rather a specific form of critical enquiry46 with all 
the advantages and limitations of any other qualitative methodology. 
According to Ellis & Bochner, the success of such forms of auto-
construction of meaning and narratives root back to the 1980s, when the 
advent of postmodernism highlighted the need across the social sciences to 
adopt a softer approach to data analysis, one that was no longer articulated 
through clear-cut truths and facts (like scientific research), but that 
accounted for a series of human variables and therefore the impossibility to 
reach a shared idea of universal truth.47 
                                                
44 Ellis, Carolyn, The ethnographic I: A methodological novel about autoethnography  (Walnut 
Creek, CA: AltaMira Press 2004) 
45 See for example Cameron and Anderson, Comparing Weblogs to Threaded Discussion 
Tools in Online Educational Contexts’ in International Journal of Instructional Technology 
and Distance Education, 2006, 2(11); Bochner and Ellis, ‘Talking over Ethnography’ in, 
Ellis, C., Bochner, A. (eds.) Composing Ethnography: Alternative Forms of Qualitative Writing, 
Vol. 1. (Walnut Creek: AltaMira, 1996); Roth, Wolff-Michael, Ed. Auto/biography and 
auto/ethnography: Praxis of Research 
Method (Rotterdam: Sense 2005) 
46 Peter McIlveen, Autoethnography as a Method for Reflexive Research and Practice in Vocational 
Psychology (Australian Journal of Career Development, 2008) 17(2), 13-20, p.14 
47 Michel De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (University of Califonia Press 1984)  
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In those years, moreover, the studies of Barthes and Derrida started to 
paint a different picture wherein the construction of meaning was 
sustained by far more complex structures than what was previously 
believed: Barthes points out that images retain a primary importance, for 
their significance is not only literal, that is, spelt by the object itself, the 
sign, but they also work on a symbolic level. These two dimensions are 
closely wound up with each individual’s perception48 which, too, 
constitutes language (and therefore meaning). Along a similar line, 
Derrida’s deconstruction sees meaning as never stable and pure, but 
always the result of multiple mediations or, one could say echoing 
Saussure, multiple signs49. Meaning is, according to Derrida, hostage to a 
western logocentrism which develops according to oppositions where one 
thing is usually defined against another, thus creating a self-protective 
mechanism unable to access unmediated expression. For this to happen, 
new terms need to be coined and language must no longer be articulated in 
terms of oppositions but in terms of difference.50 
 
So, these theories established that meaning was not descriptive but rather 
influenced by a variety of circumstances, emotions and variables so closely 
connected to subjects and their own personal ethics and morals, that every 
single person has a unique way of making sense of themselves and other 
people in the world.51 This led to a particular attention across the social 
sciences to personal stories rather than facts and auto-ethnography 
presented itself as a methodology deeply grounded in personal experience 
that possessed the characteristics needed to treat sensitive issues such as 
identity, race, gender etc. and that could offer an empathic perspective on 
                                                
48 Roland Barthes, Image, Music, Text (New York: Hill and Wang 1977) p.36  
49 Saussure Multiple signs 
50 Jacques Derrida, Writing and difference, transl. by A. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1978) 
51 Tony E. Adams, 'A Review of Narrative Ethics' in Qualitative Inquiry (2008) 14(2) pp.175-
194 
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personal narratives.52  While some have deemed this a mere self-indulgent 
exercise53, others have found this very aspect to be the most valuable aspect 
of auto-ethnography54. “This kind of writing, says Sparkes, can inform, 
awaken, and disturb readers by illustrating their involvement in social 
processes about which they might not have been consciously aware. Once 
aware, individuals may find the consequences of their involvement (or lack 
of it) unacceptable and seek to change the situation. In such circumstances, 
the potential for individual and collective restoring is enhanced”.55 
 
Within a wider ethnographical perspective, the approach I have adopted 
for analysing the content presented in the diaries draws more directly on 
ethnomethology, as explained by Bourdieu (1984, 1998).56 I am aware that 
any form of individual content production contains a conscious or 
unconscious decision to create a narrative, to “accomplish their identities, 
their activities, their settings and their sense of social order”.57  A technique 
of ethnomethodology, according to Bourdieau, however, is able to go 
beyond that initial intentional choice and, through reflectivity, reach to the 
“invisible structures that organize it”,58 that is, identify the negotiations 
between the individual and the social space that narrative sets out to 
address and from there understand the objectives.  “An 
                                                
52 Carolyn Ellis & Arthur P. Bochner 'Autoethnography, personal narrative, reflexivity' in 
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ethnomethodological reading of the video accounts provides one means for 
analysing this interplay. Using this approach, the videos are seen not only 
as methods of getting at information but, rather, as analyzable events in 
their own right”.59  Likewise, it enables the absence to fill their absence 
during the production of the content analysed and, through reflectivity, 
observation and interpretation, be an active participant, not merely passive 
audience. Because the diaries in question are spontaneous, independent 
and are made public, that is, exist on their own and are not prompted by 
anyone else other than their generators, to use their content in this research 
did not require ethical approval. Nonetheless, I am aware that to use 
personal data such as this has in itself ethical implications that need to be 
considered. These include the extrapolation of content out of its original 
context, misinterpretation due to the fact that I have never sought 
clarification or further elaboration (i.e. follow with interviews) from the 
diarists. However, what is important to notice is that my analysis is never 
textual: I am merely listening to personal stories of lived experience and 
drawing a narrative. I then reflect on this narrative in relation to the 
theoretical perspectives I present and let it inform the notions I elaborate. 
 
I would like to go a little further into explaining the validity of 
ethnomethodology. Video diaries fall into the category of participant-
generated data that relies on a visual support. Although they are not a very 
commonly used method, they create a space wherein the participants 
reflect, elaborate, construct and deconstruct meaning that is being selected 
real-time as they speak, thus offering a sneak insight into all those mental 
and psychological processes involved. The diary format can be an 
advantageous methodology for various reasons: its intimate nature can 
help the participant recall precious anecdotes and articulate feelings and 
emotions away from the pressure of the interview where it is often very 
                                                
59 Barbara Ellen Gibson, ‘Co-producing Video Diaries: The Presence of the “Absent” 
Researcher’ in International Journal of Qualitative Methods 2005, 4(4) p. 5 
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difficult to overcome the natural discomfort when dealing with sensitive 
information. Moreover, because the diary is developed over a period of 
time, it generates evidence about the everyday context and the lived 
experience.60  I believe that the absence of the researcher during the 
production of the diary helps a process of reflexivity and spontaneity 
which would otherwise be compromised by both the external presence (the 
researcher) and issues of time linked to ordinary interviews.  
 
Furthermore, video-diaries respond to the necessity to find a method for 
collective sensible data in the least invasive way possible. In this respect, 
they not only constitute a less invasive research tool, due to the physical 
absence of the researcher at the time of data production, using an 
instrument with which more and more people are becoming increasingly 
familiar. But they also resolve those limitations related to the production of 
written documents which are often restricting for a variety of reasons, such 
as lack of confidence connected to literary skills and consequent limitations 
in the ways in which one would express oneself or indeed the nature of the 
data itself which can often be intimate and sensitive, all the more so if the 
participants in question belong to minority groups.  Particularly in this 
instance, the video support can be empowering because it gives 
participants the possibility to deliver in a less mediated fashion and also 
because they “benefit from the control, voice and power that video diaries 
give them. Thus, video diaries are especially suitable for minority 
cultures”.61  
 
Before I go further into explaining the criteria according to which I have 
selected the video-diaries presented in this research, it is important to 
                                                
60 Nick Couldry, Sonia Livingstone and Tim Markham, Media Consumption and Public 
Engagement: Beyond the Presumption of Attention (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2007)  
61 Video Diary Method for Visual Ethnography, C. Brown, C. Costley, L. Friend, R J. Varey 
University of Waikato, In proceeding of Contemporary Ethnography Across the 
Disciplines, University of Waikato.  
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address what is possibly the main concern of any qualitative research. I 
have explained earlier how the construction of meaning is subjected to all 
sorts of personal circumstances and that the perception of reality is variable 
as variable are also the instruments each of us employ is our day-to-day 
understanding of what happens around us and how this affects our being 
in a given context. Nonetheless, the concept of authenticity is a central 
theme in anthropological research.  In the particular instance of video 
ethnography, video self- produced diaries that is, one can be easily drawn 
to believe that the absence of the researcher or film crew make for more 
authentic data. While this physical absence can certainly promote a deeper 
self-reflective engagement, it does not always mean that the content 
produced is more authentic. Guba and Lincoln62 theorise four essential 
criteria of authenticity in auto-ethnography: fairness, ontological 
authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic authenticity and tactical 
authenticity 63. Each of these four requirements certainly help guarantee a 
level of reliability, validity and rigour in the auto-ethnographical approach. 
However, what I believe is crucial here is to accept auto-ethnography as a 
mode of self-study and, as such, be aware that authenticity can easily 
become a redundant concern, for it can miss the focus of auto-ethnography 
itself which is not the literal study of the self, but rather, the understanding 
of the space between self and practice 64.  
 
In this context of ethnomethodology, it is important to clarify that these 
diaries are not part of a wider project, nor do they belong to anyone other 
than the individuals by whom they have been generated. The technology 
used to produce these diaries (i.e. computers, video-camera, internet 
connection, YouTube account) should not induce the reader to doubt their 
                                                
62 Egon G. Guba & Yvonna S. Lincoln, Fourth Generation Evaluation (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
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63 Guba and Lincoln, Fourth Generation Evaluation, op. cit. 
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owners’ genuineness.  They are not to be seen as an act of narcissism, nor 
should they be decoded in terms of performance. Rather, they need to be 
considered simply for what they are presenting themselves to be: 
spontaneous and free testimonies of life narratives told directly by the 
individuals who have lived those stories first-hand. The use of technology 
is to be interpreted as a sign of our times. In a world where everything is 
consumed via social media and content becomes available instantly, video 
logs – like dear diaries previously - merely serves that will – or need – to 
share a condition of social isolation and solitude, and the subsequent need 
to reach out for somebody who is going through the same struggle: to 
connect with a community and, through that community, to become less 
marginal.65 
 
So, with all the above information and caveats in mind, I have selected the 
video diaries (known also as vlogs) of people who, each at various degrees, 
identify beyond the gender binary. The decision to privilege subjectivities 
who reject the binary reflects the ambition of this research to create a 
theoretical alley for individuals who choose not to conform. This is a 
prepotent feature of this research. Transgender people who identify with 
one or the other gender have a wider space in which to enact their 
individuality, and more means through which to secure that that 
individuality is accepted. This is something that becomes very evident in 
the diaries. An example of this, as I will examine in depth in chapter 3, is 
the Gender Reassignment Act 2014: a piece of legislation that opens up 
many opportunities to those transgendered people who wish to take up a 
defined gendered identity (we will see how and through what 
requirements), while it fails to account for those who refuse gender 
altogether.  This is only one example but it is sufficient to indicate the lack 
                                                
65 Please note that the use of the adjective ‘marginal’ in this PhD goes beyond its most 
literal definition of ‘not central, remote, borderline’. My use of the term ‘marginal’ is 
heavily informed by the thought of Deleuze. This will be fully explained in the next 
chapters. For the moment, it is sufficient to think of ‘marginal’ as ‘minor’.  
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of social, political and cultural space for individuals who, on the contrary, 
do not and cannot step into the logic of gender. Their lives encounter a 
higher degree of challenge, risk, struggle, denial, rejection, violence, 
abnegation. Their marginality is total. What they have they earn day by day 
through the sheer determination of their being. It is important for this 
research to break through the normative force of the gender binary and tell 
a different story.  The individuals that I present in this research do that.  
 
 I have observed the stream of thoughts and considerations of these 
identified transgender individuals and the set of challenges and struggles 
they encounter in their day-to-day natural life. Ultimately, my interest was 
to have an insight into the ways in which everyday practice was 
experienced and interpreted by those individuals.  Because the personal is 
the domain for auto-ethnography,66 this methodology provides good access 
into a context of research which so clearly extends beyond a systematic 
reconstruction of lived experience, but requires an all-round personal 
commitment from the participants. Such commitment entails disclosing 
and sharing important parts of their lives. This involves unfolding a 
narrative that is not merely factual, but extends to beliefs, ethics, 
psychological processes and articulations that are never the same but 
always the result of a mediation between variable social and environmental 
contingencies. All this can be summed up in the values of each individual. 
The concept of values, as Aadland reminds us, has been presented within 
qualitative research and social sciences in general as the core concept of 
human existence67. They are the “expressions of worth, or likes and dislikes 
concerning things, persons, principles, attitudes, beliefs, theories, as well as 
practices”68, the one factor that really makes a difference in the definition of 
                                                
66 Peter Kincheloe & Joe McLaren, Where are We Now? (New York: Peter Lang Publishing 
2007) 
67 Einar Aadland, 'Values in Professional Practice: Towards a Critical Reflective 
Methodology' in  Journal of Business Ethics  97:461–472 (2010) p.462 
68 Aadland, 'Values in Professional Practice: Towards a Critical Reflective Methodology', 
op. cit. p. 462 
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who we are and the way in which we interpret and decode experience. It is 
this kind of difference that Derrida seeks to get out of language: the need to 
allow meaning to form freely because it is only difference that can depict 
the way in which we conceive the world. In this respect, the choice of such 
a methodology has also the function to emphasise empirically the 
theoretical direction I take. 
 
The video diaries that I have chosen to analyse in the context of this 
research are independently produced, made available on the video channel 
YouTube and regularly updated by the users themselves. By this I mean 
that these diary logs are not part of a research project that I have designed 
and previously accorded with the participants, nor do they develop themes 
that respond to a third-party research agenda. Rather, they belong to 
singular individuals who have spontaneously and independently decided to 
share insights into their day-to-day narrative as transgenders. By observing 
documents which exist independently, regardless of my interest and 
scrutiny as researcher, and thus whose production is not intended as a 
research project participation, I have the opportunity to gain more insights 
than I would if I was to induce the production of content where my 
presence would end up influencing and altering such sensitive data. The 
criteria according to which I have selected the abstracts that I present in the 
three diary sessions of this PhD are based on two main observations. The 
first observation was dictated by the themes tackled in this research: it was 
important to narrow down the vast amounts of data and concentrate on the 
three main aspects of the transgender lived experience: the compromise 
between identity and subjectivity imposed by the law (chapter 3), the 
spatial mediation of public spaces where the policing of toilets is 
emblematic of the contradictions and prejudice encountered by transgender 
individuals on a daily basis (chapter 4) and, of course, the implications of 
the transgender body as an ‘othered body’ alongside the narrative of the 
‘wrong body’ (chapter 5). These are the three theoretical quests that have 
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directly informed the selection of the diaries presented over the vast 
amount that is available on YouTube. Accordingly, the three empirical 
interludes that follow these chapters will focus respectively on the direct 
experience of individuals in relation to the Gender Recognition Act 2004 
and the Gender Recognition Certificate; the issues connected with the 
inflexible and sex-segregated spaces of public toilets, seen by many as a 
‘moment of truth’, a test that all transgender individuals feel strongly about 
and which often generates a great deal of anxiety and fear. In this context, it 
is interesting to explore such a symbolic rite in such a symbolic space 
through their most intimate accounts. Finally, the third diary session, 
reflects on the notion of the ‘wrong body’, a narrative which is used often 
by both transgender and non-transgender people to describe gender 
dysphoria and which defines transgender people as individuals ‘trapped in 
the wrong body’. Some theorists such as Jay Prosser,69 Henry Rubin,70 and 
Viviane K. Namaste71 have long highlighted that the transgender 
experience as it is lived by transgender people does not respond to the 
identity fragmentations envisioned in such a narrative and have explained 
that transsexual embodiment, for instance, is something more integral and 
unified than what it is thought to be 72. The diary accounts in this session 
appear to corroborate this theory and suggest the need for transgender 
subjectivity to exist only in relation to itself rather than an alternative story 
to the gender binary.  
 
The second observation was influenced by the urge for this research to 
highlight a dissonant point of view. I am aware that both the Gender 
Reassignment Act 2004 and more recent initiatives, such as the Equality Act 
2010, are important steps forward in the battle for equality, and I 
                                                
69 Jay Prosser, Second Skin (Columbia University Press 1998) 
70 Henry Rubin, Self-made men: identity and embodiment among transsexual men (Vanderbilt 
University Press 2003) 
71 Viviane K. Namaste, Sex Change, Social Change: Reflections on Identity, Institutions and 
Imperialism (Toronto: Women’s Press 2005) 
72 Prosser, Second Skins, op. cit. 
 60 
acknowledge the significant change they have brought into the lives of 
many transgender. However, with this research I wish to question whether 
these solutions are the only ones possible. As the diary sessions will 
demonstrate, the Gender Reassignment Act 2004 as well as the process to 
gain a Gender Reassignment Certificate fail to account for those individuals 
who simply do not want to embrace an ideal of gender stability and thus, I 
argue, these provisions can create further divisions within the same 
community. It was then vital for this research to voice those alternative 
views and challenge the ways in which the crucial quest for equality is 
being presented and pursued. 
 
It is a stylistic choice to create a space solely dedicated to the diaries. 
Throughout the text I will draw parallels and make connections with the 
empirical accounts, but it was important, at the same time, to present these 
stories on their own, and let those narratives unfold away from any 
temptations to extrapolate theoretical meaning. There are two reasons for 
this: first, it is important to maintain their immediate impact and preserve 
their forceful impetus which, I fear, could be tamed if I attempted to 
present them alongside theoretical analysis. Second, the materiality and 
specificity of the stories told is such that they require the text to 
acknowledge that raw energy and recreate that sense of urgency which 
comes across when watching them.  
 
Finally, it is important to clarify that the selected fragments of video diaries 
reported in the three empirical interludes throughout this thesis do not 
intend to be representative of trans collectivity, nor do they indicate the 
unified tendency of a community which, as it is obvious, is formed of 
multiple voices and circumstances far wider than this research. They wish 
however to present, in the words of some transgender individuals 
themselves and through the contemporary technology of the vblog – 
metaphor of a virtuality that is real in the here and now of a present made 
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utopian by those individuals - the expression of a sentiment of discomfort 
regarding various aspects of their unaligned subjectivity and which can 
offer invaluable insights for future debate.  
 
 
1.3 Why This Research? 
This question is normally posed at the beginning and not at the end of a 
methodology chapter. By leaving it for the end, I cheekily hope that by now 
I will have at least partially answered it, if only for its theoretical relevance. 
As a non-transgender individual, I have long been interested in gender 
politics and, since a young age, I was fascinated with how the notion of 
gender. As it appeared to me then, gender is the first and most significantly 
determining element of the kind of existence one will have from the instant 
one is born to the moment of death. It comes before race, before health, 
before anything else. Gender – which I was not able to even name then, let 
alone understand – seemed to me the most important definer of people 
around me. Girls do certain things that boys do not do, wear what boys do 
not wear, play with toys that boys will not even look at, and the list went 
on. These given differences intrigued me then and continued to interest me 
growing up. Transgender experience at any level and its embodiment are 
sites wherein any pre-constructed and inculcated naturalistic notions on 
gender crash. Transgender subjectivity opens up questions that are not only 
important to transgender individuals but which interest every human 
being, for the understanding and acceptance of difference is something that 
touches our most personal sense of freedom as human beings and everyone 
can benefit from it.  
 
The strict and inflexible – at times paradoxical - manner in which 
transgender politics are managed, and the degree of discomfort which, as it 
will become apparent throughout this thesis, transgender individuals 
experience both privately and publically touches vulnerable parts of us all 
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as individuals. It engages us with notions of difference, relations, affectivity 
and freedom. It confronts us with our fears and insecurities, and begs 
questions that stretch far and beyond the particularity of transgender 
issues. It pushes us to consider the space in which we live and the various 
negotiations of one’s identity within that space, it requires rethinking 
through our rights to exist when that space fails to allow that process of 
social identification so important for the individual and its community. It 
also draws imaginary lines that orientate our existence and determine the 
ways in which many aspects of our lives are experienced. This only 
becomes more dramatic when it comes to transgender people because, 
unlike other subjectivities, theirs involves a radical reconsideration of body 
and mind and the way in which these are believed to inform each other. 
Moreover, because the very essence of their being questions the 
unquestionable nature of gender and presents theoretical, conceptual and 
visual challenges, their social location is considered problematic. 
Reworking these notions and relocate transgender and its specificity at the 
centre of a narrative of its own, thus demonstrating that transgender can 
exist – and does exist – beyond normativity and the binary is the ultimate 
purpose of my investment in this research. 
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Chapter Two 
Actualised Utopias 
 
 
“There's no need to fear or hope,  
but only to look for new weapons”1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
José Esteban Muñoz opens his book on queer utopias stating that 
“queerness is not here yet. Queerness is an ideality… an ideality that can be 
distilled from the past and used to imagine a future…Queerness - continues 
Muñoz - is a longing that propels us onward…Queerness is essentially 
about the rejection of the here and now”2. He identifies queer utopias with 
an idea of futurity as an attempt to think of something else that goes 
beyond the “here and now”, an act of resistance,  “the present is not 
enough. It is impoverished and toxic for queers and other people who do 
not feel the privilege of majoritarian belonging, normative tastes and 
‘rational‘ expectations...The present must be known in relation to the 
alternative temporal and spatial maps provided by a perception of past and 
future affective worlds”3. This chapter aims to show just the opposite. The 
argument I make here is that queer utopias – transgender - is a futurity of 
the here and of the now, a virtuality that does not belong to the past nor does 
it lend itself to projections of the future, but it is totally immersed in the 
very now of the present.  
 
                                                
1 Gilles Deleuze “Postscript on the Society of Control” in October, Vol. 59. (Winter, 1992), 
pp. 3-7. 
2 José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia, the Then and There of Queer Futurity (NYU University 
Press, 2009) p.1 
3 Muñoz, Cruising Utopia, op. cit. p.27 
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The notion surrounding futurity and its implication in the development of 
queer theory has become one of the main areas of enquiry because it 
presents us with a set of challenges that question the current normative 
political engagement with gender and sexuality.  Futurity is undoubtedly a 
fascinating concept that transgender captures in a rather unique way. A 
scent of futurity indeed is given by transgender embodiment, a site of 
curious contradictions4 difficult to map out because of the complex post-
human relations it is capable of developing.5  Certainly, as Muñoz himself 
suggests, a sense of futurity is also in the function of queer utopianism he 
argues for. However, I suggest that trans desperately needs to be located in 
the present materiality of a here and a now, not projected in the futurity of a 
there and then in order for us to be able to contextualise it differently and to 
break out of the normativity discourse in which it is so deeply immersed. 
Muñoz’s theory draws from Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Utopia6 and makes 
an argument based on hope for queer, where the anticipatory futurity of the 
not-yet is framed as a hopeful methodology “knowable, to some extent, as a 
utopian feeling”7. In doing so, he reads utopian performativity as an 
indication of a ‘being’ that exists but is “not yet here”.  The here and now are 
presented as “a version of reality that naturalises cultural logics such as 
capitalism and heteronormativity”8. Elsewhere he writes: “Although 
utopianism has become the bad object of much contemporary political 
                                                
4 Halberstam, In a Queer Time & Place, op. cit. 
5 Rosi Braidotti’s most recent book, The Posthuman, analyses how, in the post-humanist 
era of genetically modified food, sensorial technology and advanced robotic societies, the 
position of the post-human body can overcome the humanistic unit of the subject. This, for 
Braidotti, would involve the dissolution of social categories and the organisation of a 
‘cosmopolitan neo-humanism’ which allows for new sustainable relations between all 
species. Roberto Esposito’s Third Person, similarly, questions the definition of ‘personal’ 
which, in his account, has only served to determine and justify evil against humans. He 
then envisions the realm of the impersonal wherein personhood does not act on behalf of a 
sense of community, but only as one singular, stripped down of all attached values, where 
one is one and many ‘ones’ move past the person, in the impersonal. 
6 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope (3 Volumes) trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and 
Paul Knight, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press) 1986 
7 Muñoz, Cruising Utopia, op. cit. p.3 
8 Ibid. p.12 
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thinking, we nonetheless need to hold on to and even risk utopianism if we 
are to engage in the labor of making a queer world”9.  
 
Neither Deleuze alone, nor in his work with Félix Guattari have explicitly 
engaged with utopia. What I want to track down is not so much a 
genealogy of utopia or a story that spells out acts of utopianism within 
transgender subjectivity, but to highlight a utopian ethics in their work 
from which, I believe, trans politics and the way this multi-faceted and ever 
changing subjectivity can benefit. I am interested in revealing a mode of 
utopia as a way of thinking about the present. Such an argument requires 
framing utopia in an imaginary of material affectivity that finds its outmost 
force in the active involvement with the multiplicity of the present. 
 
The questions I have in mind throughout this chapter are the following: 
What can understanding trans subjectivity in terms of utopia of the 
present lead to in relation to the way in which trans is at present being 
managed within the legal/medical framework? Can utopian ethics offer 
and sustain a new framework? 
 
Utopianism, as I frame it in this research, is the movement in the pursuit of 
a virtuality that is already real and that happens every day in and out of 
official recognition. It melds with forces and powerful spatial links that 
individuals have already learnt to understand and channel, and with which 
they compromise and negotiate their individuality, often struggling and 
delegitimised by a heteronormative discourse that mystifies and victimises 
them. Like any visions to pursue in life, it is motivated by desire and 
necessitates the radical restructuring and reconsideration of the disciplinary 
politics that govern subjectivity. The marginal bodies of this research 
already know this.  
 
The mistake in utopian thought, as Elizabeth Grosz notes, is that it confuses 
                                                
9 José Esteban Muñoz, Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics 
(University of Minnesota Press 1999) p. 25 
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a possibility for a virtuality, thus failing to think of utopia as a temporality.10 
Until the framing of the present is influenced by the anticipatory force held 
by the dimension of the future, utopia will remain an impossibility and a 
necessity. However, if we can reconceive the temporality of time according 
to the ethics of multiplicity – which are the opposite of hierarchical 
dualisms and identity categories – we will be able to let go of fixed realities 
and, instead, open up unbounded spaces for autonomous becomings. A 
crucial aspect of utopianism, or of thinking utopian, is that it cannot be 
mere execution, that is, it is not the realisation of a plan – however forward 
- that already exists. This is, in a way, what Manfredo Tafuri’s critique 
focuses on. In his view, utopia will remain an impossibility because it is 
always overtaken by distorted forms which are typical of rampant 
capitalistic societies11 and which will inevitably influence its outreach. In 
Tafuri’s negative analysis, the only possibility to conceive of utopian spaces 
is not by realising ideals, but through thinking beyond what is known (a no 
place, quite literally) to any ideology or movement and find new techniques 
capable of dissolving the crisis given by dialectical synthesis. 
 
Utopia, as we will see throughout this research, is not a place to reach (or 
even, a non-place to reach), nor a spatial absence to colonise and 
appropriate. This approach privileges the place over the journey to get 
there, and fails to see that utopia, as queer and as transgender, is more 
about the movement of material transformations and corporeal 
intersectionality rather than the realisation of an abstract impossibility or 
the accomplishment of a task. The diary abstracts that will support my 
theory will be indicative of this sentiment: many transgender individuals, 
as we will see, are more concerned with the ways in which they negotiate 
their subjectivity every day, and the compromises they are called to make, 
rather than obtain recognition of a status that often will not fully represent 
                                                
10 Elizabeth Grosz, Architecture from the Outside. Essays on Virtual and Real Spaces (MIT Press 
2001) p. 135 
11 Manfredo Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia. Design and Capitalist Development (MIT Press 
1976) 
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them. Their lives, the contagious material endeavours manifested in their 
incessant search for self-representation and the urgency to endure and 
establish their own unique story over the myriads of other stories depict a 
pure sense of utopianism. What matters to them, often, is not only to 
establish whether they resemble a man or a woman, nor if their voices 
match their gender or if their bodies look natural. These, contrarily, seem to 
be simplifications that, while important, fail to account for – and often 
distract from - that unique and unrepeatable experience of writing their 
own narratives. 
 
 
2.1   Utopia of the Not-Yet 
Although utopia as focus of academic enquiry first emerged in the 1960s, 12 
fascination with this concept roots back in mythological novels of literary 
nature and, later on, in a number of political and philosophical 
commentaries that provide insights into what was considered utopian at 
different times within different realities13. The themes discussed as well as 
the methods of enquiry varied, but what these early studies had in common 
is an overbridging quest for social progress, the function of utopia as an 
ideal that cannot be reached, yet it was useful to keep searching, hoping 
and progressing14. Attached to this fundamental human need for social and 
personal advancement was an almost primordial unhappiness with a 
present condition which was felt as inadequate and restrictive and therefore 
“the proper role of utopia [was] to criticise the present”.15 
 
Bloch’s utopia is a work of productive imagination, “venturing beyond”16, 
                                                
12  Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, op. cit. p.11 
13 Moritz Kaufmann’s Utopias (London: Kegal Paul, 1879), Lewis Mumford’s The Story of 
Utopia (Girvin Press, 1922), Joyce Hertzler’s  History of Utopian Thought (New York: 
Macmillan, 1923),  Negley and Patrick’s The Quest for Utopia (Maryland: McGrath, 1971). 
14 See B. Goodwill and K. Taylor, The Politics of Utopia (Peter Lang, 2009); Levitas, The 
Concept of Utopia, op. cit.; Patricia Vieira and Michael Marder (eds), Existential Utopia, New 
Perspectives on Utopian Thought (New York, London: Continuum 2012) 
15 Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, op. cit. p.39 
16 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, op. cit. p. 4  
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that is, it comes from the belief that wishful imagination of something that 
is not yet assumes a hopeful function which can produce advancement in 
humanity. Hope has a utopian function insofar as utopia is an imaginative 
idea which extends to the future as a directional promise of other  - better – 
possibilities. In other words, it stems from the necessity to find something 
else beyond the now, a way “into the future possibilities of being different 
and better"17.“The Now is the place where the immediate hearth of 
experience in general stands...As immediately being there, it lies in the 
darkness of the moment. Only what is just coming up or what had just 
passed has the distance that the beam of growing consciousness needs to 
illuminate it.18 It is through the productive function of imagination that, for 
Bloch, the spatio-temporal distance between an unsatisfactory now – reality 
as it is – and our true wishes – hope – can be shortened and advance 
towards a future that remains not-yet as we imagine it, but that may be. The 
‘Not-Yet Conscious’ is then the utopian potential of the unconscious, which 
wishes possibilities that are still in the not-yet space but anticipate what 
might be. It is down to the ‘Not-Yet Become’ to transform that anticipatory 
wish into material change. The shift between these two moments of Bloch’s 
utopia is the potentiality between what one dreams of and what the 
physical world can actually accommodate and transform into reality. The 
function of imagination as a productive incentive for change should not be 
seen as an abstract endeavour, Bloch maintains. He makes it clear that 
hopeful wishing must be contained within parameters of attainability in 
order for it to become concrete utopia, which is to be distinguished from 
abstract utopia, based on impossibility. “Pure wishful thinking has 
discredited utopias for centuries, both in pragmatic political terms and in all 
other expressions of what is desirable; just as if every utopia were an 
abstract one”19. What is interesting is that Bloch gives utopia a double 
function: the ontological materialism to remain in the ‘real-possible’ and the 
future anticipation which pushes the horizon further and sets bigger goals 
                                                
17 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, op. cit. p. 144 
18 Ibid. p. 287 
19 Ibid. p. 58 
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each time. 
 
The quest for human progress culminated in the rejection of a present that 
is often alien in Bloch is certainly of Marxist abstraction and, in essence, 
revolves around the primary preoccupation to transform society. The vast 
majority of the criticism attracted by Bloch is concerned with the overly 
idealistic approach, which Levitas identifies with the unrealistic 
expectations to expect change without confronting the constraints of the 
outside world20 but only, in a way, through the force of consciousness – 
however concrete its dreams might be - is a concern expressed by Zygmund 
Bauman. For the most part Bauman shares some of the hopeful optimism of 
Bloch but, unlike Bloch, he remains immersed in the reality of today’s 
problems and through the resolution of such problems he builds the 
condition for a better tomorrow,21 displaying an attitude that, in Pierre 
Bourdieu’s words, can be summed up in the wish to “control the present in 
order to be able to shape the future”.22  
 
I argue that the dimension of the ‘Not-Yet’ in Bloch – be it Conscious or 
Become – delineates a limbo that fluctuates in a static space wherein the 
generative force that utopia is initially attributed is arrested by contingency. 
In other words: the realisation or non-realisation of that imagination that, in 
theory, should move towards change, is totally reliant on the external 
conditions which might or might not actualise it. This anticipatory form of 
wishing, then, while provides  - as Muñoz suggests - a methodology in the 
way that it can propel an impulse towards progression, it also delegates the 
utopianism of futurity to pure function and never really fulfils that need to 
become concrete, not even in its second stage, the stage of the ‘Not-Yet 
Become’.  Bloch’s optimism and the dream of a better society, typical traits 
of his Marxist background, direct such a notion of utopia towards a conflict 
                                                
20 Levitas, The Concept of Utopia, op. cit. p. 118 
21 Zygmund Bauman, Socialism: The Active Utopia (New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publishers, 1976) 
22 Cited in The Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman: Challenges and Critique ed. by P. Poder (M.H. 
Jacobsen Ashgate 2008) p. 223 
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between transcendence and abstractism which seems to totally incorporate 
experience in the equation. Bloch says: “The Here and Now, what is 
repeatedly beginning in nearness, is a utopian category, in fact the most 
central one; even though, in contrast to the annihilating circulation of a 
Nothing, to the illuminating circulation of an All, it has not yet even entered 
time and space”.23 Consequently, perhaps even more regrettably, we have 
the ideal, which is nothing other than a future disconnected from the 
present, and we have reality, which is a present deprived of any substance 
or potential because its only function, as present, is to anticipate a future 
dimension that it (the present) does not retain. In such a vision, it is not only 
the future that appears idealised in its not-yet limbo, but also the present 
(the here and now), emptied of its organic connection to the future. Adorno 
points out the same concern: “the counterfactual yet-to-come, is draped in 
black. It goes on being a recollection of the possible with a critical edge 
against the real: it is a kind of imaginary restitution of that catastrophe, 
which is world history: it is freedom which did not come to pass under the 
spell of necessity and which may well not come to pass ever at all”.24 
 
Furthermore, there is in this view an almost compulsive attempt to control 
the chaos (the possibilities) of the future in favour of an attitude towards 
serial rationality that, for Tafuri, can be identified with succumbing to 
ideology logics, that is, the internalisation of political agendas as models to 
pursue.25  Tafuri identifies fear for the unknown – the future – as the main 
reason why utopianism is, by definition, impossible. He says: “To turn 
ideology into utopia…ideology had to negate itself as such, break its own 
crystallised forms, and throw itself entirely into he construction of the 
future”.26   However, as Jameson argues, this is not to say that an 
ideological edge to utopianism is necessarily a negative factor.27 On the 
                                                
23 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, op. cit.  
24 Cited in David Drew’s Introduction to E. Bloch (1985) Essays in the Philosophy of Music 
(Cambridge University press: Cambridge) p. xl 
25 Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia. Op. cit. pp.91-93 
26 Ibid. p.50 
27 Fredric Jameson, “Architecture and the Critique of Ideology” in Architecture Theory since 
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contrary, it can be an incentive to keep challenging the mutually informed 
relationship of ideology and status quo, “this opening space for anti-status 
quo visions”28. Although one must consider that Tafuri’s views are more 
suitable and informative when considered within their original 
architectural context,29 his ideas are nonetheless philosophically charged 
and express with pungent rationality the miscommunication between 
utopia as chaos and utopia as a propaganda instrument based on the ideal 
of growth and expansion to surpass the alienating limits of reality – seen as 
the deterrent - which reduces utopian spaces to “sublime uselessness”.30 For 
Tafuri, the avant-guarde movements that promised a utopia vision of the 
future31 have failed precisely because they have not been able to move away 
from the alienation of capitalism and have given in to its pressure thus 
becoming mere instruments for further control.32 
 
While Tafuri’s critique highlights, on one hand, the structural impossibility 
of such a configuration of utopia, on the other it also confirms the need for 
that a priori negation that triggers the necessity for a utopian imaginary in 
the first place.  That condition of “tarrying with the negative”,33 vital in 
Hegelian dialectics, then, fuels that declared impossibility which 
nonetheless finds its reason to exist insofar as that not-yet space remains 
unfulfilled. The question of this perennial mediation between positive and 
negative – as understood by Tafuri – can only be overcome through a total 
                                                                                                                                   
1968 (MIT Press, 2000) pp. 440-462 
28 Frank Cunningham, “Triangulating Utopia: Benjamin, Lefebvre, Tafuri” in City, Volume 
14, Issue 3 June 2010 268-280 p.273 
29 Tafuri’s main philosophical analysis is concerned with how capitalistic developments 
and the pursuit of various ideologies – in politics as well as art - have deprived the city of 
its utopian dimension. Besides the cited Architecture and Utopia, Tafuri engages with these 
notions also in another important publication: The Sphere and the Labyrinth, Avant-gardes and 
Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s (MIT Press) 
30 Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia. Op. cit. p. ix 
31 Here Tafuri specifically refers to the early 20th Century movements such as Cubism, 
Futurism, Constructivism, Surrealism, Dadaism. In his view, these movements have failed 
to dissolve the dialectical synthesis between chaos and order, freedom and control old and 
new. 
32 Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia. Op. cit. pp. 92-96 
33 G.W.F.Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977) p.19 
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abandonment and acceptance of the void, “to save oneself one must lose 
oneself”.34 This reciprocal “forward and backward at the same time”,35 
which is nothing other than experience overrun by the mediation between 
an absolute that is not-yet and an irrational and deluded specificity which 
can never be, underscores a tension between the real – present - which is 
utopian, and the utopian which in fact is not-yet, the only quasi-condition 
of a possibility for the real. Max Blechman puts it more effectively by saying 
that “the melancholic experience of the less puts the emphasis on the more 
that the individual is in the form of not yet being it – i.e., on the pledge of 
an identity itself prefigured as potential”.36 This double dimension of 
promise/anticipation of the Not-Yet is then highly problematic because it 
sets us away from immanence altogether in favour of a dual vision wherein 
consciousness is transcendently dependent on the present possibility of 
society to enact change and, at the same time, conditioned by an ideal of 
futurity which might remain just that, an ideal.  
 
Muñoz falls in the same trap: he claims that spaces of today can inform and 
instigate the spaces of tomorrow and traces his utopian genealogy through 
a variety of queer phenomenology experiences selected amongst the 
subcultures of queers of colour, women of colour, street artists and 
performers and through those alternative, marginal existences, he 
delineates the aesthetics of queer utopianism, insisting on the endless 
modes of being that emerge from queer culture. This is the point of access 
through which we are shown that queer utopianism is possible. However, 
despite Munoz’s attempt to emphasise an underscoring materiality, 
stressing the importance of concrete utopia, his account still sounds 
“willfully idealized”, to use his own words37: his continuous returning to 
the past to read what is missing in the present appears reluctant because of 
                                                
34 Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia. Op. cit. p.50 
35 Theodor W. Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, trans. S.W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 1993) p.136 
36 Max Blechman, “Not-Yet”: Adorno and the Utopia of Conscience” in Cultural Critique, 
70, Fall 2008, pp. 177-198 
37 Muñoz, Cruising Utopia, op. cit. p.86 
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the lack of political reach in the queer accounts he uses to delineate his 
utopianism.38 In a sense, although he maintains queer utopias are a 
collectively shared labour, what comes across from his archives are the 
isolated individual stories of subcultural narratives: the materiality of his 
queer performativity fails to lead to political relevance and it is difficult to 
grasp the passage from possibility to actuality. In a sense, without knowing, 
Muñoz reproduces and confirms the impossibility of that Not-Yet limbo 
where “the radical promise” of queer utopia never finds the necessary 
invested deployment in real life. A real life made of heterogeneous and 
promiscuous urban practices and the exposure to an often hostile and 
difficult to penetrate sociality wherein there is more than state consent at 
stake - turns Muñoz’s “concrete” utopia into material impossibility. Let us 
freeze this concept here for the time being and move on to consider the 
temporality of the future from a different perspective.  
 
 
2.2 No Present, No Future 
Muñoz’s hopeful futurity as an optimistic turn for the emancipation of 
queer, finds no support at all in Lee Edelman and Leo Bersani’s passionate 
polemic on the rethorics of happiness and communal affectivity. Leo 
Bersani’s Homos expresses skepticism for “the rage for respectability so 
visible in gay life today”.39 According to Bersani, the trends in queer theory 
follow a script of tolerance which exhaust, if not neutralise, the subversive 
challenge they should cultivate. Bersani’s famous provocation “should a 
                                                
38 Munoz’s engagement with the political potential of queer is rather thin and is never done 
outside of the realm of performativity. The only instance where his discussion connects 
with sovereign power is through the aesthetics of performativity and the visual impact it 
has. In particular he does so by analysing the management of violence against queer 
people in New York under the “Giuliani regime” (2009: 63) and the policing of collectives 
of “queer energies” (2009: 64) marching in public spaces.  “The state”, he says, 
“understands the need to keep us from knowing ourselves, knowing our masses... [It] 
understands the power of our masses...The utopian promise of our public performance 
was responded to with shattering force. Even though this impromptu rebellion was 
overcome easily by the state, the activist anger, a productive, generative anger, let those 
assembled in rage glean a queer future within a repressive heteronormative present” (2009: 
64). 
39 Leo Bersani, Homo (Harvard University Press 1996) p. 113 
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homosexual be a good citizen”? questions whether queer theory should 
continue to follow the path set out by heteronormativity or, rather, 
rediscover its own specificity. Similarly, Elderman’s ‘No Future’ challenges 
the reproductive power children retain within society and their promise for 
“a reality guaranteed, not threatened by time, sustained by certainty” and 
the illusion of immortality that they feed.  
 
The so-called ‘anti-social’ politics in queer theory root back to Guy 
Hocquenghem’s book Homosexual Desire where he wrote that the history of 
civilisation stands on oppression and “forms the interpretive grid through 
which desire becomes cohesive energy”40 channelled into a Oedipal 
heteronormative force. According to Hocquenghem, there can never be a 
revolution of dominant heteronormative cultural practices until the notion 
of desire is reworked. “Revolutionary demands must be derived from the 
very movement of desire; it isn’t only a new revolutionary model that is 
needed, but a new questioning of the content traditionally associated with 
the term ‘revolution’, particularly the notion of seizure of power”41. 
Hocquenghem’s work is concerned with the social emergency 
homosexuality was associated with in the early 90s, the stigma of AIDS 
associated to it and the way danger was dealt with. Through his analysis, 
what is important to notice - as it will be the founding principle of the anti-
social turn in queer theory - is the idea that desire can be revolutionary only 
when it opposes to social order, not when it becomes part of a civilised 
ideology. The question this raises is: why would one want to be a civilised 
citizen? 
 
Bersani is concerned with the ‘desexualising discourses’ that surround 
desire. The social strive to naturalise non-conforming sexualities, on the one 
hand, aims to de-trigger the politically disruptive aspect of homo-ness, on 
the other, it works as a boost “in order to continue exercising and enjoying 
                                                
40 Guy Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1993) p. 137 
41 Ibid. p. 135 
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the privileges of dominance”.42 Accordingly, acceptance too assumes the 
contours of a politically orchestrated game of give and take, designed to 
control and neutralise what could disrupt, to transform “gay men into 
infinitely fascinating taboos, ... less dangerous to look”.43 Bersani’s main 
argument revolves around the idea that queer studies have fundamentally 
forgotten how to be queer, that is, they have failed to account for sexual 
specificity and, at the same time, in their preoccupation to gain legitimation 
and status, they have created an inclusive queer narrative that shuns the 
multiple and contradicting ways one can be queer. Significantly, Bersani’s 
critique was published at a time when queer studies were just emerging as 
an independent scholarship, and the performative theory of Judith Butler 
had introduced new perspectives on how to enact gender. In such a context, 
his negative approach echoed more loudly and, in a way, gave origin to a 
‘negative perspective’ revisited and enhanced by Lee Edelman and his 
famous call for ‘No Future’. 
 
What Edelman adds to the argument – more to the point in this context -  is 
the notion of reproductive futurism which “impose[s] an ideological limit 
on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute 
privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside 
the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing 
principle of communal relations”.44 Reproductive futurism develops a 
cultural and political rhetoric that works towards the continuation of 
civilisation - of the species, in a way - through enhancing the sacrality of 
heterosexuality.  
 
With the cry: “fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we’re 
collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the 
poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital l’s and small; 
                                                
42 Bersani, Homos, op. cit. p.5 
43 Bersani, Homos, op. cit. p.21 
44 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press 2004) p.2 
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fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as 
it prop”45, Edelman identifies children  - supreme symbol of hope and 
future - as tools for political machinations of rhetoric on an ideal of future 
which is only the faithful reproduction of this present. “The Child, that is, 
marks the fetishistic fixation of heteronormativity, an erotically charged 
investment in the rigid sameness of identity that is central to the 
compulsory narrative of reproductive futurism”46. Children, he says, are the 
embodiment of futurity, a project that looks forwards, the most powerful 
result of the socio-political investment in heteronormativity, the 
embodiment of the past, present and future of civilisation.  
 
Both Bersani and Edelman are concerned with the sociality of queerness 
insofar as sociality is the expression of a cultural hegemony. In a context 
where to exist and be recognised one must abide, absorb and reproduce, 
they suggest that this sociality is not worth taking on and only in a total 
refusal of affectivity, sociality and emotional participation do they find a 
way for queerness to exist coherently, that is, as an opposing force, not 
compromised by trade-offs with heteronormative manoeuvres. So we have 
it that sociality requires a de-centring of the social order. “Rather than a life-
force connecting pleasure to life, survival and futurity, sex and particularly 
homo-sex and receptive sex, [the sexual instinct] is a death drive that 
undoes the self, releases the self from the drive for mastery and coherence 
and resolution”47.  
 
The provocations in Bersani and Edelman’s works can be, then, summed up 
as follows: Community politics have not produced the desired results, the 
assimilation of the predominant values have not led to freedom, the 
definition of oneself through the identification with a productive normality 
has hidden and not resolved the matter: why, then, continue enacting this 
                                                
45 Edelman, No Future, op. cit. p.29 
46 Edelman, No Future, op. cit. p.21 
47 Judith Halberstam, “The Anti-Social Turn in Queer Studies” in The Graduate Journal of 
Social Science, 2008 Vol.5 Issue 2 p. 140 
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community spirit and participate into a vision of futurity that, for queers, is 
death? Rather than being marginalised by an idea of society that rejects 
queers, why not make the conscious decision to reject sociality and become 
a marginal body? 
 
The centrality of Edelman’s views in this research is expressed by what he 
calls ‘reproductive futurism’, a temporality that, he argues, insists on 
presenting an idealised future, thus conferring it (the future) a superior 
value over the present and therefore promoting politics that preserves a 
logic “where futurism always anticipates, in the image of an imaginary 
past, a realization of meaning that will suture identity by closing that gap, 
queerness undoes the identities through which we experience ourselves as 
subjects”48. This encourages a political and social justification of the failures 
and lacks of identity politics of the present, in view of a future which, 
Edelman argues, is in fact an illusion, for it is corrupted by the reproduction 
of sameness. Paradoxically, in Edelman view, it is hope for the future that 
kills the potentiality of queer in the present, which, by contrast, is what 
Muñoz’s utopia relies on: the temporality of “the coercive choreography of 
a here and now”49 which inspires a utopian future in the ‘there’ and ‘then’. 
 
Muñoz and Edelman present two approaches in considering the future 
which I find equally problematic: the former, as highlighted in the previous 
section of this chapter, over-relies on a productive form of future which 
never fully keeps its promise because it freezes its potentiality in a not-yet 
dimension that ends up neutralising instead of enhancing it. Furthermore, 
the politics of affirmative relationality and futurity as envisioned by Muñoz 
are too closely linked to the hegemonic rhetoric of happiness50 and fail to 
account for vulnerability or instability, in favour of rosy assumptions 
which, in fact, do not match a realistic consideration of the state of affairs. 
                                                
48 Edelman, No Future, op. cit. p.24 
49 Muñoz, Cruising Utopia, op. cit. p. 162 
50 See for example Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness (Duke University Press, 2010) 
where she challenges the socially constructed imperative to be happy and argues that the 
pursuit of happiness has often justified oppression.  
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Reality for transgender people – and this is, in my view, the main limit of 
Muñoz’s analysis – is not about writing poetry, theatre performances, 
radical activism and underground forms of art. It is rather the constant 
renegotiation of their subjectivity with the friction they encounter and with 
which they must come to terms with in their day-to-day existence. Muñoz’s 
utopia is a luxury that not very many individuals can afford. As we will see 
more in detail later in my examinations of the video diaries, most of them 
are just too busy getting on with the mundanity of a life which, more often 
than not, presents threats to their personal security, well-being and basic 
human rights and where nothing can be assumed, but everything is to be 
conquered every day. 
 
Edelman’s account, too, shows a manifest teleological approach towards the 
politics of the present. In particular, his conceiving of the future as 
sameness and therefore the closure towards all the possibilities of 
contamination and encounters betrays that “ethical” demand he himself 
puts of queer to subvert a future which by his own terms, does not serve its 
purpose. So, if the present is disappointing and the future will not be any 
better, from where does Edelman draw any potentiality to enact change? To 
build a new ethics of utopianism that can account for the mode of futurity 
embodied by transgender subjectivities, I wonder if the argument still 
needs to be articulated in either impossible hope or self-annihilating 
cynicism. Is there a path we can follow beyond the mutually exclusive hope 
and negativity, construction and deconstruction, sociality and inwardness?  
 
Queer theory’s failure to engage with difference effectively roots in the 
inability to let go of essentialisms and concepts that simply cannot paint a 
different picture than what has been available thus far. This is because it is 
too fundamentally immersed in a double optic, the same double optic that 
queer proposes to dismantle. This means that the only possible 
consideration of futurity must be done using a totally new and different set 
of spatial and temporal tools capable of cracking that normative 
imperialism that has dominated the debate. I shall take up the challenge. 
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The first question to pose is not, then, what is the future, rather: when is the 
future? And is it possible to reconsider utopia through the temporal 
relocation of the future?   
 
So, one the one side we have the double dimension of the mutually 
exclusive dichotomy present/future conceived on a hierarchy between 
reality – however disconnected from the real - and imagination, the 
productive hopefulness that, in Bloch, connects the now to a then we are 
not sure about. The wishing subject projects its wishful hope to an object 
that is responsible for its realisation. This system of knowledge whereby 
conscience is a result of the transcendental mediation between a space that 
one wishes and a space that might happen is limiting, for it creates a void 
that neither the subject nor the object can fill. On the other side we have the 
abolition of the dual relationship subject/object and all we are left with is 
the self. Deleuze’s concept of difference – briefly touched on in the previous 
chapter – is paramount here.  Deleuze allows us to relocate the space of 
action of the subject – which is no longer subject but is simply self – right 
back into the self so that its full being – fully expressing and living – 
happens internally and does not depend on any external relations. In a way, 
we can think of a self that is fully formed and self-sufficient in the totality of 
its being.  This body – the self – in being a whole unit is also different, 
where difference, far from comparative, is to be considered a difference in 
being. In other words, the self is different only by virtue of being, which 
means that its modes – to which we will go back later – of being respond 
solely to one command, that of being what they are. So, how does the self 
find its whole inside and how can it surpass the limits of transcendence? 
 
 
2.3 Temporal Immanence 
The first step to take in this attempt to reframe utopia as a mode of the 
present is by understanding the difference between immanence and 
transcendence. Deleuze’s concept of immanence – or better still, of 
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ontological immanence – derives from Nietzsche and Spinoza, and it is first 
of all, as Deleuze himself declares, an ethical choice, “a mode of living, a 
way of Life”51, an ethical (and ontological) self-empowerment, we could 
say, where being is nothing other than being itself and life finds its 
completion.  
 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1891) Nietzsche develops the concept of the 
Übermensch, presented as the ideal goal humanity can set out for itself in 
order to achieve self development. This concept has attracted much 
criticism52 and its consequent symbolism around the Nietzschean imagery 
of the death of God and its reactionary values against the morals of 
Christianity, but it is relevant here because, as David Lane suggests, it 
“symbolises the promised end product of a process of overcoming all pre-
established cultural values of transcendence, and, as such, based upon a 
faith in materiality, the senses and the earth”53. From here and through the 
work of Deleuze, I suggest, it is possible to draw a sense of how the 
mundanity of life immersed in the materiality of the present can become 
enacted revolutionary utopianism.  
 
The split between good and evil or even between truth and lie is formulated 
by Nietzsche in terms of the ‘otherworldly’ and its opposite, what is 
commonly named ‘thiswordly’. The ‘otherworldly’ and the ‘thisworldly’ 
stand for transcendence (“heaven”), that “inhuman dehumanised world 
which is a heavenly Nothing”54 as opposed to empiricism (“truth”). On the 
one side, the clashing dimensions of science and on the other, its 
transcendental double: faith. Nietzsche’s position in this binarism, 
                                                
51 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1988) p.122 
52 The Ubermensch has been associated to the Nazi regime and was given a racial 
connotation in the pursuit of the ideal of the master Aryan race.  Moreover, the 
Ubermensch was used in eugenics to argue for the genetic improvement of humanity 
through the reproduction of desired traits. 
53 David Lane, “The Worldly and the Otherworldly. On the ‘Utopianism of Deleuze’s 
Thought” in Philament HABITS & HABITAT, June 2008, 86-106 p.91 
54 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (NY, London: Penguin 1969) p.59 
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delivered through the character of Zarathustra, is: “remain true to the earth, 
and do not believe those who speak to you of superterrestrial hopes!”. 55 In 
this sentence Nietzsche expresses the fundamental split between this world 
and the other world, between divine and terrain and highlights a form of 
materialism – ‘being true to the earth’ - that is essential to becoming 
Ubermensch56.  
 
Deleuze’s understanding of transcendence preserves this formal split: it is 
everything beyond being, an illusion, “any organisation that comes from 
above and refers to transcendence, be it a hidden one, can be called a 
theological plan: a design in the mind of a god, but also as evolution in the 
supposed depths of nature, or a society’s organization of power. It always 
involves forms and their developments, subjects and their formations…it 
                                                
55 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra op. cit. p.42 
56 It is relevant here, as background information that, for Nietzsche, the Cogito’s 
essentialism and moralism go hand-in-hand. What Nietzsche generally defines as the 
danger of morality and its relation to the emergence of “that little changeling, the ‘subject” 
(On the Genealogy of Morals, New York: Vintage, p. 45) is the product of a process of 
internalisation of ‘bad conscience’, that is, the illusion of a psychic interiority that, through 
a moment of internalisation (Verinnerlichung), regulates and polices itself to enter the moral 
order “enclosed within the walls of society” (Ibid.: 84). Moral and juridical order, instead of 
breeding justice and no violence values, internalise “hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting” 
(Ibid.) and use them to produce the subject with a conscience which, for Nietzsche, is 
nothing other than the self-governing discipline the sovereign uses to ensure moral order. 
The image of man that turned backward against man himself” (Ibid.: 85)  is the image of 
the rejection of the body that, in the sovereign subject, turns against life itself “life itself has 
become repugnant to him” (Ibid.:67). This self-repugnance, for Nietzsche the foundation of 
subjectivity, is the consequence of the Cartesian’s body/mind split. Foucault’s History of 
Madness (1961) envisions a similar journey to subjectivity whereby morality - or the 
bourgeois order, as Foucault calls it - and indeed a sense of sociality that comes with moral 
authority, is resulted through the internalisation of violence which “produces norms 
enforced not with the external methods of execution and torture but, rather, with the more 
effective, private internal weapons of “family values: scandal, guilt and shame” (Huffer, p. 
106). So, for Nietzsche and Foucault’s use of the morality of ‘bad conscience’, subjectivity is 
founded on the violence of morality, precisely on that passage where the subject 
internalises morality and turns backwards against itself. Moreover, as Foucault suggests 
and Deleuze confirms, the Cartesian absolutism places a limit to the free movement of 
thinking through the imposing supremacy of reason which is exclusionary and specific of a 
historical and cultural moment. The subject and its subjectivity are a product of that 
impossibility of the free movement of thinking. As both Huffer (2009) and Bell (2007) 
comment: The Cogito Ergo Sum mantra is here profoundly challenged by the uncertainty 
of thinking. An uncertainty – void, as Huffer calls it, that can no longer guarantee that 
where “there is thinking” there is discursive existence.  
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always implies a dimension supplementary to the dimensions of the 
given”.57 So, without the force of Being and the counterforce of the Act - 
or, in other words: without the Subject and its Object - life is one and it is 
unified with thought. Elsewhere transcendence is identified with 
“common sense, the unity of all the faculties at the centre of the Cogito, is 
the State consensus raised to the absolute” that threatens desire.58 The 
counterpart of common sense is the “schizofrephic” who, contrarily to 
transcendental essentialisms, is capable of producing nomadic thought.59 
 
 “Life activates thought, and thought in turn affirms life”.60 This mode 
happens immanently. Life in immanence is a unified force that proceeds 
by ‘variation’. It is a “streaming, spiralling, zigzagging, snaking, feverish 
line of variation [that] liberates a power of life that human beings had 
rectified and organisms had confined, and which matter now expresses as 
the trait, flow or impulse traversing it. If everything is alive, it is not 
because everything is organic or organized, but, on the contrary, because 
the organism is a diversion of life. In short the life in question is 
inorganic, germinal, and intensive, a powerful life without organs, a body 
that is all the more alive for having no organs”.61 The reverberation of its 
“streaming, spiralling zigzagging, snaking” is “complete power, complete 
bliss...no longer dependent on a Being or submitted to an Act - it is an 
absolute immediate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to 
a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life”.62  
 
“We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing 
else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is nothing 
is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute 
immanence: It is complete power, complete bliss. It is to the 
degree that he goes beyond the aporias of the subject and the 
                                                
57 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, op. cit. p.128 
58 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus op. cit. p. 376 
59 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti–Oedipus, op. cit. pp. 7-21 
60 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on a Life, trans. A. Boyman (New York: Zone 
Books 2001) p.66  
61 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus op. cit. p. 499 
62 Deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on a Life, op. cit. p. 27 
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object...no longer dependent on a Being or submitted to an Act - 
it is an absolute immediate consciousness whose very activity no 
longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life”.63  
 
Thus, immanence, that is, life (that is, a unified force) exists by means ‘of 
variation’ and only in a mode of becoming. Such movement of becoming 
that is immanence is a force both eternal and non-hierarchical; it does not 
go “from one point to another”64, for “a line of becoming is not defined by 
points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it 
passes between points, it comes up through the middle, it runs 
perpendicular to the points first perceived, transversally to the localizable 
relation to distant or continuous points. A point is always a point of origin. 
But a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, 
origin nor destination...A line of becoming has only a middle”.65 Nothing is 
outside of immanence which “is immanent only to itself and consequently 
captures everything, absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to 
which it could be immanent”66 and nothing exists if not in becoming. 
“Becoming is the movement by which the line frees itself from the point, 
and renders points indiscernible”.67 It is only by, in and through becoming 
that one can be. Anything that is outside of this immanent becoming - that 
is life - will serve trascendence and will weaken immanent life and its 
ability to keep producing the new. Similarly, what is not in the present is 
not in immanence (it is outside of life) and therefore unable to become, that 
is, to live. “Becoming cannot be conceptualized in terms of past and future... 
[It] remains indifferent to questions of a future and a past... it passes 
between the two”68. The concept of immanence is essential because in it we 
find the essence of specificity, “the impersonal yet singular life”69, a 
                                                
63 Deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on a Life, op. cit. p.27 
64 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus op. cit. p. 323  
65 Ibid. 
66 Deleuze, What is Philosophy? op. cit. p. 45 
67 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus op. cit. p. 324 
68 Ibid. p. 322 
69 Deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on a Life, op. cit. p. 28 
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“commitment”70 to empiricism that allows to begin from specific experience 
– molecular - as a condition for molar.  
 
Immanence then informs nomadic ethics, which Rosi Braidotti identifies 
with the multifunctional and complex flow of bodies, energies, desires and 
affects operate by “logic of invention”71 and are always conceived in terms 
of multiplicity - filled with “multiplicity which changes in nature when it 
divides”72 - an irrational force (or multiple forces) that bring together 
different and discontinuous degrees , shapes and forms. It is smooth space, 
a “heterogenous, in continuous variation ... amorphous”73 which 
deterritorialises and reterritorialises in a constant infectious movement 
from smooth to striate and back to smooth so to “to free up the fixed 
relations that contain a body all the while exposing it to new 
organisations”74.  These smooth spaces employed here are spaces of 
difference. They delineate the movements, the orientations and linkages (or 
lack of) in constant variation that do not rely on referential objects or points, 
but rather, move following haecceities, that is, singular modes of 
individuating relations in the world that go beyond mere definitions of 
good and evil, “since only the subject which incarnated it in the midst of 
things rendered it good or bad.75 In contrast to this, striated spaces 
(identified with the State) are sedentary, striated by trajectories, regulations, 
roads and directions. 
 
This process from striate state through newly created smooth space is the 
precise moment when the revolution of becoming takes place and, in its 
perpetual oscillation, it preserves being (Life) from the static and stiff 
crystallization of established norms. “Smooth space is constantly being 
translated, transformed into a striated space; striated space is constantly 
                                                
70 Colebrook, Understanding Deleuze, op. cit. p.82 
71 Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, op. cit. p. 113 
72 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus op. cit. p. 534 
73 Ibid. p. 536 
74 Adrian Parr, The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh University Press 2005) p. 67 
75 Deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on a Life, op. cit. p. 4 
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being reversed, returned to a smooth space”76 The turn of immanence 
which reverts to transcendence, from deterritorialized to reterritorialized 
and from new to old and back to new ensures the vitalism that is essential 
to life. The importance of spatiality in this thesis is paramount because it 
constitutes the primary and most inflexible interlocutor in the compromises 
transgender individuals must undertake in the day-to-day expression of 
their subjectivity. To conquer space  - from striated to smooth – is not only a 
question of external validation, but it is the victory of the specificity of one’s 
subjectivity over the smooth rendering to pre-established identities.  
 
2.4 Future in the Present 
The common understanding of temporal phases sees the present as the 
moment where past and future split. It is our day-to-day conceiving of time, 
a model that derives from Aristotle’s Physics, defined by a “number of 
movement in respect to before and after”77, where the past has a ‘no-longer’ 
dimension and the future holds a ‘not-yet’ anticipation, two containers 
where things take place in an infinite linear mode and where past and 
future are delineated by the position of the now. Heidegger opposes this 
very principle of eternal, time-less time. As I will go to explain in this 
chapter, his views deeply inform Deleuze’s understanding of time. 
Heidegger envisions time as a more cohesive dimension where the past 
takes up the effects of the present and the present provides a trajectory for 
what the future might become. Three distinct but far from separated 
moments, past, present and future are expressions of the same fold in the 
fact that what is in the past is connected to the future through he present. 
This is the human-centric analytical perspective of Heidegger that sees 
being in time. The Being-towards-death state of being places Heidegger’s 
emphasis on the Zukunkt (future): the anticipatory Zukommen (come forth, 
come towards) projects us to the future, yet future is not infinite, there is an 
                                                
76 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus op. cit. p. 524 
77 Aristotle Physics (Oxford’s World Classics 2008) 4.11.219b2, 220 a25 
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end to it. This is why, for Heidegger we have the possibility to shape our 
future and make it our own through the present, so not to ‘waste’ a chance 
and, at the same time, not to let that anticipation disappoint us. The novelty 
in this conception of time is that time is no longer seen as “a movable image 
of eternity”78, but it faces death. That is to say, it does not happen in a 
dimension of eternity, it is not an infinite series of linear ‘now’ points that 
passes us by, but “it is only for a being that lives with an awareness of its 
own mortality”79, that is, it has a deadline pending on it, death. 80  
 
With Deleuze time assumes yet another form. Temporality is not a domain 
of the human being only but has a horizon that goes beyond the human 
dimension. It does not have a chronology, but is “a formal network of 
processes…interacting with one another”81. For Deleuze there are no past or 
future as such: “we are travelling back and forward in time all the time with 
no need for special machines or for odd physical properties such as 
wormholes"82. There is only present. Present that assumes different forms, 
but is enacted only as present. Let me explain this better: the past is a series 
of memories of what happened (in the past) but is no longer happening, yet 
is being re-enacted in my memory at this moment and is therefore still 
present (“It is not, but it acts”83), for my act of remembering is happening 
now, in the present. “The past and the present do not denote two successive 
moments, but two elements which coexist: One is the present, which does 
not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but 
through which all presents pass…The past does not follow the present, but 
                                                
78 Plato Timaeus, trans. R. G. Bury. Loeb Classical Library, Vol. IX. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press) 1929 p. 37D 
79  Lilian Alweiss, “Heidegger and the Conception of Time” in History of the Human Sciences 
2002 15: 117-132  p.118 
80 This has been seen as a problem by other philosophers. Sartre, for instance, argues that 
Heidegger’s impetus to ‘own’ the future, to make it our own in the face of death suggests 
that death is something at our disposal, within our human reach, while “death comes from 
outside and transforms us into the outside”. Sartre, J. P. Being and Nothingness, trans. H. E. 
Barnes. (London and New York: Routledge) 2003: 545 
81 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2011 p.3-9 
82 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy of Time, op. cit. p.8 
83 Deleuze, Bergsonism, op. cit. p.55 
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on the contrary, is presupposed by it as the pure condition without which it 
would not pass”.84 The present, “which does not cease to pass”85, is the 
condition for which the past has past. Without present the past would not 
exist. Yet, one should not conclude that the past is only residual memories 
of a present through which it has passed: “if it were, there would be many 
pasts, as many as there are people…[or] as many as there are psychological 
states of people”86. Now, the present exists in actuality, “it acts”87, while the 
past exists in virtuality, “it has ceased to act…but it has not ceased to be”, 
hence ”it should not be said that it ’was”88.  The virtual and actual as spaces 
are not filtered through the phenomenological mind of each of us (they 
have no “psychological existence”89). Rather, these must “be understood as 
‘the two sides of the Real’”90, not distinct, but ontologically unified as 
“whole, integral past”.91  
 
Utopian becomings, then, need to be understood as the duration that 
connects the future to the past and which, through perpetual becoming, 
best embodies the present. Grosz explains multiplicity as the embodiment 
of all virtualities not actualised, yet present, which contains an element of 
ideal and the notion of time as becoming, “an mixture of the latency of the 
past and the indeterminancy of the future”.92 The concept of duration is 
borrowed by Bergson and is the differentiating force that motivates 
becoming, “the operation of self-differentiation, the elaboration of 
difference … Duration is that which undoes as well as what makes: to the 
extent that duration entails an open future, it involves the fracturing and 
                                                
84 Deleuze, Bergsonism, op. cit. p.59 
85 Ibid. 
86 May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, op. cit. p.47 
87 Deleuze, Bergsonism, op. cit. p.55 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Andrea Pavoni, Exceptional Tunings: Controlling Urban Events (PhD Thesis, University 
of Westminster 2013) p. 47 
91 Deleuze, Bergsonism, op. cit. p.59 
92 Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, op. cit. pp.130-149 
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opening up of the past and the present to what is virtual in them, to what in 
them differs from the actual, to what in them can bring forth the new”93.  
 
These complex connections need further unpacking: Through his reading of 
Bergson, Deleuze elaborates the notion of the virtual.94 Berson places the 
possible and real on the same level: what is possible is not second to what is 
real, it does not pre-exist the real. In doing so, he eliminates the possibility 
of thinking of what is possible as something that will be (but is not yet) 
realised in the real.  Deleuze rejects this Bergsonian notion of the possible 
and instead replaces it with the notion of the virtual, which is already fully 
real (it is not in the condition of possibility) and therefore dissolves that 
passage ‘possible to real’ that Bergson eased out by placing possible and 
real on the same level. This opens up to a whole new way of accounting for 
what is real. In particular, I refer to the acknowledgement and inclusion of 
all those invisible realities which, because of their marginal social location, 
are often not seen or, worse, deemed irrelevant and silenced through 
oblivion. This claim I am making here will become more apparent in the 
next chapter, where I highlight the limitations of the Gender Recognition 
Act 2004 and the dramatic split it creates between transgenders who decide 
to fully embrace gender and those who refuse it. The first diary session, 
furthermore, will be emblematic of this tendency. 
 
So, the virtual for Deleuze is the condition for the real, “the virtual is real in 
so far as it is virtual”95, it is the only moment where real experience takes 
place, “the site of the condition of possibility of the virtual”96. Unlike the 
possible (which is possible but not real), the virtual is real, just not yet 
actualised. As Pavoni notes, the relationship between virtual and actual is 
neither conflictual nor harmonious, rather, is it one where “they affect each 
other, in a radical, swerving asymmetry, between the real potentialities of 
                                                
93 Elizabeth Grosz, “Bergson, Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecoming”, op. cit. p.4 
94 Deleuze, Bergsonism, op. cit.  
95 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p.208 
96 Keith Ansell Pearson “The Reality of the Virtual: Bergson and Deleuze” in MLN 120 
(2005) 1112-1127 p.1113 
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the virtual and their relational actualization”97.  
 
Because the virtual operates in multiplicity, it necessitates a vision of the 
real that is plural and constitutive of difference. For Bergson, difference can 
be external or internal, the former is concerned with nature, the latter is 
constitutive, both forming the essence of becoming different.98 What is 
important is that this is not a binary dualism, but each is an impulse of that 
movement of differentiation that determines multiplicity. It is through 
intuition – an ever-productive force – and its tendencies inside and reverse, 
that difference is dissected, assimilated and forged into the new languages, 
new concepts, new life. “ Intuition is not simply the discernment of natural 
differences, qualitative differences or differences in kind; it is the inner 
orientation to tendency, to the differenced between tendencies, it is the 
capacity to understand natural differences beyond a monistic or dualistic 
model, not as relation of two terms, but as the convergence of two 
tendencies or dispositions, not marked by negation but brought together 
through contraction/dilation”99.  
 
So we have it that full potentiality is already in the virtual, which means 
that it is already exposed and constantly traversed by intuition which 
actualises it. It is life – the real, the virtual – that overcomes life (“life 
overcomes itself”100) and its becoming is not only expressed through its 
being virtual (present and real) but also by its being in constant re-
elaboration. Potentiality, then, does not disappear when it becomes 
actuality, it does not develop into actuality. The passage between a before 
that is intangible (a potential) and an after that is developed (actualised) 
that for Hegel101 is distilled in the power of reason that unpacks inner 
                                                
97 Andrea Pavoni, Exceptional Tunings: Controlling Urban Events, op. cit. p. 47 
98 Grosz, “Bergson, Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecoming”, op. cit. p.7 
99 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (New York: Zone Books, 2004) p.102 
100 Grosz, “Bergson, Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecoming” Op. cit. p.10 
101  In Reason in History Hegel writes: “The insight then to which – in opposition to these 
ideals [of imagination] – philosophy should lead us is that the actual world is as it out to 
be, that the truly good, the universal divine Reason is the power capable of actualising 
itself. This good, this Reason, in its most concrete representation, is God. God governs the 
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potentiality and actualises it, is not contemplated here. Dynamism and 
positivity are the two traits of the virtual for Deleuze. There is no negation 
because there is no dialectical exchange – we are in a Spinozan monism – 
and therefore there are no negotiation or possibilities for hierarchical 
characteristics between potential and real.  
 
In De Anima, by contrast, Aristotle makes a neat distinction between 
potentiality and actuality: potential becomes full sensation only when it 
meets the external object. Until that moment, it is only in a phase of denied 
or under-developed existence, it is what Agamben calls the “existence of a 
non-Being, a presence of an absence which for him is a form of 
privation”102. Agamben’s reading of De Anima distinguishes, two kinds of 
potentialities: the first is a generic potentiality (which can be understood as 
opportunity), the second is an existing potentiality (which can be 
understood as ability). The two potentials operate differently insofar as 
generic potential is the possibility that through a given process, i.e. 
learning, one can express a potential. The second potential, interestingly, 
already resides fully developed in the subject who can decide to actualise it 
(bring that knowledge into actuality) or not. So for Agamben (and 
Aristotle), potentiality is still expressed, and the negation, that is, the act of 
not bringing it into actuality, does not alter it. “What is potential can both 
be and not be, for the same is potential both to be and not to be”103.  
Potentiality, then, is not simply active but it can also lie in the 
                                                                                                                                   
world. The actual working of His government, the carrying out of His plan is the history of 
the world … [which] represents the phases in the development of the principle whose 
content is the consciousness of freedom … All we have to indicate here is that Spirit begins 
with its infinite possibility, but only its possibility. As such it contains its absolute content 
within itself, as its aim and goal, which it attains only as result of its activity. Then and only 
then has the Spirit attained its reality. Thus, in existence, progress appears as an advance 
from the imperfect to the more perfect, but as that which contains at the same time its own 
opposite, the so-called perfect, as germ, as urge within itself. In the same way, at least in 
thought, possibility points to something which shall become real; more precisely, the 
Aristotelian dynamis is also potentia, force and power”(The Bobbs-Merrill Company 1953) 
p.47 
102 Giorgio Agamben “On Potentiality” in  Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Ed. 
and Trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford 1999) p.179 
103 Aristotle Metaphysics, (Harvard University Press 1989) 1050b 10 
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inoperativeness of the subject, an ontological determination of not-being. 
“Human potentiality maintains itself in relation to its own privations, it is 
always – and in regard to the same thing – potentiality of being and of not 
being, of doing and not doing. This relation constitutes, for Aristotle, the 
essence of potentiality. Beings that exist in a potential mode can own their 
own impotence, and only in this way they possess this potency. They can be 
and do, because they are in relation to their own nonbeing and 
nondoing”.104 So, the notion of inoperosity should not be read as the lack of 
activity of ‘doing nothing’, but it is an affirmation of the human being and 
the suspension of its potentiality. There is potentiality also in inoperosity.   
 
While in Agamben impotentiality is autonomous and can lead to 
inoperativity (non-being), for Deleuze and Guattari being is expressed by 
impersonal becoming. What I am most interested in here, however, is what 
Deleuze calls the “extreme determinancy”105 of the subject (or Life) to 
determine an ethics whereby the subject can articulate its own existence in 
terms of possibility or potentiality. This choice, in my view, does not need 
to be presented in terms of affirmation versus negation, rather, as a 
powerful and creative ethical choice which echoes with Deleuze’s  
corporeal striving towards “that which agrees with us and allows for a 
passage to absolute singularisation”.106 
 
 
2.5 Sustainable Utopian Ethics 
Through Bergson and Deleuze it is possible to turn around a notion of 
utopia that, traditionally, has always been conceptualised in terms of space, 
anchored in the theoretical spatiality of a no place and located in a time-less 
future. Out of space and out of time. Both static dimensions, a result of a 
spatio-temporal dialectical speculation between imagination and invention. 
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We have seen how in the utopic discourses of More and Bloch, the notion of 
utopia has been uncontrollable and, at the same time, fundamentally 
controlled: a victim of pressing social conditions which pushed utopia 
further out in space and further out in time. The function of such a notion of 
abstract utopia is exhausted in the fulfilment of that reassurance it is sought 
from it. This kind of utopia stands on hope, the hope for a better future, for 
progress, for a better place in a better time.  While this utopia is projected 
towards the future and only concerned with the present as a spatio-
temporal constraint to overcome, it appears to have no future; it is only the 
speculative  exercise of fantasy necessary for control over what is new, what 
is innovative, what is truly unique and uncontrollable: what Foucault called 
‘the event’107 which is the instrument of power. For Foucault, power as such 
does not exist and cannot produce consequences because it does not happen 
on a cause/effect mechanism that produces consequences outside of itself. 
Power is, rather, an event and its node of action occurs internally. Utopia as 
the non place in a time-less future is an event in the face of the 
unforeseeable new, far from being frozen itself, for its precise function is to 
manipulate the past and project a frozen image of the future onto the 
present. As Grosz puts it, “a freezing of the indeterminable movement from 
the past through the future that the present is unable to directly control”108. 
If there is no space and no future in this vision of utopia, how can it, then, 
account for subjectivity, relations and  diversity? With Deleuze’s theory of 
becoming and with Bergson’s theory on time, how can we think of an ethics 
of utopian that is sustainable? Can we open a utopian space that feeds from 
the reality of the here and now and actualises the impulses that come from 
the future in the materiality of the present? And finally, how does 
trangender fit into this?   
                                                
107 Foucault argues that all phenomena in life can be accounted for as ‘event’ or series of 
‘events’. Foucault defines the event as a historical occurrence that introduces change into a 
system of power and fabricates new values thus reconsidering the relations of individuals. 
“It is a form of power which makes individuals subject. There are two meanings of the 
word subject”. (in ‘The Subject and Power’ in Paul Rabinow (ed.) Power – Essential World of 
Foucault Vol. III (New York: The New Press, 1997) p. 331 
108 Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, op. cit. p. 142 
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If we look at the way utopia has been considered, as unobtainable 
transcendece located outside of the subject, we notice that the subject has 
never been present or active in this formulation. Utopia as a theory, utopia 
as escapism, utopia as hope, utopia as a dream, utopia as progress; all these 
instances have maintained a common denominator: a spatial description 
deprived of the subject. Utopia as a vision for a collective, never presented 
in terms of the “one-man dream”109. “There can be nothing collective about 
Utopia – says Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos - unless one considers the 
limited, logocentric inter-subjective interface created in the cusp of the 
otherwise immured experiences of each Utopist, adequate territory for the 
erection of a common Utopia”110. In order for utopian ethics to be 
sustainable, that is, alive and generative, they must find a site within the 
subject before they open up to the responsibility of reframing the world. 
Being nomadic, becoming nomadic in the Delezian sense, is not merely a 
philosophical theory. Rather, it is a notion immersed in pragmatism and 
corporeality which, far from being set out as vision to follow or a mode of 
escapism from alienating reality, finds its best and outmost actualisation in 
the micro social and political stances of the present. It is an immanent 
movement undertaken immanently by the immanent body, a site “of forces, 
or flows, intensities and passions that solidify – in space – and consolidate – 
in time – within the singular configuration commonly knon as 
‘individual’...self”111. Grosz laments that “no utopia has been framed to take 
account of the diversity not only of subjects but also of their utopic visions 
… to the way in which visions of the ideal are themselves reflections of the 
specific positions occupied in the present”112 . This is precisely because the 
very notion of utopia, already weakened in its spatial constitution remote 
from the pulsating life of the here and now, has been kept together by an 
ideal of collective representation, i.e. the ideal society. The only way of 
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envisioning sustainable utopia, that is to say, a mode of creative, positive 
and, most importantly, generative utopianism, is if we strip it down of its 
universal value,  and relocate it into the singularity of the individual who, 
through passions and affects and through corporeal contaminations  will 
meld with its spatiality, “so much so that spatiality becomes a quality of the 
body itself”113.  
Clare Colebrook puts it well when she says that “the Key error of Western 
thought has been transcendence. We begin from some term which is set 
against or outside life, such as the foundation of God, subjectitivy or 
matter... Transcendence is just that which we imagine lies outside (outside 
thought or outside perception). Immanence, however, has no outside and 
nothing other than itself. Deleuze argues for the immanence of life. The 
power of creating does not lie otside the world like some separate and 
judging God; life itself is a process of creative power ... To think is not to 
represent life but to transform and act upon life“.114 It is exactly in this 
immanent-nomadic-affirmative attitude that the creative force of 
utopianism lies: in the leaking boundaries of a body that contaminates and 
is contaminated by passions and desires and which, through self-
transforming and self-becoming, takes those same (and other) passions and 
desires into the world in the constant construction of its own ethics which, 
because fundamentally and constitutively different are, by more of 
becoming, universal. In this process where the one is multiple, it is the 
present and not the future, that provides the impulse for the actualisation of 
a virtuality that is already within the subject and that, by appropriating that 
spatiality, filling its absence, and directing its impulses, finds in the 
affirmation of its differentbeing the most concrete mode of futurity. 
Braidotti argues that sustainability is given by a subject that expresses its 
potentia through the fundamental drive to life that is not mediated “neither 
                                                
113 Andreas Philippopulos-Mihalopoulos, “Mapping Utopias: A Voyage to Placelessness” 
in Law and Critique 12:135-157, 2001, p. 139 
114 Claire Colebrook, Understanding Deleuze  (Allen & Unwin 2003) p. xxiv 
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by the will of God, nor the secret encryption of the genetic code”115, but 
rather, she continues, is “embedded in the corporeal materiality of the 
self”116. It is then that being ‘faithful to oneself’, is not to be mistaken with a 
“mark of autenticity of a self (me, myself and I) that is a clearing house for 
narcissism and paranoia – the great pillars on which Western identity 
predicates itself. Rather, to be faithful to oneself reconnects being with the 
emotional, affective and intellectual awareness of oneself in a mode of 
interaction with others, “this is the faithful of duration, the expression of 
one’s continuing attachment to certain dynamic spatio-temporal co-
ordinates and to endure”117 
The reader might find this to be an overly romaticised proposal, indeed a 
utopia that finds little room in the hostility of a reality that exhausts 
passions and mortifies impulses. I concur that dreams, desires, aspirations 
not always come true, as they often have to render to the impenetrability of 
a world that rejects affirmative subjectivity and imposes representational 
identities. However, to think in these terms means to still commit the 
mistake of letting an idea of the outside (whatever that might be, i.e. 
contingency, power, politics, morals) take charge and shape the inside. In 
order for utopian ethics to be sustainable, the perspective from which we 
gaze out must change radically, and it is a perspective that does not need 
external validation, but it is legitimated by virtue of being.
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Chapter Three                                                                             
 Logics of Recognition 
 
 
“To bring into existence and not to judge.” 1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
New subjectivities and ways of embodiment have been the focus of a good 
part of contemporary critical theory, queer theory and a certain kind of 
progressive feminism.2 New notions of deconstructionalism, sexual identity 
and self expression have been populating socio-political discourse 
producing new ideas on identities and self-representation. Within these new 
debates, however, the language and intellectual references have often 
struggled to keep up-to-date with the multiplicity of possibilities that are 
contemplated by the Self.  It is vital that we transform not only the way in 
which we think of the body and self-identity, but also of how we elaborate 
important political patterns and ethics. It is not a question of how to 
establish one’s identity in the world: in order to rebuild a system of 
knowledge which approaches diversity with the adequate intellectual 
instruments, we must push for a  reconsideration of the notions that have so 
far disciplined subjectivity. 
 
Recognition, the struggle/need to ensure equal dignity to all people, is 
central to the way we live and develop relations in society. The way in which 
recognition has been theorised by law in the context of the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 is that of acknowledgement of sexual identity that, in 
order to comply with the requirements of this model of recognition, needs to 
                                                
1 Gilles Deleuze , Essays Critical and Clinical (Verso 1998) 
2 See Judith Halberstam, Rosi Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz 
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be solid and committed to stability; in other words, it must be authentic.3 
This vision is based on the idea that identity is the fixed product of a political 
negotiation between the linear alignment body-mind and the social and 
cultural environment. Recognition appears then as each individual’s right to 
be oneself and be legitimised in thier identity. The terms of this tradition are 
derived by Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit4 where recognition is the result of 
the acknowledgement between the Subject and the Other. The encounter 
between the two generates as well as legitimises their respective identities 
making the practice of recognition remain conditioned upon the acceptance 
of the other.  
 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 plays a primary role in the politics of 
transsexual recognition in UK. It came into effect on 4th April 2005 and  
introduces a regulatory scheme that allows transsexual people to change 
their legal gender, as it gives them the possibility to apply for legal 
recognition as members of their preferred gender. The Gender Recognition 
Act 2004 was as a response to the European Court of Human Rights’ 
decision in the case of Christine Goodwin and I V UK [2002] 2FCR 577) that the 
UK Government had discriminated based on violation of Articles 8 and 12 5 
of the European Convention of Human Rights. It is also the result of long 
and sustained activism by trans communities in the UK and in particular the 
group Press for Change. It marks an important moment for trans politics 
because, for the first time, it enables transgender people to gain recognition 
in their new acquired gender with no need to have had surgery or hormonal 
treatment,6 which is the most remarkable feature of the legislation.7 For this 
                                                
3 Elizabeth Grosz, ‘A Politics of Imperceptibility’ in Philosophy & Social Criticism (2002) 28, 4, 
p.464 
4 George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1977) 
5 Article 8 - Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.  
Article 12 - Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this rights. 
6 This is radical if one considers that in many countries on the Western world where it is 
possible to obtain gender recognition it is required a certain degree of bodily adaptation. 
7 Since the Gender Recognition Act 2004, other countries have approved progressive 
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specific permission, the Gender Recognition Act goes beyond the 
requirement of the European Court of Human Rights and it takes the UK to 
occupy a leading position in this area of law reform. 8  
 
Although the Gender Recognition Acts 2004 is a rather emancipated piece of 
legislation, and has been regarded as a very positive development by 
contemporary legal theory,9 it has over the years produced some criticism 
for its reinforcement of the orthodoxy of the binary system,10 and especially 
for its reconsideration and shift from gender to sex, 11 thus highlighting a 
concern within the law with the materiality and the aesthetics of the body 
despite the claim of the Act that the anatomical body, and indeed biology, 
are no longer paramount. 
 
The process of gender reassignment is regulated by the clinical industry, 
which sets behavioural standards by which the eligibility of candidates is 
assessed. The main requirement in order to receive authorisation for body 
alteration is a successful simulation of the lifestyle normally associated with 
the desired gender, that is, a successful fulfilment of a certain kind of 
                                                                                                                                   
gender recognition laws that, like the GRA, do not require physical intervention to 
guarantee formal gender recognition. Some recent examples are Argentina (law approved 
in May 2012) and the Netherlands (law approved in December 2013). According to a recent 
report released by report released by Transgender Europe (TGEU), only 13 countries in 
Europe allow gender recognition without medical manipulation of the body. 24 countries 
out of 33 require forced sterilization, 19 out of 33 require divorce and 16 countries do not 
have a law for gender recognition. 
http://www.tgeu.org/TGEU_announces_Trans_Right_Map_on_IDAHOT_2013 
8 Andrew N. Sharpe, ‘Gender Recognition in the UK: A great Leap Forward’ in Social & 
Legal Studies (2009) 18, 2 p. 242 
9 A. N. Sharpe, ‘Structured Like a Monster: Understanding Human Differences Through a 
Legal Category’ in Law and Critique (2007) 18, 2, pp. 207-228; Andrew N. Sharpe, ‘England’s 
Legal Monster’ in Law, Culture and the Humanities (2009) 5, 1, p. 100; Sheyla Jeffreys, ‘They 
Know It When They See It: The UK Gender Recognition Act 2004’ in PJPIR (2008) 10; Emily 
Grabham, ‘Governing Permanence: Trans Subject, Time, and the Gender Recognition Act’ 
in Social and Legal Studies (2010) 15, 1, p.107; Sharon Cowan, ‘Gender is no Substitute for 
Sex: A Comparative Human Rights Analysis of the Legal Regulation of Sexual Identity’ in 
Feminist Legal Studies (2005) 13, 1, pp.67-96 
10 Ralph Sandland, ‘Feminism and the Gender Recognition Act 2004’ in Feminist Legal 
Studies (2005) 13, 1, pp.43-66 
11 Sharpe, Structured Like a Monster, 2007, op. cit.; Sharpe, ‘England’s Legal Monster’, 2009, 
0p. cit.  
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enactments and consequently the full-time embodiment of the gender of 
choice for a period of at least two years.  Clinical professionals – commonly 
referred to as the gatekeepers – authorise Gender Reassignment Surgery 
(GRS) if the individual satisfies the diagnostic criteria of the Diagnostic and 
Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), so it is not improper to state 
that the clinical industry not only constructs transsexuals physically but, 
together with the law, is the institution which regulates the organic existence 
of trans subjectivities. It is, more precisely, the delicate intersection between 
clinical and legal forces that constitutes a space for trans narratives to exist.  
 
This chapter will begin with an analysis of the Gender Recognition Act of 
200412 in which I wish to demonstrate that the language of the law, so 
partitioning and uncompromising, collides with the very fluidity of desire, 
that is, it fails to consider the space of uncertainty and possibility which 
inhabits the experience of living gender so crucial for transgender 
subjectivity. To do so I turn to legal theory and, in particular, to the recent 
analysis on transgenderism within law by Grabham, Sadland, Cowan and 
Sharpe. 13 Moreover, drawing on the work of Deleuze and Deleuze and 
Guattari, I will explain why the current model of recognition present in 
political discourse cannot provide the necessary instruments to develop a 
new theory which accounts for the multiple ways subjectivity comes to 
fruition. Finally, through the work of Elizabeth Grosz, whose reading and 
reinterpretation of Nietzsche will provide several useful points of analysis, I 
will argue that in order for trans subjectivity  - and indeed any unaligned 
subjectivity - to appropriate and fill the space of its own narrative, political 
discourse and the law must reformulate the cardinal principles upon which 
they are constructed and come up with a new strategy that does not 
stigmatize difference but that is able to read and translate the ever changing 
                                                
12 Find complete act here: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/7/contents  
13 Grabham, Governing Permanence, op. cit.; Sandland, Feminism and the Gender Recognition 
Act 2004, op. cit.;  
13 Grabham, Governing Permanence, op. cit.; Cowan, Gender is no Substitute for Sex, op. cit.; 
Cowan, Gender is no Substitute for Sex, op. cit.; Sharpe, Structured Like a Monster, op. cit.; 
Sharpe, England’s Legal Monsters, op. cit. 
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needs of this incendiary space full of reactionary potential. “What would an 
ethics be like that, instead of seeking a mode of equivalence, a mode of 
reciprocity or calculation, sought to base itself on absolute generosity, 
absolute gift, expenditure without return, a pure propulsion into a future 
that does not rebound with echoes of an exchange dictated by the past?”14 
 
 
3.1 Gender Recognition Act 2004 
‘A person of either gender who is aged at least 18, living in the other gender 
or having changed gender under the law’15 can apply for recognition under 
the Gender Recognition Act of 2004. The application process is run by the 
Gender Recognition Panel which grants recognition if the candidate can 
provide evidence that she or he: 
 
(a) has or has had gender dysphoria, 
 
(b) has lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years 
ending with the date on which the application is made, 
 
(c) intends to continue to live in the acquired gender until death, , and 
 
(d) complies with the requirements imposed by and under section 3. 
 
Section 3 is about proving oneself, and the candidate must present: 
 
(a) a report made by a registered medical practitioner practising in the 
field of gender dysphoria and a report made by another registered 
medical practitioner (who may, but need not, practise in that field), or 
 
(b) a report made by a chartered psychologist practising in that field 
and a report made by a registered medical practitioner (who may, but 
need not, practise in that field). 
 
As it becomes obvious from the above, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 
presents itself in such a way that transgender people are from the very 
beginning dealt with and referred to in clinical terms, thus resulting into a 
                                                
14 Elizabeth Grosz, Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory and Futures, ed. by Ithaca 
(Cornell University Press 1999) 
15 Gender Recognition Act (2004) - Section 1(a)(b) 
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pathologisation of their trans condition. This appears quite clearly from 
point (a): ‘the candidate must provide evidence of gender dysphoria’16. The 
term dysphoria belongs to the psychiatric tradition, it emphasises a mental 
condition and gives the word a sense of instability, something one bears 
rather than something one is. It “translate[s] desire into need and disorder”, 
17 and in need of medical intervention for its resolution. In addition, the 
application must include a diagnosis made by a medical practitioner and 
another made by a chartered psychologist.18 In order to make the diagnosis 
“there must be evidence of clinically significant distress”19. This is an 
insidious way of allowing a subtext which undermines the validity of trans 
identity and makes it something objectionable and in need of constant 
validation. This is the approach that the medical discourse takes towards 
trans and it is also the language the law adopts when regulating such 
phenomenon. The rituality of the court which judges and pronounces the 
sentence is the same rituality of the Gender Recognition Panel, made of ‘at 
least one legal member’ and ‘at least one medical member’20, which reserves 
the right to decide whether an individual is convincing enough (or is 
mentally distressed enough) as to be granted the Gender Recognition 
Certificate.  
 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 requirements do not state the need for 
ongoing treatment in form of hormones or surgery but only a ‘life test’ of at 
least two years when the applicant lives in the desired gender, that is, 
dresses, behaves, talks and presents himself or herself in such a way that he 
or she is socially accepted as a legitimate member of that chosen gender. 
While this is a huge achievement which shows an intention to relieve trans 
(and gender) from the burden of biology, this provision has generated a 
great deal of criticism because, from a further analysis of the Act, it becomes 
                                                
16 Section 2(1)(a) 
17 A. N. Sharpe, ‘Endless Sex: the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Persistence of a 
Legal Category’ in Feminist Legal Studies (2007) 15, 1, pp. 57-84 
18 Gender Recognition Act (2004) Section 3(2) 
19 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(4th Edition, 1995) Washington, DC:APA. 
20 Schedule 1, 4(2)(a)(b) 
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evident that it is not as straightforward as it promises to be.  To begin with, 
the use of the term transsexuality belongs to the clinical paradigm and it 
refers to a man or a woman who has undergone a certain degree of bodily 
alteration – be it surgical or hormonal – in order to transit, to become the 
other gender.  If it were to allow transsexuals to be what they are without 
demanding any final medical adjustments, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 
would not only be lifting the pressure of aesthetics and sex off trans-
identified individuals who do not wish to conform to the binary 
representation of gender, but it would also reform the term ‘transsexuality’, 
showing great breadth of inclusion insofar as it would also legitimately 
signify for non-operational trans-identified individuals.  However, reading 
through the Act, one understands that this process is not so obvious. The 
Gender Recognition Certificate is issued by a Gender Recognition Panel, 
made by women and men who have an idea of what a certain gender should 
look like or how it should be enacted and may therefore exercise their own 
personal preconceptions of correct gender behaviour and appearance.21 In 
placing so much emphasis on the enactments and appearances of gender - to 
which Sandland refers as “public politics of the presentational” 22 - the law 
contradicts itself in so far as it shifts its purpose from the cure of the 
distressed mind  - that dysphoria it proposes to resolve - to the alignment of 
the body which needs to be proper in order to be recognised. In other words, 
the law enacts a public regulation of the transsexual body: the more gender 
is visible and therefore recognisable, the more it is governed and controlled. 
It is those who travel under the surface of visibility who do not find a place 
for recognition. 
 
 
3.2 Shift Gender/Sex 
The assumption under which the Gender Recognition Act 2004 is 
constructed suggests an idea of fluidity when contextualizing gender within 
the provision. The legislation considers gender  - and not sex – the primary 
                                                
21 Jeffreys, They Know It When They See It, op. cit. p. 333 
22 Sandland, Feminism and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, op. cit. 
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measure by which recognition is granted23 and shows that the law is 
dropping its traditional biological understanding of sex in favour of a more 
Butlerian approach which looks at gender as socially constructed, 
“something like a lifestyle option”.24 The first wave of feminism in the 1960s, 
following Simone de Beauvoir’s work,25 presented sex as the invariant and 
irreducible characteristic of the body with which one is born, the 
unchangeable aspect that determined a man or a woman. Gender, on the 
contrary, was a baggage of cultural meaning, the result of one’s experience, 
values and personal acculturation. By the 1990s, with the advent of queer 
theory and in particular the work of Judith Butler,26 the body was no longer 
at the mercy of biology (sex), but it could produce its own gendered identity. 
This is the approach institutionalised by the Act, “gender is the dynamic. 
‘Sex’, if it is anything, is the product”.27 
 
However, as Sharpe points out, the fact that the Gender Recognition Act 
recognises gender as a matter of choice does not mean that biology does not 
have a great deal of relevance in the process of recognition as the Gender 
Recognition has it. On the contrary, it still “persists as an important subtext 
within the legislation”.28 This incoherence has appeared evident within a 
variety of cases that have insisted on the concept of ‘correct/wrong body’ 
resulting in a juridical insistence to seek psychological and anatomical 
harmony29. Sharpe goes on to explain that “in relation to M.T.”s30 sexual 
functioning the court explored in some detail her genital topography. 
                                                
23 Cowan, Gender is no Substitute for Sex, op. cit.; Jeffreys, They Know It When They See It, op. 
cit. ; Sharpe, Structured Like a Monsters, op. cit.; Sharpe, England’s Legal Monsters, op. cit. 
24 Jeffreys, They Know It When They See It, op. cit. 
25 Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Sex (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd. 1949) 
26 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York, 
London: Routledge 1990) 
27 Sandland, Feminism and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, op. cit. p.47 
28 A. N. Sharpe, ‘A Critique of the Gender Recognition Act 2004’ in Journal of Bioethical 
Inquiry (2007) 4, 1, pp.33-42 
29 Sharpe, A Critique of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, op. cit. 
30 As reported in Sharpe’s article, in M.T v. J.T., recognising M.T., a post-operative Male 
to Female transsexual, the court declared that “a preoperative transsexual […] should be 
classified according to biological criteria” (355A. 2d. 204 (1967) at 209). in A Critique of the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004, op. cit.p.59. 
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Drawing on the medical evidence, the court noted that M.T. had “a vagina 
and labia which were adequate for sexual intercourse and could function as 
any female vagina, that is, for traditional penile/vaginal intercourse”, and 
“it had good cosmetic appearance and was the same as a normal female 
vagina after a hysterectomy”.31 This means that the law and the clinical 
tradition work together towards creating a natural replica of gendered bodies 
that comply with the physical reproduction not of sexual intercourse, but 
rather, of heterosexual intercourse. In Sharpe’s analysis, this process serves 
to satisfy the law’s twin desires: on the one hand it reproduces gender-
binarised bodies where a woman is matched with a vagina and a man is 
matched with a penis (so to contrast the ‘wrong body’); on the other, whilst 
doing so, it simultaneously protect heterosexuality from homosexual 
contamination.32  
 
 
3.3 Until Death Do us Part 
The third requirement (c) for gender recognition is that the candidates 
‘intend to continue to live in the required gender until death’33. While it has 
been established that the Gender Recognition Act 2004 requires, however 
subtly, a certain degree of biological understanding of sex, a state of 
“apparently non-surgical crossing”,34 it appears clear that it also demands a 
state of definitiveness, of solidity, a one way, no-return endeavour from the 
applicant.  
 
This is problematic in many ways: it poses a question of equity insofar as it 
demands that trans individuals produce a gender permanence that non trans 
individuals are not expected to have and, in so doing, it simultaneously 
insists on the notion that trans belongs to the sphere of the artefact, 
something non authentic, something not natural which needs boundaries in 
                                                
31 Sharpe, A Critique of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, op. cit. pp.62-63 
32 Ibid. p. 63 
33 Section 2(c)  
34 Sharpe, A Critique of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, op. cit. p.71 
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order to be contained and recognised. The life commitment proves precisely 
the solidity of the undertaking. It is the guaranty that the trans individual 
will throughout the entire course of his or her life comply to the rules of 
gender normativity and, by default, of the binary system beneficiary of this 
policy. Furthermore, as Sandland suggests, this Act is constructed on a series 
of dividers which do nothing other than create distance between those who 
are for life and those who are not, between the acceptable and the 
unacceptable, between conformity and deviance.35  
 
This mechanism excludes those trans people who do not intend to take the 
step from one gender to the other and thus automatically find themselves 
positioned outside the legal boundaries of recognition because they are not 
represented by its strictly dichotomised vision of gender. What is more, 
because it proposes to cure gender dysphoria through a process of 
naturalisation that redirects the body towards the mind, the Act also 
aggravates the divide between those who, complying to the rules, are finally 
cured and those who decide to resist engendered living therefore remaining 
dysfunctional. This represents a point of discrimination against which the 
Gender Recognition Act offers no help. Consequently, the logic according to 
which trans subjects are perceived in terms of ‘fraud’ to cite Janice 
Raymond,36 one of the main voices of radical feminism, implies that there is 
a counterpart of naturalness and authenticity which one should aim to reach 
or worse, which one can never reach. The doubt of flexibility cast on trans 
subjectivity is not only offensive because it undermines the validity of the 
individual who in this instance cannot signify for oneself and needs proven 
evidence in support of what one states to be, but it automatically produces 
an effect of forced commitment which is intensified by the exclusive 
consequences of the possibility of non-recognition. It is interesting to note 
how on the one hand the law produces a piece of legislation in order to 
tackle legislative discrimination against trans individuals who need this 
form of regulatory protection but, on the other, because of this very 
                                                
35 Sandland, Feminism and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, op. cit. p.50 
36 Janice G. Raymond, The Transsexual Empire, op. cit. 
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legislation, it produces and allows other forms of discrimination to happen. 
This is a trait that occurs often throughout the Gender Recognition Act and 
to which I shall return. 
 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, Grabham37 argues that the 
temporality aspects of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (two years of lived 
experience, the ‘until death’ promise) have no legislative reason to exist and 
that they only “function as temporal mechanisms which influence trans 
agent’ experiences of time, but also […] shape trans agents’ experiences of 
their own bodies, and their experience of the ‘forthcoming’, 38 what Homi K. 
Bhabba calls the “translation of the meaning of time into the discourse of 
space”. 39 Bourdieu’s habitus is a system of social dispositions which interact 
on the social structure and are internalised, naturalized and reproduced by 
bodies without following a conscious path or aiming for a presupposed 
outcome: “objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the 
product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without 
being the product of the organizing action of a conductor”.40 These structured 
structures – to use Bourdieu’s terms - form social patterns through which the 
social world is experienced. In his habitus, Bourdieu recognizes a 
phenomenological perspective in the temporal relation between bodies and 
social space, a sort of temporality of being which inscribes our history.41 The 
temporal factor is an anticipation of the future (a projection of what might 
be) based on the constraints of a given situation in the present.  
 
“Habitus constructs the world by a certain way of orienting itself 
towards it, of bringing to bear on it an attention which, like that 
of a jumper preparing to jump, is an active, constructive bodily 
tension towards the imminent forthcoming”.42 
 
                                                
37 Grabham, ‘Governing Permanence’, op. cit. 
38 Ibid. p.113 
39 Homi K. Bhabba, The Location of Culture (London and New York: Routledge 2004) 
40 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Polity 1990) p.53 
41 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Mediation (Stanford University Press 2000)  
42 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Mediation (Stanford University Press 2000) p.144 
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Grabham takes this notion further and argues that the Gender Recognition 
Act 2004 holds a strong element of temporality (the wait) that not only 
effects the way in which the experience of waiting is carried out (thus also 
modifying the subject’s engagement with the social world), but it also 
manipulates the projection of that expectation onto the future since “waiting 
is the suspension of future action while another goal is achieved; 
postponement defers a subject’s action further into the future”.43 This is 
precisely the ‘not-yet’ limbo I was referring to earlier in chapter 2: that 
infinite moment of suspension where time is not just a question of mere 
temporality, but encapsulates relations of power and dominance between 
the vulnerable subject and social practice which manipulate the perception 
of time itself.  
 
“Waiting – that is to say, for the whole duration of the 
expectancy – modifies the behaviour of the person who ‘hangs’, 
as we say, in the awaited decision”. 44 
 
 
To this effect, the transgender subject who ‘hangs’ on the outcome of the 
Gender Recognition Application and who is overwhelmed with a sense of 
forthcoming of what it was and of what might be, is subjected to the power 
relations between possibilities (agents) involved in the matter which will end 
up manipulation the subject’s experience. Grabham observes that the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 is not the only piece of legislation characterised by 
temporal factors which enter in collision with the experience of 
individuals,45 however, unlike other legislations, this Act possesses the 
peculiarity that its temporality is not merely a space of wait where the 
subject awaits to know the result of a given situation which had been 
previously defined and which is now on hold awaiting the long arm of the 
law; but rather,  it is the social space where the desired outcome is being 
enacted and externalised; it is the stage where trans individuality is being 
embodied for the world to see, in search of legitimation and recognition. It is 
                                                
43 Grabham, ‘Governing Permanence’, op. cit. p. 117 
44 Ibid. p. 228 
45 Ibid. p. 113 
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a temporary space which brims with expectation and hope, but also with 
fear of being ‘not enough’, not a good enough man or a good enough woman 
worthy of recognition. Unlike other pieces of legislation where the agents 
external to the individual (the facts) are frozen until the law’s proclamation, 
in the case of the Gender Recognition Act, the agents involved are all 
internal to the individual and what we have is a constant on-going becoming 
of the desired results.46  
 
Alongside this runs the discriminative influence of the ‘until death’ 
provision which does not only refer to a condition which will need to 
continue to be, but aims to recreate and seal a trajectory of foreverness, of 
absence of doubt which is proper of life. The ‘until death’ requirement is in 
fact the negation of life itself, it is the negation of human uncertainty, the 
smooth space par excellence, a halt to that human flow which, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, is for Deleuze the condition of life itself.   This 
is yet another manipulation of people’s engagement with themselves, their 
present and their future insofar as it imposes a series of parameters only 
within which the desired result becomes possible. Moreover, it should not be 
forgotten that the trans individual who awaits to be assessed will feel 
compelled to overdo gender in order to fulfill the Gender Recognition 
Panel’s expectations, which in the end preserves and reinforces the 
orthodoxy of the binary system.  
 
Under the legislation, individuals find themselves in a limbo, hostage of a 
space which is not recognised by anyone where legalisation passes through 
the language of normativity, but they are victims of a multi-layered 
mechanism which discriminates against the very people it is called to assist. 
Furthermore, by gaining the Gender Recognition Certificate – which is the 
legally recognised right to be considered a legitimate man or woman – the 
transsexual only partially resolves his/her problem: he/she only passes 
from one state of non-recognised minority to a state of recognised minority. 
                                                
46 Grabham, ‘Governing Permanence’, op. cit. p.113 
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As clarified at the beginning of this chapter, I am not asserting that the legal 
consequences of the Gender Reassignment Act are altogether negative or 
discriminatory. I am merely pointing out that while this particular piece of 
legislation provides an acceptable field for mediation to many transgender 
individuals who feel well represented by the two models – male and female 
– it puts forward, it does not do so for those who those models reject 
partially or completely. The legal and social consequences, accordingly, are 
different. A transsexual that goes through gender reassignment and gains 
gender recognition will have a different experience from one who rejects the 
idea of gender altogether and finds no space for its unique subjectivity. 
Furthermore, to gain gender recognition and become a legitimate member of 
the chosen gender – to be naturalised, that is - does not mean that 
transsexuality becomes altogether more accepted. It is in fact fair to say that 
through the Gender Recognition, one becomes in fact fully assimilated into a 
gendered society which still considers trans a minority, the ‘undesirable 
other’47. The beneficiary of the Gender Recognition Act is not the transsexual 
individual, it is gender, for this is a legislation which recognizes gender for 
the sake of preserving gender and, in doing so, it erases trans subjectivity as 
well as the binary challenging possibilities it stands for. The Gender 
Recognition Act is first and foremost a piece of legislation for the 
preservation of gender, it is a system which aims to recruit gender 
representatives and which improves only specific forms of the lived 
experience of trans subjectivity.  
 
 
3.4 Dialectics of Recognition 
There is a dilemma that emerges from the above analysis of the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004. I have explained the contradictions which run through 
this piece of legislation when it comes to handling important processes of 
                                                
47 ‘Undesirable other’ is borrowed from Mark E. Casey’s formulations on LGBT 
minorities. In his article, The Queer Unwanted and Their Undesirable ‘Otherness’ (pp. 125-
136 in Browne, K., Lim, J., and Brown, G. (eds) Geographies of Sexualities, Ashgate, 
2007) Casey refers to gay, lesbian and queer people who are marginalized and kept 
outside of the mainstream LGBT scene because they are ugly, unpleasant, old. 
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classifications which on the one hand aim to regulate a phenomenon that is 
still deeply surrounded by disinformation and prejudice, and on the other 
create new forms of social hierarchy and power, and bring very little change 
to the lived experience of transsexual subjectivity. I do not wish to dismiss 
the importance of the Gender Recognition Act and the significant impact it 
has on the lives of many. It is however clear that although it fulfils its most 
obvious purpose, that is, to grant gender certificates which allow trans 
individuals to be legally legitimised in their chosen gender, to have their 
personal documents updated with their new name, to have the legal right to 
be classified under male or female categories and so on, it fails in the far 
more challenging task to produce social acceptance, that is, to create the 
conditions for a much-needed shift from formal gender proclamation to 
effective, discursive acknowledgment. Charles Taylor’s work addresses 
what I think is an important element in the game of recognition, that is, the 
individual’s necessity as well as ability to negotiate with the social and to 
demand that his/her individuality is not only recognized, but fully 
incorporated within the politics of society because “recognition is not just a 
courtesy we owe people…[but] a vital human need”.48 
 
Not to offer recognition, which practically equals to deny recognition, would 
mean to enforce or allow oppression, to “[imprison] someone in a false, 
distorted, and reduced mode of being”.49 With this in mind, I concur with 
those who see great legislative aperture in the Gender Recognition Act 2004 
but, at the same time, anything other than this would be a non-possibility, it 
would be oppression. The various provisions in the Act should no longer be 
seen as possibilities but they are conditions for life: Trans citizens cannot tip-
toe through life and put their existence and survival in the hands of human 
rights categories. Recognition cannot continue to be declined within a 
framework of tolerance, nor can it run on the level of the symbolic, but it is 
necessary that it stretches out and contaminates the space in which every 
                                                
48 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, N.C. ed.by. Duke University Press 
2004) p. 26 
49 Ibid. p. 25 
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day these bodies – our bodies – entwine together, intersect and infect one 
another. I use the allegory of contamination because recognition cannot be 
seen as an achievement or a goal to reach, it cannot be defined by a 
certificate. It is rather a set of goals in movement, it is a process that travels 
and constantly melds and adapts to the space in which it is contained but 
that it too contains within. Moreover, I wish to suggest that the term 
‘recognition’ is problematic because it already contains within it the 
possibility of non-recognition as it poses the responsibility of the act of 
recognising on one agent which at any point can cease to exercise 
recognition. To this effect, the notion of recognition deployed within a legal 
framework is equally perplexing because it reinforces the idea that the law 
can give and take back individuals’ right to exist within their own identity.  
Let me contextualise this further. 
 
In Phenomenology of Spirit, 50 Hegel understands recognition as a necessary 
passage towards knowledge; it becomes cognition through the recognition of 
the other, that relation which makes an object become a subject. This 
mutuality celebrates the bond between self and other that needs to exist in 
the world. Hegel’s sociological theory, based on the idea that social life is 
governed by recognition and that conflict can be a means for the 
development of society, can be understood in the master-slave dialectic 
where, in order for the self to affirm its supremacy and reach self-
consciousness, it must go through the process of recognising the other as a 
subject which is positioned on the same level as the self. While this 
encounter - the moment of recognition for the other subject - is a negation 
and compromises absoluteness of the self, at the same time, through this 
conflict, the self acknowledges the possibility that the other subject can be 
equally independent and absolute. Such acknowledgement does not occur 
peacefully but manifests itself through hostility: each of the two entities 
wants to be recognised by the other and yet maintain its distinct and 
independent identity, and it is precisely this friction that affirms the need for 
                                                
50 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press 1977) 
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the other, thus creating the conditions for recognition which appeared 
impossible but that, at this stage, becomes necessary. For Hegel it is only 
when the self-conscious recognises another self-conscious that absolute 
knowledge is reached.  
 
The desire for recognition  - which is nothing other than a desire for 
satisfaction, where we can read satisfaction as self-fulfilment - acts as an 
impulse because its manifestation automatically provides certainty for one’s 
self: the self confronting the other is a threat of death  - ‘struggle to the death’ 
– but it is at the same time essential because it is only through the limits 
imposed by the presence of the other and the acknowledgment of that 
presence that the self acknowledges its very desire. There is no master 
without a slave. 
 
From this image a reflection can be made: the mutuality mentioned above is 
presented as a necessary condition of freedom. Hegel sees freedom as the 
ability to determine one’s will, that is, oneself. However, our will is always 
expressed through experiences with other subjects. “[s]elf consciousness 
exists in and for itself when, and by fact that, it so exists for another; that is, 
it exists only in being acknowledged”.51 In Hegel’s view, individual freedom 
is always dependent on collective freedom. This means that when we 
recognise authority to the other, in order for us to be free, we need to interact 
with others who not only benefit from the authority we are giving them, but 
who themselves are free. What I find interesting in this passage is not so 
much the idea that individuals cannot be free without the acknowledgement 
– which at times resembles the connotations of approval - that comes from 
the collective other, for there is a possibility of self-affirmation and therefore 
of freedom even within non-recognition; but rather, it is the idea that 
collective identity can be a place for everyone where differences are 
expressed, acknowledged and overcome: the asymmetry between the master 
and the slave where the master is the dominant figure and the slave a 
                                                
51 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, op. cit. p.178 
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subordination, can of course generate disruption and lead to a violent split 
of mis-recognition, but it is nevertheless an electric moment of exchange and 
possibilities. It is, as we have seen in chapter 1, what Deleuze identifies as 
chaos,52 the very essence of difference – life – fulfilling itself. This is an 
important point to which I will return in the second part of this chapter. 
 
Some of the predominant supporters of the logics of recognition, such as 
Taylor, Honneth, Habermas and Benjamin53, have drawn from Hegel and, in 
particular, have focused on the moment in which the struggle ends in favour 
of the triumph of recognition over the possibility of negation. Jessica 
Benjamin, for example, resolves this unbalance between the self and the 
other through communication as the vehicle for recognition. In her view, 
when the subject and the other acknowledge each other, the occasional 
‘break-down’ that may stem from the encounter is nothing more than part 
and parcel of the process of recognition and it “ continues until survival 
becomes possible”, for intersubjectivity sees the object not as a subordination 
of the self, but as an external other which can exist independently.54 
Likewise, Taylor’s ‘radical reflexivity’ sees all human beings possessing a 
sense of self which always emerges through what he calls ‘dialogical 
relationships’ between the self and the social.55 These relationships are a 
constant negotiation between the self and the social, and exist in relation to 
the idea that recognition is not a one-off occurrence in the history of 
individuals, but an ongoing dialogue, often characterised by struggle and 
negation, through which the individual identity is validated collectively. 
Both Benjamin and Taylor, as well as the work of Honneth56, share the idea 
                                                
52 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, op. cit. 
53 See Maeve Cooke, ‘Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of 
Recognition’ in Political Theory Vol. 25, No. 2, 1997, pp.258-288;  
54 Jessica Benjamin, ‘Recognition and Destruction: An Outline of Inter-subjectivity’ in 
Like Subjects, Love Objects: Essays on Recognition and Sexual Difference (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1998) 
55 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge University 
Press 1992) pp. 58-59 
56 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Polity 
Press 1995) 
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of a communicative relationality which, in my understanding, should not 
stop the ‘break-down’ moment from occurring in the act of recognition but, 
through the potential collision that it provokes, it should open up 
possibilities for equality insofar as inter-subjectivity does not relegate the 
object as subordination of the self but as an external other. 
 
 
3.5 Limits of Recognition 
On a formal level, what emerges from Hegel’s reading is a shared intention 
to coordinate recognition in terms of public and private, and connect the two 
spheres through intersubjective communication. However, the paradigm 
according to which the self is legitimised through the recognition of the 
other is highly problematic because it does not assure the production of new 
happy (recognised) subjects. As I have mentioned, what I find interesting in 
the Hegelian tradition of recognition is precisely the moment of uncertainty 
which derives from the encounter of the two parties. The moment when the 
dialectical exchange has not started, where time and space are suspended 
and the chaos of life has a chance to emerge and infect, affect and link those 
bodies together. However, this moment soon dissolves and the dialectical 
conditions of the encounter take over. Many are the things that can go wrong 
in this encounter. First, the possibility of misrecognition – and therefore of 
oppression. It is not a matter which can remain in the sphere of the 
transcendental but it is intrinsic in the material experience of the self, very 
often with tragic results, and cannot be resolved with yet more categories of 
unhappy identities. The sense of expectation carried by the object that 
approaches the subject in the hope to be recognised is such that the 
encounter becomes automatically unequal. It puts one of the two parties in 
the condition to perform the very feature that will grant it recognition, thus 
resulting in both the production of a wrong sense of self and the 
reinforcement of that Other on which their recognition depends. This kind of 
theorizsation can be useful to those who fall right into the categories it 
produces (and therefore those for whom recognition happen without 
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struggle), but it leaves too many unhappy and unresolved cases behind. 
Namely, it does not account for those subjectivities whose specificity does 
not fit in the clear-cut mechanism of recognition. We will see in the section 
that follows this chapter how this constitutes a major problem in the life 
experience of many. 
 
Another problem closely connected to the first is that of relevance. The rigid 
dualism of this structure presupposes only two participants in the politics of 
recognition, self and other. The subject who grants recognition will be likely 
to recognise an easily identifiable object. There is the intention to create 
legitimised beings that, through the performance/production of their 
identity, live under the protection of recognition. In other words, the final 
aim of recognition is to create identifiable relevant categories through which 
maintain order. The term relevance is not casual, it holds a regulatory 
significance insofar as it benefits from “institutional accreditation and 
canonisation in the public sphere”57 and raises a question of authority and 
hegemony which needs to be addressed. Who decides which identity can be 
recognised and which cannot? What determines relevance? Bourdieu 
observes that when the individual creates an expression, this is never 
casually assembled, but it is always the result of accumulated socio-cultural 
and political resources which are implicit in the demand of the market and 
therefore, every interaction, however innocuous, intimate or apparently 
insignificant, always holds parts of a specific socio-political structure which 
it helps reinforce. 58  
 
The narrative of the ‘wrong body’, with which I will duly engage in chapter 
5 and in the third diary interlude, is the perfect example of how meaning is 
rarely assembled together arbitrarily: the ‘wrong body narrative’, which is 
the assumption according to which transsexual individuals experience a 
                                                
57 Jacques Derrida, What is a Relevant Translation? Trans. by Lawrence Venuti (Critical 
Inquiry Vol.27, Winter 2001) p.180  
58 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Production and Reproduction of Legitimate Language’ in 
Language and Symbolic Power, ed.by John B. Thompson, Trans. by Gino Raymond and 
Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Polity Press 1991) 
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sense of being trapped in the wrong body, is a powerful way of creating 
hegemonic notions that determine the relevance of certain bodies over 
others. Relevance is then a kind of censorship which haunts all layers of the 
social tissue and which, through its institutions, is ultimately cast on 
individuals and the narrative they create in the world. The ‘wrong body 
narrative’ helps establish a notion of dysphoria through which dissonant 
bodies are deemed wrong and socially prompted to become right. For 
Bourdieu relevance is determined by “the state of the power relations 
between agents”59, that is, discursive strategies which dictate what can be 
innovated and what must be preserved, and gender purity, as we will see in 
depth in chapter 4, is something to preserve. In Bourdieu’s view there is a 
distinct regulatory power which, through different forms of capital assigned, 
decides which fields can further or remain intact. It emerges that in order to 
be considered relevant – and suitable for recognition - it is important to 
understand these terms and conditions and undergo a process of 
domestication which results into an increase of power. This is precisely what 
is expected of ‘wrong bodies’. At the same time, however, the death of all 
processes of social and cultural renovation (translations) without which no 
society can progress. Within the rules of the Hegelian game of recognition 
played between Self and Other, the risk is that one – the predominant – can 
deem the other irrelevant. The process by which irrelevance is determined 
can vary but it always plays in favour of a majoritarian relevance. 
 
A third problem occurs when one considers that the affirmation of the self in 
the master-slave dialectic is based upon the necessary negation of the other: 
the subject’s goodness is derivative and dependent on what it neglects. The 
self-affirmation is not authentic because it does not take place unless the 
other element is negated. It is in fact not self-affirmation but ressentiment, an 
“exhausted force which does not have the strength to affirm difference, a 
force which no longer acts, but reacts to the forces that dominate it – only 
such force brings to the foreground the negative element in its relation to the 
                                                
59 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1988) 
 117 
other. Such a force denies all that it is not and makes this negotiation its own 
essence and the principles of its existence”.60  Since this affirmation depends 
on the other, the need for recognition is servile as well as superfluous 
because it is not auto-regulated, thus non self-affirmative, and therefore not 
useful – or negative - as well as any comparisons or relationships based on 
the approval of the other. Similarly, ‘I am good therefore you are evil’ defines 
the same principle: You are evil describes something that has no importance 
to the affirmation of good of the first subject but it is nonetheless used to 
undermine the object: its affirmation is constructed on the negation of and 
comparison with the other. Nietzsche’s master, unlike Hegel’s, operates 
outside of recognition: he does not need a slave to affirm his status, nor does 
he need to compare himself to others because differential self-affirmation is 
not dependent on recognition. If a Deleuzian understanding of the dialectical 
self-affirmation entails a good degree of servile morality and a fundamental 
lack of imagination (the force which does not have the strength to affirm itself) 
Deleuze’s interpretation of differential self-affirmation is a chance for 
pluralism, for the affirmation of difference and, above all, for 
independence.61 It is also a way to locate the subject away from the sameness 
created by recognition insofar as dialectical opposition dissolves difference 
and reduces all subjects to feeling and needing the same things,62 thus 
                                                
60 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (Continuum 1992) p.9 
61 “What the wills in Hegel want is to have their power recognized […] This is the slave’s 
conception, it is the image that the man of ressentiment has of power. The slave only conceives 
power as the object of recognition… the stake in a competition, an therefore makes it depend, at the 
en of a fight, on a simple attribution of established values. If the master-slave relationship can 
easily take on the dialectical form, to the point where it has become an archetype or school 
exercise for every young Hegelian, it is because the portrait of the master Hegel offers us is, 
from the start, a portrait that represents the slave […] as at best a successful slave. 
Underneath the Hegelian image of the master, we always find the slave” Deleuze, Nietzsche 
and Philosophy, op. cit. pp.9-10  
62 For Deleuze, master and slave do not share the same identity and therefore they are not 
comparable. Unlike the slave, whose identity is heavily mediated by the master’s morality, 
the master “does not wait to be called good” (Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, op. cit. 
p.118), he calls himself good. According to Deleuze, the negation moment in the master’s 
experience is only external whereas that slave goes through it fearfully, not knowing the 
outcome of the encounter. Deleuze does not agree with placing master and slave on the 
same level. Although this might seem a way of giving both subjects equal opportunity 
within the dialectical game, Deleuze thinks that this is a way of erasing all individual 
pluralism and reducing subjects to the same life-denying beings. 
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dissolving that pluralism and hierarchical difference so crucial to Deleuze. 
 
Another problem is derived by the fact that the Hegelian framework 
presents the Self/Subject – Other/Object as already fully-formed identities 
and leaves no room for transformation. We have seen how this constitutes a 
problem (insofar as it the lack of movement arrests that process) of 
differentiation which is the principle that guarantees life. A static act without 
movement that operates through politics of inclusion through identification, 
where inclusion means incorporating already existing and closed categories, 
can fulfil the immediate political need to organise regulatory patterns of 
recognition, but it cannot work for those identities whose existence is 
developed through the process of transformation and becoming other. This 
is highly problematic for those transgender people who present a dissonant 
way of understanding gender. We will see is an aspect that comes across 
very strongly from the live narratives presented in the three empirical 
interludes. To account for these individuals, I wonder whether instead of 
conceptualising individual identity (and the subject) as an agent dependent 
on another agent (that is, as a victim and potential prey to the conflict for its 
own recognition), why do we not allow the multiplicity of uncertainty and 
chaos into this mediation?  Chaos, as we have seen, must not be considered 
in terms of confusion, but in terms of differentiation. It is the coexistence of 
multiple intensities. The existence of categories of identities, by contrast, are 
there to endorse majoritarian values and it is always trough the identities of 
majorities that the identities of minorities are formed, measured in society 
and regulated politically.  
 
 
3.6 Intersectionality 
The work of Kimberlé Crenshaw63 highlights the forms of disadvantage that 
                                                
63 Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalising the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination  Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ 
in The University of Chicago Forum (1989) 89 
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result from what she refers to as ‘multiple discrimination’.64 Crenshaw uses 
the term ‘intersectionality’ to describe the complex situations in the context 
of violence against women of colour where also race and class become part 
of the same case in US courts. Grabham argues that today ‘intersectionality’ 
can be more broadly used as a flexible notion to indicate discrimination 
which transcends the spatiality of the court and reflects people’s singular 
and varied experience of inequality with the law.65 The law, as outlined in 
the arrangements of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, presents a model 
which cannot account for the singular individual and inevitably contains 
structural deficits which, instead of looking at the specificity of each case, 
tends to rule out failing to do justice to the singular in favour of a general 
principle. As we have seen in Chapter 2 through Deleuze’s notion of 
difference and being, this is a principle which presents several problems 
because it is erected on the assumption that identity is something to 
construct outside of the individual and that this needs to fit in that given 
definition. The problems then concern a vision of individuality as one 
element of a collective picture, as the micro fulfilment of a macro category. 
We will see more in depth in the next section of this chapter (3.7) how this 
collides with the understanding of individuals in terms of unique and 
different and how, within a Deleuzian reading, we can drop the concept of 
identity and category approach that of imperceptibility. Before we get there, 
however, it is worth considering all aspects of why in our reading of the 
GRA, intersectionality is a problematic model to pursue. 
 
Crenshaw advocates a reconsideration of politics where “recognizing that 
identity politics takes place at the site where categories intersect thus seems 
more fruitful than challenging the possibility of talking about categories at 
all”66 and I believe that the theoretical foundation for a theory of 
intersectionality is valid and worth pursuing, as it is deeply imbedded in the 
                                                
64 Crenshaw, Demarginalising the Intersection of Race and Sex, op. cit. pp.139-167. 
65 Emily Grabham, ‘Taxonomies of Inequality: Lawyers, Maps, and the Challenge of 
Hybridity’ in Social & Legal Studies, 15, 1, p.6 
66 Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color (Stanford Law Review, 1991) pp.1241-1299 
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different realities of life. However, it is a method of scanning reality which 
contains elements that in my view are worrying because ‘intersectionality’ as 
a theory/method/model of examining different degrees of discrimination is 
very closely linked to the reality of Black women and how ethnicity 
combines with other categories and identities such as gender, class, 
sexuality, race, nationality. It is a theory introduced within a US context with 
a focus on gender and race which was eventually integrated with new 
categorisations such as disability, class, nationality, etc. and concerned, more 
broadly, to socio-cultural systems of power across identity and categories.67 
Intersectionality is first and foremost a methodology directed to categories. 
Although I understand that its aim as an empirical method of practice is to 
comprehend the intersecting marginalising experiences and to resolve the 
discrimination which is produced within that condition of entwinement, I 
believe that the political and theoretical framework that has developed 
around intersectionality tends to aggravate the proliferation of categories 
and social stratifications because it operates on the basis of 
inclusion/exclusion (inclusion of the single and exclusion of the group). In 
doing so, the comparison between single individuals is amplified and, by 
default, also between the various discriminated groups. In addition to this, 
because it is an approach mainly concerned with single demographic 
differences and not with the universal, the risk is that it creates groups of 
minorities within the minority because it produces margins of 
difference/similarity within the same case, contributing to the aggravation 
of the discrimination it aimed to alleviate. As Valentine states, “the 
contemporary focus within the social sciences on … the complexity of 
intersections risks losing sight of the fact that within particular spaces there 
are dominant spatial orderings that produce moments of exclusion for 
                                                
67  See Nina Lykke, ‘Transformative Methodologies in Feminist Studies’, special issue of 
European Journal of Women's Studies 12. 3, 2005; Leslie McCall, ‘The complexity of 
Intersectionality’ in Davina Cooper (ed.),Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the 
Politics of Location (Oxon, Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) pp. 49–76; Stephanie A. Shields, 
‘Intersectionality of Social Identities: A Gender Perspective’ in Special issue of Sex Roles, 59, 
September 2008. 
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particular groups”. 68 This is also the risk I highlight in the way in which the 
GRA operates. Namely, while it creates the possibility for recognition to 
those transgender individual that are well served by the gender binary, it 
creates a void for those who pursue a different form of subjectivity. 
 
This mechanism highlights the presence of elements of hegemony and 
ideology contained in the theory of intersectionality, and also raises the 
problem of the production of the ‘stereotype’ in the ideological construction 
of the Other. The figure of the ‘stereotype’ is the “major discursive strategy, 
… a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is 
always ‘in place’, already known, and something that must be anxiously 
repeated”69. I will engage with issues surrounding the Othered body more in 
depth in chapter five, but it is worth spending a thought in this context: it is 
the focus and challenge of Bhabba’s hybridity, that is, the social process by 
which the hegemonic authority overtakes the identity of the colonized Other 
with the intention of incorporating it within its framework, and instead it 
produces something similar but new thus furthering social evolution. In my 
view, a theory of hybridity as envisioned by Bhabba can be more effective 
because it is based on the fundamental idea that existing categories are a 
burden to surpass and that change, however hard, is infectious, that is, it 
travels across taking up different forms and installs itself on things making 
them something else. Bhabba contends that the emergence of the hybrid 
identity which possesses within it elements of the colonizer and the 
colonized represents a challenge to the validity of cultural essentialism. 
Hybridity serves as a space of disruption in-between cultural, political and 
legal polarizations, it is a phenomenological mode of articulation “an 
interruptive, interrogative and enunciative”70 space where boundaries blur 
and the stereotypical classification of social categories loosens up. 
 
                                                
68 Gill Valentine, ‘Theorizing and Researching Intersectionality: A Challenge for Feminist 
Geography’ in The Professional Geographer (2007) 59(1), p.19. 
69 Homi K. Bhabba, ‘The Other Question’ in Screen 24.6 (1983): 18-36 p.18 
70 Bhabba, The Location of Culture, op. cit. p. 178-179 
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Having said this, however, I do not intend to encourage the adoption of  ‘the 
middle’ space as a solution to the hostility of two extremities. The hybrid 
space can offer a useful set of methodologies for the consideration of what is 
different. For example, it can provide an alternative which opposes to 
cultural essentialism and can “find those words with which we can speak of 
Ourselves and Others. And by exploring this hybridity, this ’Third Space', 
we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of 
ourselves”.71 It should be seen as an opportunity, an incentive,  from which a 
third, a fourth, fifth, sixth, infinity is derived. I therefore believe that 
hybridity is a useful concept insofar as it shows an approach towards 
establishing a principle of participative difference. However, it is less useful 
if conceptualised as a spatial ‘cutting-edge’ central ground instituted for 
mediation and compromise. 
 
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos makes a neat distinction between 
middle and central spaces.  He interestingly identifies the ‘middle space’ as 
the core of life (Deleuzian life): “the space in which the inevitability of being 
thrown-in and exposed to the draughts of the world becomes evident”, 72 
where bodies are exposed to other bodies. Central spaces, by contrast, are 
institutionalised orientations which lack the spatial strength of the middle. 
Such spaces, then, cannot resolve the problems at stake because their 
hierarchical structure would only reciprocate the dynamics and politics 
reiterated by the two polarities (with the only difference than instead two, 
we would be dealing with three spaces).  The existence of a hybrid space – 
like the recognition of a third gender - can offer an inclusive method that 
opposes radical ‘politics of polarity’73 on gender, private and public space, 
feminine and masculine. Such a method would indeed serve to introduce an 
element of differentiation, a more heterogeneous ground into the lifeless 
                                                
71 Homi K. Bhabha, ‘Cultural Diversity and Cultural Differences’ in The Post-Colonial 
Studies Reader, B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, H. Tiffin,  eds. (Routledge, New York 2006) p. 209 
72 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “…the sound of a breaking string”. Critical 
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dialectical logics. However, because governed by old logics of 
representation, it remains an ‘average’ space:74 not able to sustain the radical 
‘right to signify’75 Bhabba hopes for, the motor of individuality itself. 
 
 
3.7 Will to Be Imperceptible 
 
Elizabeth Grosz suggests that instead of seeking recognition through 
intersectionality, that is, through the theorisation of identities and categories, 
we must start seeking recognition through “politics of acts…in which 
inhuman forces, forces that are both living and non living, macroscopic and 
microscopic, above and below the level of the human are acknowledged and 
allowed to displace the centrality of both consciousness and 
unconsciousness”.76 In other words: we should let go logics of recognition as 
explained in this chapter, and embrace a new mode of individuation away 
from the Hegelian structure of static identity.77 The subject must seek to  “be 
conceived as modes of action and passion, a surface catalytic of events, 
events which subjects do not control but participate in, which produce what 
history and thus what identity subjects may have”.78 For this to happen, 
however, Grosz argues that instead of conceiving politics as more or less 
violent negotiations between identities that strive for recognition where the 
model for recognition is strictly structured and the negotiation is unilateral 
and patronising, that is, only pursued by the subject that seeks it, we should 
rethink politics as a structure that allows a “profound tranformation in all 
related concept – of objects, of the social, of action and agency”.79 The 
moment of the encounter  - to which I will return shortly offering a different 
                                                
74 “The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up 
speed.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, op. cit. p. 28 
75 Homi K. Bhabba, ‘Fireflies Caught in Molasses: Questions of Cultural Translation’ in 
Rosalind Kraus et al. October: The Second Decade, 1986-1996. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
1997) 
76 Grosz, ‘A Politics of Imperceptibility’, op. cit. p. 470 
77 This notion is traditionally marked by the Hegelian reflections of psychoanalysis 
provided by Lacan whereby identity is forged through loss in the infant-mother dyad 
moment and the self is formed by the essential dualism body/mind. 
78 Grosz, ‘A Politics of Imperceptibility’, op. cit. p.468 
79 Ibid. p. 469 
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perspective- theorised in the Hegelian scheme of recognition, can be a place 
of participation and development only if the two parties involved abandon 
their ‘molar-being’ in favour of ‘becoming-molecular’80 and reach one 
another from the perspective of multiplicity rather than with the intention of 
each preserving their unity. “It is no longer a subject that takes before it a 
subject with whom to identify, and an object on which to enact its desire or 
will; rather forces act through subjects, objects, material and social worlds 
without distinction, producing relations of inequality and differentiation, 
which themselves produce ever-realigning relations of intensity and force”.81 
 
Grosz’s theory of imperceptibility has at its core the Deleuzian concept of 
multiplicity. Accordingly, a Deleuzian analysis of the GRA and the 
dialectical politics that sustain it cannot leave out the aspect relative to the 
miscommunication between the law and institutions which is fundamental 
in Deleuze’s understanding of the law. In Empiricism and the Subjectivity 
Deleuze makes a bold distinction between society, which is reviewed as 
“creative, inventive and positive”,82 and the law which acts almost as a break 
on that creativity, inventiveness and positivity.  For Deleuze - and this is a 
conclusion he will get to later, particularly in the L'Abécédaire 83 - 
jurisprudence can identify with society: both positive and creative 
assemblages that operate to coordinate day-to-day issues and act as a 
guarantee for what Alexandre Lefebvre calls “certain preexisting rights”84, 
thus stopping subjects from harming each other. Laws, on the contrary, 
produce abstract and static understandings of rights, they create false values 
for people to identify with “and it’s in the name of all this that thinking is 
fettered, that any analysis in terms of movement is blocked”.85 To Deleuze 
the notion of right is lifeless in that it is locked, abstract and it does not 
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81 Grosz, ‘A Politics of Imperceptibility’, op. cit. p.469  
82 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, op. cit. p. 46 
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respond to a real need, but rather, generates more opportunities for 
categories and therefore for divisions.86 Moreover, for Deleuze laws do not 
address human necessity but only respond to a temporal passion influenced 
by the momentum and the interchangeable fashion in which things in 
society are understood. On these terms, one could argue that the GRA is 
designed on an abstract notion of what gender is or should be, or how it 
ought to be portrayed and reproduced in society. At a certain point gender is 
assimilated in terms of female and male polarities and on such polarities the 
reiteration of gender roles and gender production. At a different moment in 
time – following a Deleuzian reading - the very definition of gender may be 
based on a different understanding of those same roles and it may extend to 
include or exclude certain other aspects that today seem irrelevant. So, what 
we have is only a natural evolution of sensibilities and rights that change 
according to the construction of new juridical scenarios. It is important to 
note how, for Deleuze, the law by itself – and indeed its laws and codes – are 
self-reflective and sterile without the existence of jurisprudence, which is 
what creates the social situation wherein a concrete necessity comes up and 
determines the production of new rights and new laws. Jurisprudence is the 
grounded, real dimension of abstracts notions such as law, justice and 
rights.87 Such an understanding recognises relevance to rights only through 
the concreteness of jurisprudence without which those right would only 
remain abstract and incomprehensible timely passions. Jurisprudence can be 
understood then in terms of a differential “process-orientated”88 system of 
practices.  
 
For Deleuze that there are two conditions that make certain cases real social 
emergencies. Such affects are a condition of accidentality and a condition of 
necessity at once. They are accidental because these cases draw attention 
                                                
86 In L'Abécédaire Deleuze goes as far as saying that “there are no human rights, there is life, 
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87 Edward Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze. The Expression and Representation of Law 
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onto themselves accidentally, and they are necessary because the law must 
present them as such. From this double status stems Deleuze’s definition of 
encounter. This is crucial because through it the law renews itself, being the 
encounter a means to introduce a certain outside perspective into the law “in 
a constitutive relationship with its outside – with cases – which forces it into 
action and intervention”89. It is also important because the encounter gives 
us the opportunity to reflect on the dogmatic aspect of the law. The 
encounter itself is a promise, the promise that the law will account for what 
is just, but it is a promise that is not kept because, as Lefebvre citing Bergson 
tells us “the possibility that something might be genuinely new, that is, that 
we encounter something unprecedented and experience a shock to thought, 
is an anathema to thought premised on recognition. As a consequence, both 
the genuine exteriority of the outside and the chance for encounters is 
forfeited – these are both interiorized, as it were, into our representations 
before the fact of an encounter. A genuine encounter is missed; it simply 
becomes an opportunity for the instantiation of prepossessed concepts”90. 
For Deleuze, recognition then is made of and reiterated by a series of trivial 
facts, “everyday banality”91, that are none other than the re-evaluation and 
the re-adoption of facts and situations that are believed to be the foundation 
of thought. The price of this pre-disposition is paid by the law which, in a 
way, is kept hostage of this a priori mechanism which may be explicit or 
implicit, but still responsible of a dogmatism that is deeply imbedded in the 
way in which cases are recognised.  So one can conclude that the 
suppression of the free fruition of the encounter haunts and compromises 
the genuineness the law itself. 
 
Moreover, this dogmatism imbedded in law makes recognition happen only 
through judgment based on consuetude, thus shutting off any possibility for 
real difference. Deleuze clearly says that judgment itself has only two 
                                                
89 Lefebvre, The image of Law, op. cit. p. 59 
90 Ibid. p.60 
91 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p.135 
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functions, two “essential functions” 92 to be precise: one is to ensure that 
ideas are distributed  - “the partition of concepts” – and the other is the 
“hierarchization, which it ensures by the measuring of subjects. To the 
former corresponds the faculty of judgment known as common sense; to the 
latter the faculty known as good sense (or first sense). Both constitute just 
measure or ‘justice’ as a value of judgment. In this sense, every philosophy 
of categories takes judgment for its model”.93 For Deleuze, as explained by 
Lefebvre, common sense and good sense are both guarantor of that system 
that “partitions being into its genera and upholds identity for each genus 
through its subdivision into species”94. This explanation of judgment 
establishes exactly what Deleuze opposes, that is, a concept of difference that 
cannot be understood in terms of difference between two things, because 
such an understanding presupposes the existence of contradiction between 
those same two things. As we have seen, it is rather difference in itself, that 
constitutional difference that, according to Deleuze’s analysis, judgment is 
not able to depict because it is structured to operate only in terms of 
difference between things, “either between different concepts or between 
different things under different concepts”.95 The encounter is then offset 
because this is a system of knowledge that “conforms to the general”96 and 
only allows for conceptual difference. From here it is possible to understand 
what Deleuze means when he says that the law makes the future 
predictable: it operates following the same binarised mechanisms. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari develop a theory of the rhizome, opposing to an 
arboric system of knowledge. The rhizome is an undergournd tuber that, 
unlike a solid tree that preserves its solidity and is unable to contain and 
reproduce tranformation, ramifies and expands through the grounds, always 
reaching out for new territories.97 What they propose is a system of 
                                                
92 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p. 33 
93 Ibid. 
94 Lefebvre, The Image of Law, op. cit. p. 64 
95 Ibid. p. 65 
96 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p. 38 
97 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, op. cit. p. 7 
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connections that ramifies into new flows and takes up differet forms where 
subjectivity is multiple and goes hand in hand with the ‘othered body’ thus 
encouraging a constant negotiation of the Self. Multiplicity has no structure 
and does not belong to anyone or anything, it stands in opposition to the 
very idea of category, for its structure is a non structure with no centre or 
unity and therefore the representation of any kind of linear identity becomes 
impossible, being multiplicity itself constituted by non linear movements. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, multiplicity is the very essence of becoming; if we 
give up concepts such as subject and object (Hegelian Recognition), then it 
will be easier to think in terms of molecular multiplicity as a space composed 
by heterogenous elements in constant movement, where each object is 
connected to everything else. We are in a space of chaos, disruption and 
difference where the Self does not travel towards producing a representative 
identity singularity, but rather, it transforms in order to always become 
something else. Such transformation is internal to the self, immanent, it is a 
matter of being.  
 
The most obvious critique that one could raise against the theory of 
molecular is that transsexual identity, already so precarious in its various 
representation across the various disciplines of social sciences, needs a 
narrative that develops on solid ground and that is based on a less 
mellifluous and unsettling understanding of what identity should be. This 
is however a point that Deleuze clarifies when he insists on the univocity of 
being, for becoming other is not to be seen as unsettling movement of self-
denial in constant search of another kind of selfhood to embrace, it is rather 
a new method of understanding the world, where the individual is one and 
univocal in his being, but his being contains within itself the chaos of 
possibilities, each equally dignified. “There is no dualism between the two 
planes of transcendent organization and immanent consistence… [we] do 
therefore speak of a dualism between two kinds of ‘things’ but of a 
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multiplicity of dimension, of lines and directions”98. So, we can understand 
the molecular not in terms of identity, but as the force of becoming being 
such that it fragments the straight push of normativity which, in reaction 
against change, attempts to contain the dynamism of these fragmentations 
in molar forms. It is important to understand that the human body is here 
conceived as part of a multiple whole unified by haecceity, not an 
individual, but a mode of individuation that is manifested through 
intensity. “The life of the individual has given way to a life that is 
impersonal but singular nevertheless, and which releases a pure event freed 
from the accidents of inner and outer life; freed, in other words from the 
subjectivity and objectivity of what happen”.99 Open then to the movements 
and affected by its surroundings (other bodies in movement). We see then 
that identity is not a finished product made of certain steady components, 
but it is a container without its lid where complex interchanges, lines and 
variables interconnect only to keep moving and reach other bodies in a 
constant motion of becoming.  
 
Deleuze insists against the existence of a closed group or identity (in this 
case, the category of trans) because identification happens only through the 
connection with others (and recognition given by others).  
 
“ In recognition, the sensible is not at all that which can only be 
sensed, but that which bears directly upon the sense in an object 
which can be recalled, imagined or conceived … The object of an 
encounter, on the other hand, really gives rise to sensibility with 
regard to a given sense … It is not the sensible being but the 
being of the sensible”.100 
 
The encounter, then, works by means of affirmation and not dialectical 
exclusion. Everything that is encountered can be recognised only by virtue 
of being. To avoid the encounter would be to give in to dogmatism.  
Furthermore, what we encounter triggers a movement that forces us to 
                                                
98 Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet, Dialogues, Trans. by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) pp.132-133 
99 Deleuze, Immanence: A Life, op. cit. p. 4 
100 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p. 140 
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think (“Something in the world forces us to think” 101), thus initiating (and 
not arresting) a process of multiple differentiation.  
 
Sexuality – and indeed transsexuality – is multiple and open “to all sorts of 
possible new relations, micro-logical or micro-psychic, essentially reversible, 
transversal relations with as many sexes as there are assemblages 
(agencements), without even excluding new relations between men and 
women: the mobility of particular S&M relations, the potency of cross-
dressing , Fourier’s thirty-six thousand forms of love, of the n-sexes (neither 
one or two sexes)”.102 In this fluid space of disruption and fragmentation 
where pre-existing categories and schemes of representation cannot contain 
the flow of becoming, a rhizomatic body eludes the classification that would 
confine it to the male or female category based on genitalia and a politics of 
recognition which extends thus far would automatically serve to subvert 
such categories. “The rhizome … is a liberation not only from reproduction 
but also from genitalia”.103  It becomes evident that a structure of recognition 
envisioned as a specific moment fixed in space and time when 
acknowledgement is bestowed upon the individual blocks the flow of desire 
and takes back the self to the duality of normativity, for this structure of 
recognition is only a matter of dialectic and identity reproduction. The 
affirmation of the Self travels rather on processes of identification that are 
ongoing and elaborated through movement. 
 
My analysis of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 suggests a series of 
instances where prejudice and essentialism in handling trans subjectivity 
become causes of inequality and discrimination. I have explained that it 
relies on binaries understandings of bodily aesthetics which are theorised 
under the categories of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ and reintroduced into 
discourse by the Gender Recognition Panel. I have argued that this is a cause 
of discrimination against those modes of trans-embodiment that do not fit in 
                                                
101 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p. 139 
102 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and other Texts, 1953-1974, Trans. by M. Taormina (New 
York: Semiotext[e], 2004) p. 287 
103 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, op. cit. p. 20 
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this binarisation thus generating tension within the same category. 
 
The argument that has emerged so far highlights a strong essentialism in the 
construction of a politics of recognition and, in particular, in the case of the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004. The transsexual self that throughout the Act is 
always conceptualised in terms of body/mind is not body nor mind, but it is 
shaped in a condition of ‘in-betweeness’ , of differences, of pluralism which 
is not accounted for in the Act. Likewise, the temporal dimension of this 
legislation delineates the attempt of the law to map-out a template of trans 
identity which is stable and ‘authentic’ and fails to consider the varieties of 
modes of identification which the Self undertakes. What we need to focus on 
is not the negotiation of identity inclusions, for as we have seen with the 
Gender Recognition Act, acts of inclusion can easily turn into acts of 
exclusion, but it is a new way of theorising the self.  The model of 
Recognition used in political discourse is essentially Hegelian, where 
identity is not something naturally developed internally or externally 
through inter-subjective relations between Selves, but a certain something 
that is imposed on the Subject and with which the Subject has to come to 
terms never being able to fully pay off the debt with the Other. In short, it is 
an ongoing struggle, a lifetime effort. “This Hegelian strand […] that 
underlies all discourses on identity that require the other’s tacit implication in 
the subject’s formation, needs to be counterbalanced with an alternative 
tradition, one with a considerably shorter history, which can be dated from 
the Nietzschean rewriting of the Hegelian dialect as the servile 
rationalizations of the slave and the herd, rather as the movement of an 
enlightening ‘spirit’ to its own self-fruition”.104 In Grosz’s reading of 
Nietzsche - passing through Deleuze – it is possible to find the map for a 
new theory of imperceptibility which instead of conceptualising the subject 
as either an acting agent upon an object or as the victim of another agent, “it 
marks the subject as such is its capacity to act and be acted upon, to do 
                                                
104 E. Grosz, A Politics of Imperceptibility, op. cit. p.466 
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rather than to be, to act rather than to identify.”105 
 
“That which gives the extraordinary firmness to our belief in 
causality is not the great habit of seeing one occurrence following 
another but out inability to interpret events otherwise than as 
events caused by intentions. It is belief in the living and thinking 
as the only effective force – in will , in intention – it is belief that 
every event is a deed, that every deed presupposes a doer, it is a 
belief in the ‘subject’. Is this belief in the concept of subject and 
attribute not a great stupidity?”106 
 
Question: is intention the cause of an event? Or is that also 
illusion? 
Is it not the event itself?” 107 
 
Nietzsche’s model may provide us with a new way of approaching the 
conceptualisation of the Subject and recognition as a social practice.  What 
makes us so certain that the subject needs to be recognised? As we have 
seen, recognition does automatically produce acceptance, and it is fiercely 
questioned in the next section of this research by those individuals who do 
not feel fit for the rigidity of its requirements. So what makes this model so 
appealing?  Nietzsche’s subject stands beyond recognition, in the sense that 
it does not rely on the struggle for recognition present in Hegel. Nietzsche’s 
subject is affirmative and develops through self-identification rather than on 
the negation of negotiations. Hegel’s master/slave dialectic in Nietzsche 
becomes a subject developing though the relation of affects and will. “ In 
place of the desire for recognition as the condition for subjective identity, we 
need to begin with different working assumptions, which may cover some of 
the same issues as those conceived by identity politics, without, however, 
resorting to the language and assumptions governing recognitions. In place 
of the desire for recognition, the emptiness of solipsistic existence, the 
annihilation of identity without the other, the relation of desperate 
dependence on the other for the stability of one’s being, we could place an 
                                                
105 Ibid. p. 466 
106 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random 
House, 1968) p. 294 
107 Ibid p. 295 
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account of subjectivity, identity, or agency at the mercy of forces, energies, 
practices, which produce an altogether different understanding of both 
politics and identity”.108 
 
In what follows we will see actualised fragments of utopias in the lives of 
some individuals that claim an imperceptible space wherein to establish 
their unique transgender specificity. These people, as they themselves will 
explain, are not served by the recognition logics of the GRA because their 
subjectivity is not accounted for by the rigid bipartition of genders. These are 
marginal bodies to whom recognition is denied but that, through being, take 
up the right to write their own narrative and their utopia is spelt and 
affirmed every day by their own difference.
                                                
108 Grosz, A Politics of Imperceptibility, op. cit. p.468 
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The Diary Sessions, I 
On Gender Recognition 
 
 
 
“GENRES ARE NOT to be mixed. I will not mix genres.  
I repeat: genres are not to be mixed. I will not mix genres”1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Tom, 25 year old FtM working and living in London says: 
 
 
“One of the main reasons why I don’t want a GRC (Gender 
Recognition Certificate) is that I want to keep my birth certificate as a 
female because I am incredibly connected to my femaleness and I feel 
almost that it’s taking it away. That last piece of paper that says I’m a 
female kind of takes away from me identifying as a Gender Queer … I 
was born female, the majority of my time I identify as gender queer or 
trans masculine or femme, and all of those things are combined in my 
identity, I feel that to get a GRC is to deny my past. I don’t want to 
deny my past. I don’t want to rewrite my life and I want people to know 
that”.2 
 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter how the GRA is for so many reasons 
an advanced piece of legislation that enables trans people to gain a new 
birth certificate stating the gender of choice, to marry or enter civil 
partnership and to benefit from a recognized legal status and citizenship3. 
While the GRA remains an outstanding accomplishment for trans 
communities, it is important to question the significance of the Act for trans 
people themselves beyond the political paradigm of rights and legal 
recognition and also beyond any theoretical configurations. What does the 
                                                
1 Jacques, Derrida “The Law of Genre” Trans. Avital Ronell. Critical Inquiry 7.1 (Autumn 
1980): 55-81. 
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKvpIy4lLtI 
3 For an in-depth study on citizenship and how citizenship is articulated in relation to the 
Gender recognition Act 2004 please see Sally Hines, TransForming Gender: Transgender 
Practices of Identity, Intimacy and Care. 
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GRA mean? Or even, what does recognition mean in the life of transgender 
subjects? In the light of the analysis presented in the previous chapter, this 
section will be useful to reflect on certain practical aspects and issues raised 
by the GRA and may help think about any discrepancies and areas that 
need further consideration within the legislation. 
 
In chapter 3 I highlighted a series of circumstances and contradictions that 
stem from a partly inflexible piece of legislation based on few but precise 
principles. One such principle is the stability of gender, which is an 
important part of the structure of the GRA. We have seen how the third 
requirement (c) for gender recognition is the intent to “continue to live in 
the required gender until death”. This predicament poses first of all an issue 
of equity because it demands an a priori engagement with an ideal of 
solidity of gender that non trans individuals are not expected to engage 
with and produce (this based on the assumption that gender is stable and 
those who are not diagnosed with gender dysphoria would not question 
this notion in the first place), but it also opens far more complex issues 
caused by a more dangerous ideal, that of purity of gender. We will see 
later in chapter 4 how the ideal of purity in gender is played out within the 
configuration of a sex segregated public space such as that of public toilets. 
In the context of the GRA, by purity of gender I mean two things 
specifically: First, the assumption that gender is recognised insofar as it 
travels on a female/male binary – and therefore any blurry positioning is 
suppressed. With uncertainty must also go the possibility that feminine and 
masculine may cohabit within the same subjectivity. Secondly, the Gender 
Recognition Certificate can overwrite one’s history erasing any traces of 
gender discontinuity in favour of gender coherence, that is, an ideal that 
gender must be pure and uncontaminated. 
 
To open up to an idea of identity where “all those things are combined” 
would of course encourage an element of fluidity to gender and would 
consequently create room for questioning that monolithic ‘until death’ 
requirement upon which the GRA is so tightly constructed.  
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Tom: “[The GRC] takes a big chunk of me and rolls it away and 
pretends it doesn’t exist and it never existed. But it does exist and it did 
exist. I was born a female and I’m always going to have that history. It 
would be like getting rid of a part of my life I don’t want to get rid of”.4 
 
 
Mark, mid 30s FtM, concurs: 
 
“I want to be recognized as a male…at the same time, I don’t know… 
My current birth certificate says that this person was born a female, 
was given a female name and that to me is a quite important part of my 
history to actually have a new birth certificate to claim that I’m actually 
this other person. This is difficult in my mind. I know who I am”.5 
 
 
To leave a trace of oneself, of one’s history becomes vital. And to give up 
such a significant part of oneself is seen by some as an act of betrayal. 
Moreover, what seems vital is the necessity not to make their unique trans 
narratives invisible. The Gender Recognition Certificate seems to do just 
that for some. 
 
Tom: “At the end of the day I get that a piece of paper is not super 
important, I get it that it doesn’t really erase my past, but it means that 
if I get a GRC nowhere will ever show that I’m trans unless I choose to 
tell them. And I wonder how easy it would be for me to disappear and 
become invisible to myself. I feel like the GRC would be taking 
something away rather than giving me something”.6 
 
 
Mark “I know when I look at my birth certificate and I see a female it 
isn’t right, at the same time that forms a part of me so I’m not planning 
on going for a GRC just yet. The thought of changing my history is 
tricky”.7 
 
 
Robin, late 30s FtM says: 
 
“Some guys don’t want to leave any traces of ever lived with a female 
body so for them a GRC is important. For me it’d be a practical point of 
making sure I remain safe wherever I am in the world, if I’m to travel 
                                                
4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKvpIy4lLtI 
5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=prjhPR6Bbr0 
6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKvpIy4lLtI 
7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=prjhPR6Bbr0 
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out I’d have supporting documentation. But from a personal point of 
view I wouldn’t want to erase history. I think it’s vitally important that 
we live behind a trace that we are transgender because otherwise how 
would people in the future now how far back these things go… there are 
already people that pretend there was no such thing as transgender 
priori to 1960, which is ridiculous. I believe in leaving an evidence 
trail”.8 
 
 
Adrian, young FtM who lives in Brighton UK and who has already 
obtained his GRC, thinks through the process and concludes that, in his 
experience:  
 
 
“A pro would be a sense of achievement and the feeling that you’re 
finally being recognised, and the other major pro is legal. For example, 
from now any documentation that’s addressed to you has no reason to 
be addressed in your old name, gender or title. But what does it really 
mean if you think about it? Organisations don’t care: you say call me 
Mister, you say call me by this name and they’ll do it. I still get 
mistaken for a female on the phone… that [the GRC] hasn’t changed, 
I’m just going to have to accept that and move on with my life.  [The 
GRC] hasn’t changed anything in the way I present or go about my life, 
and I think, you know, at the end of the day did it really change 
anything? I didn’t add anything”.9 
 
 
What seems to be the primary concern for some people is not so much to 
draw a line between past and present, between a before and after, for such a 
distinction does not appear as clear cut as the Gender Recognition Act 
advocates. History matters a great deal and a new birth certificate 
compromises the specificity of that unique relationship everyone has with 
their own origins. Tom quite succinctly says: “I wonder how easy it would be 
for me to disappear and become invisible to myself. I feel like the GRC would be 
taking something away rather than giving me something”10. What comes up 
rather prepotently is the necessity to have a free space wherein a narrative 
takes place and develops.  
 
                                                
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-X6c2nnxd0 
9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmE-1EYc34A 
10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKvpIy4lLtI 
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“A lot of people when they realize they’re trans, they feel an incredible 
amount of pressure to become hyper-masculine – I’m talking about 
trans guys here – and to  start pursuing all the steps necessary to 
become and embody completely male sex. That is totally fine for some 
people and totally not fine for other people. All these choices are totally 
ok but it’s really hard because there is a lack of vocabulary out there. 
Even I live my life based on this ‘either or’, but I think it’s totally ok to 
say I’m a transsexual. I don’t need to say trans male or gender variant 
and all that sort of stuff. I’m just transsexual and it fees good to say it 
and believe it”11.  
 
Recognition is important, but acceptance cannot happen only on the basis of 
a legal definition of what gender should be like and where the boundary 
between gender and sex lies. As Charles says: “I’m just transsexual and it fees 
good to say it and believe it”12.  
 
Such a drastic and uncompromising understanding of gender inevitably 
give the Acts itself the taste of a dead piece of legislation detached from 
people’s lived experience, a means to an end, something to have just 
because a legalised and recognised identity is easier to live in, rather than 
an active and ongoing involvement with an ongoing transgender debate.  
 
Tom: “My documents have been changed since February 2010 and 
we’re now in May 2012 and that means that I meet the requirements to 
apply for GRC now and I can change my birth certificate. This is 
interesting. I remember one year ago I was mad that I couldn’t apply for 
GRC and I wanted one so badly, while now the only reason why I 
would want a GRC is because it’s be easier to access my benefits… 
Other than that, I don’t care”.13 
 
Tom: “ I feel like I should get one [GRC] to make things easier for 
myself.”14 
 
Adrian: “If you can change your gender on your ID, driving license 
and passport, don’t bother [with a GRC]”.15 
 
                                                
11https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_JCfTzbXPo&list=UU9y7S7zKwMCzm
opAMeRd4g 
12https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_JCfTzbXPo&list=UU9y7S7zKwMCzop
AMeRd4g 
13 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKvpIy4lLtI 
14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKvpIy4lLtI 
15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmE-1EYc34A 
 139 
The Act is certainly useful in affording legal recognition and social 
legitimacy to trans people who identify as women or men, it gives people 
with a coherent path of transition the opportunity to have that history 
corrected and for a new one to emerge and to be recognised. However, as 
also pointed out by some scholars and activists, such as Whittle and Turner, 
2007; it has not improved the legal condition of those who identify beyond 
the female/male categories. “My identity is always shifting”16, says Charles, a 
young transman who, like many, does not fit in the clear-cut picture 
painted by this legislation,“that’s the beautiful thing about queerness, there is 
room for constant identity shifting”17. But does the issue come down to 
shifting identities versus stable identities? I will come back to this reflection 
shortly. 
 
Before I do so, however, I must reflect on what Tom, Mark and Adrian said: 
They fully identify as males and live in their new gender role. Yet they feel 
the importance to retain their past, not let go of their history because it is 
part of who they are today as individuals. This to them does not take away 
their masculinity, about which they feel very strongly, nor does it threaten 
the ‘stability’ of a gender they have desired, pursued and are now 
embodying. On the contrary, it adds to their trans subjectivity because what 
is at stake to them is the appropriation of a narrative that is their own and 
that the GRA is attempting to eradicate and replace. This could suggest the 
presence of a certain degree of doubt. Maybe it is exactly this uncertainty 
that the GRA wishes to address and ensure is resolved before individuals 
embark on the journey for recognition. This is a legitimate consideration: 
certainly everyone has a different story and for some it is important to erase 
all connections with a past that may have been dramatic, hurtful and 
traumatising.  For other transgender people such as Adrian and Mark, for 
example, the darkness of their past is constitutive of who they are today as 
transgender individuals. Their stories do not contemplate uncertainty 
linked to their new gender: Mark says “I deliberately chose a name that is 
                                                
16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vrgpYb-86l4 
17 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vrgpYb-86l4 
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deemed very masculine”18. Adrian insists: “I really really despise my old name … 
my whole life growing up and the experience of being me was not good… That 
name is darkness to me, it’s death to me, it’s my least favourite word in the world 
and I hate to hear it … I don’t want those memories, they are horrible to me. I felt 
like I was a phantom.”19.  Still, it seems that to give up that past – however 
painful - and to rewrite a brand new story is for some trans subjects to deny 
a narrative that comes before any formal recognition that uniforms them to 
a category which does not take into account their specificity of human 
beings before being trans. 
 
This is a very important point that needs further examination. Two things 
are particularly significant: First of all, a desire – suppressed by the current 
design of the GRA - to retain feminine and masculine sides within the same 
subjectivity and for this to be accepted as part and parcel of transgender 
identity as it is understood by the law. So the law can substitute a narrative 
with another by assigning a new gender which overwrites birth gender, yet 
physical intervention is not a requirement for the GRC, which means that 
the transgender people going for recognition can maintain their birth 
genitalia, as long as they have been living in the role of the desired gender. 
Now, how does the law resolve that contradiction? Or even, does this 
contradiction need resolving? One can assume that if the law accepts the 
coexistence of two opposites – birth genitalia and different gender – then 
why can the law not tolerate that desire of maintaining the specificity of an 
individual narrative wherein elements of masculinity and elements of 
femininity can be equally validated? 
 
“I have a concern: should I ever end up in jail, if I have a GRC does that 
mean that I automatically go to a man’s jail? Because, quite frankly, I 
don’t want to do that. I don’t think I would be safe there… I don’t think 
that any [mens] jail in the UK or abroad would accommodate for the 
peculiarities of my physicality”20 
 
                                                
18 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=prjhPR6Bbr0 
19 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=39kRrBemXz4 
20 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmE-1EYc34A 
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Secondly, it seems that the need to maintain a tight and distinct gender 
binary and to prove that one’s gender is stable and that it will indeed not 
oscillate does not only preserve gender per se, but works in favour of a 
greater purpose which is the masterplan of preserving heterosexuality21 and 
the secular institutions that are anchored in it, one for all marriage. This 
becomes apparent in the way the GRA regulates same sex marriage. Let us 
take a closer look:  
 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 enables a trans person to marry an 
individual of the “opposite sex”, or to enter into a civil partnership with 
someone of the “same sex”. This of course requires that the individual or 
individuals involved, each identify with one gender. Furthermore, before 
the new gender is recognised, any pre-existing marriage or civil partnership 
outstanding needs to be dissolved, which presents a set of issues trans 
individuals are put through. 
 
 
Mark: “ I couldn’t actually get a full GRC until I had my civil 
partnership dissolved, because I’m in a civil partnership with a woman 
and the way that they deal with this is that they’d give me an interim 
GRC which gives you six months to sort out your marriage status… 
This presents problems for us…if I wanted to maintain that legal status 
I would have to dissolve my civil partnership and marry her as a 
straight couple. That’s not something I’m comfortable doing and 
certainly not something she is comfortable doing”22. 
 
 
Again it is possible to see how through this formulation the law attempts to 
silence an idea of gender fluidity and rewrite a narrative rather than allow 
individuals to rewrite theirs according to their unique circumstances and 
lived experiences, thus presenting problem for those who identify 
differently. Further developing the concept of fluidity in intimate 
                                                
21 Dunne, Michael ‘Sampling Considerations’ in Wiederman, M & Whitley, B (Eds.) 
Handbook for Conducting Research on Human Sexuality (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates  2002) pp. 85-112. 
22 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=prjhPR6Bbr0 
 142 
partnerships, in her research on ciswomen’s 23 partnerships with trans men,  
Carla Pfeffer points out how couples are heavily influenced by the body 
image of one or both partners, “the body image of one partner may affect 
both the body image of another, as well as the ways these bodies may relate 
(sexually and non-sexually) to one another.”24 This suggests that  intimate 
relations rely on a set of processes that are certainly established by the 
internal dynamics between the partners, but they are also socially 
constructed, that is, they retain social and political significance and the 
GRA requirements – as Mark expresses above - unsettle that mechanism.  
The problem is that recognition structured such as it is in the GRA 2004 fails 
to consider that trans subjectivity is also a question of matter and 
embodiment. Recognition may be a status, but the day-to-day lives of trans 
people have to face the materiality of their bodies and the struggle of that 
disagreement that the GRA cannot resolve. As Adrian said earlier: “I still get 
mistaken for a female on the phone… that [the GRC] hasn’t changed”.25 
 
Charles, who insists he does not belong to either gender, says:  
 
“My gender is really different than many trans guys I interact with. 
How many genders are out there? I think that by definition the gender 
binary says that you’re feminine or masculine, male or female. So that 
dichotomy is silencing to those who identify in the middle. People who 
identify in the middle are constantly silenced and invalidated by the 
gender binary itself”26. 
 
“I like to think of gender as non-binary and not necessarily as a 
spectrum where there can be people in the middle, but move as a 
diagram where there is many different circles. There is some continuum 
to it, but there is also multi-dimensional.”27 
 
“Certainly I do know that gender is stacked and there are many people 
out there that identify as female or male, feminine or masculine…but I 
think that we need to come up with new vocabularies. Gender policing 
                                                
23 Ciswoman is the abbreviation of ‘cisexual woman’. It refers to a woman whose 
performed gender role and sense of self match her female birth gender. 
24 Pfeffer, Carla A, ‘Bodies in Relation—Bodies in Transition: Lesbian Partners of Trans 
Men and Body Image’ in Journal of Lesbian Studies 12(4), 2008: 325-345 
25 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmE-1EYc34A 
26 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15_w2fmcNQ0 
27 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15_w2fmcNQ0 
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obviously happens outside of the trans community.”28 
 
 
Charles points out a grave problem, perhaps the most important when it 
comes to gender policing, certainly the most crucial when it comes to 
understanding and managing transgender subjectivities. It is the way in 
which people who identify differently are presented and articulated in 
socio-political discourse, that is, as we have already seen, by means of a 
psychiatric diagnosis: gender dysphoria29. By this I mean the pathologisation 
of transgender and the consequent stigmatisation which frame any 
transgender subjectivities within a medical context from which it is hard, if 
not impossible, to detach oneself.30  
 
 
Charles: “The GID is always inherently pathologising and we are seen 
as mentally unsound … I have a real problem with pathologising 
transsexuality… Pathologising only stigmatises us and it only makes it 
harder for us to access the health benefits that we need because 
essentially if it’s classified as a psychiatric diagnosis rather than a 
medical diagnosis then insurance companies look at SRS (Sex 
Reassignment Surgery) as cosmetic surgery and also they dole out a lot 
less money for psychiatric needs so I don’t really understand the point 
of it”.31 
 
Jenna: “We are pushed into claiming on the ground of disability… 
                                                
28 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15_w2fmcNQ0 
29 ‘Gender Dysphoria’ is listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
V (DSM5). See Anne Vitale ‘Rethinking the Gender Identity Disorder Terminology in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM IV)’, Paper Presented at the Conference of Harry 
Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, Bologna, 6-9 April;  
30 Until 2012, gender dysphoria was listed as Gender Identity Disorder (GID) in The 
American Psychiatric Association under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders.  This was controversial especially because the emphasis was put on gender 
identity and expression, considered and articulated in terms of ‘disorder’. As of 2012, with 
the 5th revised edition, only the term ‘gender dysphoria’ was used and it was employed to 
indicate “a marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and 
assigned gender” as opposed to what once used to label all transgender as psychiatric 
cases. This shift is an important step towards reframing transgender and helps remove 
some stigma. Doctor Jack Drescher, a member of the American Psychiatric Association 
who was involved in the revision said: “We know there is a whole community of people 
out there who are not seeking medical attention and live between the two binary 
categories. We wanted to send the message that the therapist’s job isn’t to pathologize.” 
http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2012/07/23/dsm-replaces-gender-
identity-disorder-gender-dysphoria 
31 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DPpmX83wVQ 
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Now, I’m not disabled. I’ve got all my fingers, all my toes, I’ve got my 
legs, my limbs, I’ve got my brain, my heart, I’ve got everything… I’m 
not disabled”.32 
 
Charles:“I think that the standards for this should be coming from our 
community… I’m not psychologically ill. I don’t have a psychiatric 
issue. Maybe I needed counseling because it’s stressful to go through 
this and you need some assistance figuring things. The fact of the 
matter is, these standards work against us in so many ways: they 
continue to stigmatise us in society and also keep us from the medical 
treatment we need”.33 
 
 
 
As we have seen earlier in my analysis of the GRA, the current regulations 
encapsulate transgender within the boundaries of psychiatric issue and 
articulate it using two uncompromising languages – the medical language 
and the legal language – to write guidelines by which a certain category of 
individuals must adhere, yet they do not contemplate the necessity to open 
up and let those individuals they speak to have their say in issues that 
concern their lives, experiences and subjectivities. This observation is made 
also in the accounts presented here. 
 
Adrian and Mark, for example, express frustration about having to appear 
before a panel and prove the authenticity of who they are. Partially because 
some have not had happy experiences with medical professionals or they 
find the process and ritual of assessments intimidating and distressing.  
 
 
Mark: “I find it a really scary idea, the idea of a panel of people 
deciding my faith”34. 
 
 
Adrian: “They [doctors and professionals dealing with trans issues] 
haven’t been very helpful with any of my emotional issues in the past. 
I’ve been shunted from side to side, abandoned, patronized, not listened 
to … I’m worries that these people won’t take me seriously… I mean, 
what if I just sit differently that how your average guy does … I don’t 
                                                
32 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQ_copThESU 
33 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DPpmX83wVQ 
34 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=prjhPR6Bbr0 
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mind the colour pink. I don’t like cricket, I don’t like football”35. 
 
 
Adrian’s scepticism is not unfounded. His story depicts the very paradox I 
am highlighting, which is a paradox the legal-medical industry cannot 
resolve… Adrian has been living in his male role for many years, he has 
been on testosterone for three and has obtained his GRC. He is legally a 
male now. Yet, because he has not had his mastectomy or hysterectomy – 
not necessary for gender recognition - the medical professionals who 
periodically check his blood levels (something people on hormone 
therapies ought to do often) continue to treat him as a female. When he was 
referred by his GP for a cervical ultrasound (trans-men on testosterone who 
have not had hysterectomy are at risk of cervical cancer and are invited to 
periodical screenings), the nurses have booked him in a female department 
and have referred to him by ‘Miss Adrian’. Adrian had agreed to a cervical 
ultrasound, but the appointment was made for Pap Smear Test which, to 
Adrian, was problematic. 
 
 “ I freaked out. Nobody said anything about this… Do you really want 
to show up at a place where only women ever go and have all the nurses 
and doctors look at you like ‘what the fuck is he doing here?’ That 
would be fucking mortifying frankly. I was ‘what the hell do I do’? I 
though to ring the people, explain the situation … but I didn’t ring 
them because I felt nervous. Nervous about talking to perfect strangers 
about something that is such an intimate detail of my life. What am I 
going to say, ‘Look what you’re dealing with is something you haven’t 
seen before?’…I just want to be able to get on with my life… I can 
forgive it from members of the public, but when it’s medical 
professionals, I just think, my God you should really know better than 
to put me through this, because you are the only people in the world 
who are actually on my side and can have some understanding 
knowledge of what I’m going through here. My doctor… she didn’t set 
me up in any trans-friendly place, or any place that actually understood 
what the situation was… I have been passing for ages now… but you 
are so forcefully reminded that you can’t get away from it” 36. 
 
 
                                                
35 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRAEcBuOjFg 
36https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_UB69VZWzw&list=UUboZ8TmF20NDZXhlRK4
KBmQ 
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So, considering the uneven outcome of the GRA 2004, should the socio-
legal argument be reduced to a battle between shifting identities versus 
stable identities? Is it still helpful for the law or the medical industry to 
keep establishing parameters that not only fail to resolve the issue, but 
seem to aggravate a division within the same community? Finally, should 
the very notion of recognition be reconsidered through the help of an 
inclusive approach that takes into account the specificity of the single 
rather than the imposition of a set of rules that still create so many fractures 
for so many people? 
 
Charles: “I think that especially in a binarised society it’s really hard to 
come out as trans and I think that maybe as a community we can come 
up with certain guidelines. The fact of the matter is that people make up 
these guidelines and from what I know  - even though I can’t make 
assumptions for their sexuality – these are straight white dudes. They 
sort of sit around and talk this psyche-bubble about Freud shit and all 
this. One of the guys said that SRS is genital mutilation so, you 
know… The odds are stacked against us so I feel that in 2013 we need to 
have a say. Our community needs to have a say. We are the ones who 
should come up with the guidelines on what’s best for us as a 
community. Although it’s hard to come up with these generalized 
guidelines…”37 
 
 
Reading these accounts it becomes apparent that the GRA 2004 missed a 
chance: it seems that its move towards equality remained stuck in a 
dialectic concerned mainly with the politics of gender in relation to 
heteronormativity rather than with the experience of trans subjectivities. 
The attempt to make gender clear and inoffensive and transgender 
disembodied of its material specificity works in favour of those who are 
threatened by its subversive potential.  
 
Charles: “The reality of what’s around is a society that’s extremely 
threatened by the subversion of gender, it sort of threatens the entire 
status quo”38. 
 
 
                                                
37 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DPpmX83wVQ 
38 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15_w2fmcNQ0 
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This is true also when we think that the people who primarily benefit from 
the GRA seem to be those who already occupy a privileged position in 
terms of gender embodiment.  
 
Charles: “I think that language is a powerful thing”, says Charles. 
“What I’m asking us as a community to do is use our creativity to start 
integrating into our language different ways of contextualizing our 
own experiences.  A language that doesn’t silence our people’s 
experiences and identities”.39 
 
It is important that any future debate around transgender politics must 
open up to the possibility for transgender individuals to think through 
their experiences and propose their own terminology40. The GRA 2004 has 
shown that although a move towards equality was made, true equality for 
all transgenders cannot be achieved unless we are ready to understand 
difference. Until then, transgender subjectivities unable to embrace a 
heteronormativised ideal of female or male will continue to suffer from the 
inability to express themselves.  
 
 
 
                                                
39 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DPpmX83wVQ 
40 See Anne Vitale , Potential Therapeutic Errors When Using Binary Terminology to Explain the 
Gender Variant Condition, http://www.avitale.com/TherapeuticErrors.htm  2006 
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Chapter Four 
Spatial Dystopia. 
Or a Case against Public Toilets. 
 
 
“Those who search into the very bowels of reality  
in order to assimilate its value and wretchedness;  
and those who desire to go beyond reality,  
who want to construct ex novo new realities,  
new values, and new public symbols”1 
 
 
 
The sex assigned to bodies at birth, argues Elizabeth Grosz, is very different 
from the corporeality developed by the social subject and the modes of its 
subjectivity.2 What determines this discrepancy is space, “one of the crucial 
factors in the social production of (sexed) corporeality… it is the condition 
and the milieu in which corporeality is …sexually…produced”.3 The 
transgender body is the perfect example of that incompatibility between 
birth sex and socially inscribed corporeality, and public toilets provide a 
spatial paradigm wherein disobedient bodies that rebel against the model 
imposed by space are alienated. They constitute a battleground where the 
in-betweeness of transgender subjectivity clashes with the absoluteness of 
their uncompromising rigidity. Their impactful spatial materiality and lack 
of metaphorical representation in their symbolism represents well the 
inflexible impression they make on unaligned transgender individuals. This 
chapter examines public toilets theoretically, while the diary section that 
follows will explore instances of real life.  
 
Recent scholarship has focused on public toilets in relation to sex-
                                                
1 Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia, op. cit. p. 24 
2 Grosz, Space, Time and Perversion, op. cit. p. 84 
3 Ibid. p. 104 
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segregation and accessibility, highlighting issues of citizenship, social 
justice and social inclusion.4 Toilets have also been an interesting site for 
academic research around the body, visibility and sexual identity, bodily 
waste, sanitisation, social anxiety.5 Highly significant sites that reflect and 
reproduce cultural assumptions about human interactions, public toilets sit 
at the intersection of the symbolic and the material: issues of relations, 
power, surveillance come to play within public toilets, but also the human 
body in its irreducible material essence made of psychical presence and 
biological needs. The hierarchical structure of space, “mired in 
misconceptions and assumptions, habits and unreflective gestures”6 
assumes even sharper connotations within public toilets, where the 
intersection of the symbolic and the material generate a series of 
oppositions that reinforce their inviolable codes of practice. 
 
The spatial differentiation of sexes that takes place in public toilets is so 
emblematic that Jacques Lacan uses it as a case study to theorise what he 
names the “laws of urinary segregations”.7 The iconic division between 
‘Ladies’ and ‘Gentlemen’ is for Lacan the direct product of the power of 
language in the signs on the door: “by doubling a noun through the mere 
juxtaposition of two terms whose complementary meanings ought 
apparently to reinforce each other, a surprise is produced by an unexpected 
precipitation of an unexpected meaning: the image of twin doors 
symbolizing, through the solitary confinement offered Western Man for the 
                                                
4 See Olga Gershenson & Barbara Penner, Ladies and Gents: Public Toilets and Gender 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010); Barbara Penner, ‘Researching Female Public 
Toilets: Gendered Spaces, Disciplinary Limits’ in Journal of International Women’s Studies 6,2 
(2005) pp.81-98; Clara Greed, Inclusive Urban Design: Public Toilets (Taylor & Francis, 2003); 
Welby Ings, ‘A Convenient Exchange’ in Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social 
Justice, Vol I, Art.3 (2007) 
5 Deborah Cohen, Ute Lehrer, Andrea Wilnkler, 'The Secret Lives of Toilets: A Public 
Discourse on ‘Private’ Space in the City' in Utopia: Towards a new Toronto Ed. J. McBride and 
A. Wilcox (Toronto: Coach House Books, 2005); Sheila L. Cavanagh, Queering Bathrooms: 
Gender, Sexuality, and the Hygienic Imagination  (University of Toronto Press 2010); Harvey 
L. Molotch, Laura Norén, Toilet: Public Restrooms and Politics of Sharing (New York: New 
York University Press 2010) 
6 Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, Essays on Virtual and Real Space. Op. cit. p.115 
7 Jacques Lacan, 'From The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious' in The Norton 
Anthology of Theory and Criticism (New York: Norton 2001). 
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satisfaction of this natural needs away from home, the imperative that he 
seems to share with the great majority of primitive communities by which 
his public life is subjected to the laws of urinary segregation”.8 The picture 
of the two bathrooms, however, shows two identical doors and we are 
never taken inside the spaces of the toilets, for Lacan’s aim here is to prove 
how the signifying enters the signified and, in its immateriality, its force 
becomes spatial. It is interesting to note, though, that the spatial division is 
nonetheless present. Judith Butler notes: “I almost always read the signs on 
bathroom doors marked ‘men’ and ‘women’ as offering normative and 
anxiety-producing choices, delivering a demand to conform to the gender 
they indicate.”9 
 
The two-dimensional spatial configuration of public toilets has over the 
years remained unaltered: they reflect and shape the binary division 
between men and women in everyday’s urban experience on both a 
personal and public level.  They create and dictate a spatiality of their own 
by imposing on the single person what is acceptable collectively, thus 
bringing the private to the public and meticulously maintaining elements of 
both through their architecture and provision. For this, public toilets are 
important sites for the reinforcement of gender roles, sexuality and power 
relations. They provide a space for communication, solidarity or resistance, 
especially among women; and they can also act as repositories of 
behaviours and fantasies that can destabilise norms.10 They constitute a 
space in-between what is known and what is hidden, between what can be 
known and what one would rather like not to know.  
 
 
4.1 The Monolingualism of Public Toilets 
These concepts of univocity and singleness in language lend themselves to 
                                                
8 Ibid. 
9 Judith Butler, Introduction to: Linda Singer, ed., Erotic Welfare: Sexual Theory and Politics in 
the Age of Epidemic (New York: Routledge 1993)  
10 Kevin A. Morrison, ‘Spending a Penny at Rothesay; or, How One Lavatory Became a 
Gentleman’s Loo’ in Victorian Literature and Culture 36 (1) (2008) pp.79-94. 
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an evaluation of gendered spaces. In particular, in the context of the public 
toilet, the application of Derrida’s notion of monolingualism, highlights the 
struggle of trans subjectivity, the constant need to perform a translation 
between body and mind, and how the impossibility of that translation 
generates a space of uncertainty  - of the unknown - which public toilets 
systematically attempt to suppress. The question of unidimentionality in 
language posed by Jacques Derrida - a monolingualism,11 a dogma in its 
monolithic and unquestioned singleness - suggests an unquestioned 
supremacy that we associate with the hierarchical position that our own 
language appears to hold: a sovereign language which embodies and 
represents the hegemonic force of the speaker who possesses it: so, we 
could conclude that to speak a language is to reiterate that hegemony.  
 
In Derrida’s deconstruction the ‘I-ness’ of the self represents both the 
limitation and the possibility of appropriating meaning: every instance of 
reading and speaking is at the same time a form of writing or, even, 
rewriting that original meaning. Each time an Other tries to read the 
singularity of a text, this is already altered into another meaning within 
another consciousness. There is always an element – or more elements – in 
which meaning differs from the original intention: while the text aims at 
signifying, in that very moment, it is already manifesting the non-presence of 
the living presence. 12 Words only indicate presence, they are only an 
indication that what is being signified is no longer present. When one 
listens to another, the lived experience that is being told to the listener is not 
present. What one perceives is the reproduction of something that is no 
longer there.  “Translation practices the difference between the signified 
and the signifier”:13 the materiality of words cannot be translated from one 
language into the other: “To relinquish materiality: such is the driving force 
                                                
11 Jacques Derrida, The Monolingualism of the Other, or, The Prosthesis of Origin. Trans. Patrick 
Mensah (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2001). 
12 Jacques Derrida, 'Speech and Phenomena: Introduction to the Problem of Signs in 
Husserl’s Phenomenology’ in J. - Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on 
Husserl's Theory of Signs (Evanston Northwestern University Press 1973). p.37 
13 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago & London: University of Chicago 
Press 1981). p.19 
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of translation.”14  
 
The materiality (which is also the limitation) of words is then present as text 
unfolds and recreates the scenery of what no longer exists, and the practice 
of translation only reminds us of the inevitable failure of semantic 
transference. Derrida prefers the term ‘transformation’ over ‘translation’, “a 
regulated transformation of one language by another, of one text by 
another.”15 This transference, that is, the translation, for Derrida is not 
subordinate to language: it itself constitutes language. It is the result of a 
transaction, of a transformation to put it in Derrida’s terms – but certainly 
not a translation, for it does not sit outside of language, it is not secondary 
to language and it is not the second act which follows the original, it is 
rather the experience of language itself in a new consciousness. Translation 
is an impossible task, and it is as impossible as it is necessary. The act of 
translating is never accomplished, it is a practice that never finds its 
fulfilment, the circle is never closed, and it is precisely this impossibility 
which determines its urgency and necessity to exist: as long as it is 
impossible to translate, one must translate. 
 
The space between the translation of signifier A into signifier B generates a 
gap which the translation cannot fill, and this failure produces a lack where 
the two signifiers remain hanging between the two languages. Instead of 
filling up that gap, Derrida’s ethics hold on to it because the point is not just 
to oppose or abuse the original in translation but to create a field of 
opposition where the translation will affiliate itself neither to the host 
language nor to the target language. There is no pure language, so 
translation does not merely involve forwarding the original but it goes 
beyond the life of the original meaning and it reaches out to the new life 
brought into being by the translated text. When Derrida writes: “translation 
practices the difference between signified and signifier”16 he enhances the 
                                                
14 Derrida, The Monolingualism of the Other, op. cit. p.264 
15 Derrida, Positions, op. cit. p.19 
16 Ibid. 
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importance of that space between the two poles and reduces the sense of 
supremacy claimed by a supposed purity of meaning. The condition of 
possibility for translation is precisely its “economy of difference”,17 the 
impurity of that space does not belong to either of the two signifier, it does 
not make any promise of relevance to the one or the other language, rather, 
while maintaining its core lack, it participates in and economy of in-
betweeness, the ‘hymen’18 – as Derrida calls it – the space for what cannot 
be decided but that is nonetheless productive. As Spivak writes in ‘The 
Politics of Translation’, “meaning hops into the spacy emptiness between 
two named historical languages”,19 alluding to Derrida’s idea that the 
newly-generated meaning is formed by and through the interplay of those 
two differences rather than imposed by any science of linguistics.20 So, 
when Spivak says that “language is not everything. It is only a [...] clue”,21  
like Derrida, she suggests that meaning cannot rely only on the sign system 
but it is drawn from the violation of those predetermined translation 
patters. “By juggling the disruptive rhetoricity that breaks the surface in not 
necessarily connected ways, we feel the selvedges of the language textile 
give way, fray into frayages or facilitations.”22 The hopeful and generative 
force of ‘the in-between’ as a space for new perceptions also comes forth 
through the work of Homi Bhabha who writes that “...the ‘foreign’ element 
that reveals the interstitial; insists in the textile superfluidity of folds and 
wrinkles; and becomes the “unstable element of linkage”, the interminate 
temporality of the in-between, that has to be engaged in creating the 
conditions through which ‘newness comes into the world.”23 
 
The impossibility of translation highlights and the search for purity are 
                                                
17 Catherine Kellogg, Law’s Trace from Hegel to Derrida (London, New York: Routledge 2013) 
p.70 
18 Jacques Derrida, 'The Double Session' in Dissemination (London, New York: Continuum 
2004) pp. 197-316 
19 Gayatri C. Spivak, 'The Politics of Translation' in The Translation Studies Reader, ed. 
Lawrence Venuti (London and New York: Routledge 2000) p.398 
20 Derrida, The Double Session in Dissemination, op. cit. 
21 Spivak, The Politics of Translation, op. cit. p.398 
22 Ibid. 
23 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, op. cit. p.326 
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patterns that can be found in the politics of spacing public toilets. I will 
draw a parallel between the notion of purity in language questioned in 
Derrida’s work and the notion of purity in gender by analysing the role 
hygiene and surveillance play in the spatiality of public toilets. In this 
framework made of sanitisation and order, it is apparent that trans 
subjectivity constitutes a point of impurity as it not only embodies the 
uncertain, the unclear, unsorted, unstable body, but it also - and more 
dangerously - represents the “dissolution of once stable polarities of male 
and female, the transfiguration of sexual nature into the artifice of those 
who play with the sartorial, morphological or gestural signs of sex”.24 The 
(un)linearity of language and the impossibility of a pure translation 
highlights a similarity with the (un)compromising dynamics of spacing 
public toilets. Derrida’s analysis, as I will demonstrate further in this article, 
underscores a materiality in language that is transferable to the spatiality of 
public toilets, namely, the distinct separation between the roles of signifiers 
and signified and the need for a ‘transcendental’ approach rather than the 
impossible pursuit of “an absolutely pure, transparent, and unequivocal 
translatability”. Derrida extracts words out of their metaphysical 
framework and releases them into the material, with all its limits of 
signification and communication (“the limits to which it is possible”)25 and, 
in doing so, he allows for contaminations and transference of meaning.  
 
The carrier of that meaning or, in other words, the facilitator for 
contamination, is sense which, for Deleuze, is the most important element 
in the transference of meaning. When we talk about sense, we must bear in 
mind that, as I explained in Chapter 1, for Deleuze it is always defined 
through the relations and affects of bodies.  
 
“Sense is both the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, 
and the attribute of the state of affairs. It turns one side towards 
                                                
24 Rita Felski, ‘Fin de Siècle, Fin de Sex: Transsexuality, Postmodernism and the Death of 
History’ in The Transgender Studies Reader, Stryker and Whittle, ed. (New York: Routledge 
2006) p.566 
25 Derrida, Positions, op. cit. p.20 
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things and one side towards propositions. But it does not merge 
with the propositions which it expresses any more than with the 
state of affairs or the quality which the proposition denotes”.26  
 
 
So sense is deeply entwined with affects, which delineates a precise attitude 
against the doxa of language also recognised in Derrida. “We may not even 
say that sense exists either in things or in the mind; it has neither physical 
nor mental existence…In fact – he continues – we can only infer it 
indirectly”.27 It is only through empiricism that we may discern the idea 
from language and extrapolate sense: “Only empiricism knows how to 
transcend the experimental dimensions of the visible without falling into 
Ideas”,28so one understands how absolute sense does not exist, it “is not a 
quality in the thing, but an attribute which is said of the thing... [it is] what 
is expressed [but] does not exist outside its expression”.29 
 
Sense must not be confused with the signifier. If sense, as we have seen, is 
considered to be an active (and material) process; the signifier, that “dirty 
little secret”,30 is a despotic process that feeds on transcendence and 
abstraction, “in which the very nature of the sign changes: the sign is no 
longer territorial, a concrete mark…[but]it has become abstracted.”31 
Furthermore, the signifier is characterised by bi-univocality, a clear sign of 
complicity with power which “impose[s] meaning (significance) and…is the 
main actor in the process of subjectification”32 of the speaker. This is in fact 
the core of Deleuze’s critique of Saussure (and, indirectly, of Lacan):33 the 
                                                
26 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, (London, New York: Continuum 2004) p.25 
27 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, op. cit. p. 23 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. p. 24 
30 Deleuze, Dialogues, op. cit. p. 46 
31 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Deleuze and Language (Palgrave 2002) p. 80 
32 Lecercle, Deleuze and Language, op. cit. p. 81 
33 In Course in General Linguistics, (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2005) Saussure 
defines language “a system of signs expressing ideas, and hence comparable to writing” 
(p.15). Deleuze, by contrast, thinks that the only way to understand the sense of a sign is by 
interpretation. He writes: “One becomes a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the 
signs of wood, a physician by becoming sensitive to the signs of disease.  Vocation is 
always predestination with regard to signs. Everything which teaches us something emits 
signs, every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs.” (Deleuze, Proust 
 156 
signifier is always engaged in a negotiation between subject an object. This 
imperialism, as explained above, expression of hegemonic power, generates 
meanings and associations that heavily influence the corporeal experience 
of space. As I go on to explain theoretically in this chapter and through 
empirical data in the session immediately after, public toilets are the perfect 
example of how the inflexibility of language (signifier, not sense) erects 
invisible walls that dramatically affect the experience of transgender 
individuals.  
 
According to what said above, the impossibility in translation identified by 
Derrida is a limit that is not contemplated by Deleuze. “For Deleuze and 
Guattari – says Colebrook – language was neither a limit nor a radical 
primary force but merely one way sin which a broader inhuman life 
generated system of difference”.34 This is determined by the different ways 
in which Deleuze and Derrida view language or a text. While Derrida is 
always aware of the constraints of signs, and through deconstruction aims 
to push or disrupt the limits of their close structure, Deleuze understands 
signs as perceptions to be interpreted creatively. “Language is not only and 
not even the instrument of communication but a site of symbolic exchange 
that links us together in a tenuous and yet workable web of mediated 
misunderstandings”,35 explains Braidotti. This allows language to operate 
outside of the referential and actively create new styles and new signs.36 
Signs, then, can be seen as intensities and “abilities to affect … in sensory 
stimulations of gesticulations towards and movement among other 
bodies”.37 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
and Signs, New York: Doubleday, 1972 p. 4) 
34 Claire Colebrook, ‘Woolf and Theory’ in Bryony Randall and Jane Goldman, eds. Virginia 
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36 Claire Colebrook, ‘Woolf and Theory’, op. cit. p. 70 
37 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice. Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere 
(Routledge 2015) pp. 119-120 
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4.2 The Making of Public Toilets 
Modern public toilets in Western societies became largely popular with the 
urbanisation of towns and the consequent rise of the sanitary reform which, 
by the beginning of 1900, saw public toilets as spaces of moral urgency 
necessary to the “free and safe circulation of goods”.38 However, these 
facilities were initially only designed for men, which limited women’s 
presence and mobility within the urban space. It wasn’t until the first 
decade of 1900 that a public fully functioning lavatory for women was first 
introduced in London after many years of opposition by local inhabitants 
who claimed that women would only leave their homes for short walks 
within their neighbourhoods and therefore there was no need for such 
places. Some argued that the presence of female lavatories would lower 
sales of local shops; others simply thought that it was an abomination 
which would violate both general decorum and the privacy of women.39 At 
that time, negative social attitude towards bodily functions was already 
very present but there was something more disturbing as far as women’s 
lavatories were concerned: the public presence of women within the spatial 
mechanism of public toilets and the visibility of the female body which, 
until that moment, had remained exclusive and prohibitive.   
 
“The Degree to which women had internalised the patriarchal system of 
representation, particularly the discourse of decency and femininity”40 was 
such that ladies lavatories ended up being disregarded by women 
themselves because they were ‘too public’.41 Due to the moral 
condemnation associated with the corporeal experience that until that 
moment had remained locked within the bedroom, the female lavatory 
evoked a sense of danger, of unrespectability and immoral sexual conduct. 
                                                
38 Deborah Brunton, 'Evil Necessaries and Abominable Erections:Public Conveniences and 
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41 Ibid. 
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In ‘Queering Bathrooms’42 Sheila L. Cavanagh draws an interesting analogy 
between the toilet and the bedroom; she argues that each space in our life is 
designated to a specific function and many of these spaces contain some 
degree of gender-specifications and ‘rules of entry’. Men and women are 
merged together in the marital bed (private bedroom) and split apart in the 
public toilet; what happens in each space, however obvious, is to be kept 
secret.43 Moreover, the architectural connotations of the public bathrooms, 
often located underground, with no windows, so hidden from the public 
gaze, was unsettling and constituted yet another reason for prejudice and 
un-acceptance. Class was also an important factor and the promiscuous 
mixing of working class and middle class bodies within the same limited 
space was seen as a sign of corruption.44 In mid and late Victorian logic, the 
increasing presence of working-class women and their free circulation 
within the urban tissue was seen as a threat to patriarchal values and 
‘respectable’ women would refuse to inhabit the same spatial sphere as 
‘compromising’ commoners.  
 
At the turn of the century, the home had ceased to be the central economic 
unit, as men left for new public workplaces. This introduced a new division 
between the private and the public spheres: the workplace became the 
domain of men and the home the domain of women. This distinction of 
space also left to a distinction of role and representations: women were 
virtuous, domestic and reassuring whereas men appeared as brave, self-
possessed and in control of their destiny. This was the predominant 
Victorian narrative reiterated in literature throughout the second half of 
1800: public duty was for men, private affairs for women.45 The fin de siècle 
and the beginning of the 19th century saw this image changing rapidly, as 
women left the privacy of their homes and entered the public world of 
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workplaces, civic life, community and social activism.46 Such changes, 
together with a new medical awareness of female/male anatomy, 
transformed what up until that moment were only considered differences 
in social roles into inborn fixed biological connotations which set females 
and males apart.47 For several decades policymakers architected sex 
separators in the form of ladies reading-rooms, tea-rooms, surgeries, 
waiting rooms, etc. All home-like spatial boundaries were designed to 
tackle the growing presence of women within society and to address the 
social anxiety that such presence was causing. Terry Kogan writes: “laws 
for separated toilet facilities can be understood as an attempt by legislatures 
to re-create the separate-spheres ideology within the public realm. If 
women could not be forced back into the home, substitute protective 
havens would instead be created in the workplace by requiring the 
separation of water closets, dressing rooms, resting rooms, and emergency 
rooms. In so doing, policymakers used […] legislation by manipulating 
architectural space to enforce social value.”48  
 
By the early 1900, with the first wave of feminism, women began to enter 
the intellectual debate through literature and journalism. Although initially 
only as spectators, their bodies served as vehicles through which a new 
sensitivity was slowly forming. Questions of visibility and spatial access 
were already posed by Virginia Woolf in A Room of One’s Own49, where she 
theorised that women need to be inhabiting their own space - not that of 
men - in order to exist in society and stand for themselves. This quest for 
individuality, for appropriating ‘rooms of one’s own’ where to be something 
else has been focus of prolific feminist debate throughout 1900 and it has 
led to questions such as hierarchies of visibility and surveillance.   From 
passive and secondary, the body is now a site of desire and sexuality, a field 
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where disciplinary powers intersects. If gender and sex were not a matter of 
enquiry in the past, now their existence is approached from within a 
biological paradigm, through the ‘medical gaze’ as Foucault puts it.50 Such 
fetishistic interest towards the body, its gender, its differences, its practices 
and impulses finds its highest expression within the boundaries of public 
toilets. The body with its functions is now made visible for everyone to see 
and through this exposure it becomes object of surveillance. The female 
body, in this paradigm, assumes an even more dangerously symbolic value: 
it is not only an exposed body, but it is also a resistant body: its existence is 
problematic because in the bio-politics of visibility and surveillance it 
represents a threat to the patriarchal prohibition. In particular, the presence 
of women outside the sites traditionally designated to them, such as 
theatres or tea-rooms, led to a condition of social anxiety and growing 
public health awareness. Simultaneously, the rapid development of 
industrialization shifted the individual from the private comfort of homely 
boundaries to the centre of fast-moving metropolis made of fast-moving 
men and women and separating bodies in public toilets under the signs 
‘Ladies’ and ‘Gentlemen’ - signifiers for masculinity and femininity, for 
what is accepted, morally convenient and for what should be visible - was a 
tangible way of re-establishing order. The architecture of public toilets, so 
uncompromising on the one hand, but so neutral and sterile on the other, is 
also the signifier of a subtext that cannot be visible but whose presence is 
relevant51. The only visible differentiation is disclosed by the signs ‘Ladies’ 
and ‘Gentlemen’. Everything else is carefully designed so to oppress gender 
differences, at least on a superficial level.  
 
Joel Sanders, who has written extensively on the subject of gendered 
                                                
50 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (London: 
Vintage Books 1994) p.121 
51 See Diana Agrest, ‘Architecture from Without: Body, Logic, and Sex’ in Agrest, D. 
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Space, ed. Beatriz Colomina (New York: Princeton Architectural Press 1992) pp.327-389. 
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architecture and how space participates in manufacturing masculinity,52 
makes an interesting point when he says that regarding buildings as neutral 
containers, passive to politics and ideology, means to facilitate the 
undisturbed presence and interaction of sovereign forces in space and to 
allow architecture to “work in covert fashion to transmit social values in 
unexpected places - the everyday and often banal places where our lives 
unfold53.” Spatial configurations are then programmatic: their decoration, 
furniture, boundaries, the way objects are distributed and bodies made 
visible or invisible make the space and create a narrative. Catherine 
Ingraham argues that “casting space as neutral, architecture is able to avoid 
the specificity of difference that is the very structure of sexuality, insofar as 
sexuality is paradigmatically about the specificity of, identity through, and 
competition between gender differences”.54 Eloquent spaces, then, whose 
structure inevitably operates on an exclusive/inclusive model: The division 
between public and private, visible and invisible, is only one of the 
oppositions of the spatial dualism of public toilets: urinals and stalls are not 
simply determining a physical position, i.e. standing or sitting, but they are 
first and foremost mapping desire, identification, moral conduct and sexual 
impulses. Space must here be considered in all its manipulative materiality, 
as an active mode whose forceful dynamics concretely and tangibly mark 
its perception and lived experience and it forces the law to render its 
“normative obsession by allowing the spatial influx”55 to come in and 
deinstitutionalise spatial production and reproduction. 
 
 
4.3 The Un-Making of Public Toilets 
In The Eye of Power,56 an interview with Jean-Pierre Barou and Michelle 
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Perrot, Foucault tells us that the control of gender and sexuality becomes 
inscribed in architecture, and that space is managed and controlled in the 
name of health and hygiene.57 Foucault emphasises the importance of 
surveillance in this operation of control and extends Bentham’s 
panopticon58 to spaces such as hospitals, schools, asylums, thus 
highlighting the use of architecture to “transform individuals: to act on 
those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of 
power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them”.59 
While sexuality was something unspoken, hidden and unaccounted for in 
social discourse in the Victorian Age but, with the sanitary reforms which 
took place in Europe and the United States throughout the last decades of 
1800 and the first of 1900, it soon became object of scrutiny and transformed 
into a powerful element of political discourse. A new conceptualisation of 
the segregated way in which gender was produced in the urban space was 
produced and, through an overly visceral approach to the body and its 
physiological functions, the boundaries between inside and outside were 
blurred and made unstable.60 The body was now sanitised, organised 
within compartments, kept separate from other bodies and scrutinised.61 
Alongside this was a conscious attempt to make the body invisible, to 
protect the traditionally virtuous image of women from the scrutiny of 
society, to keep things private. And it is in the name of privacy and for that 
principle of inviolability of the natural, cultural and medical differences 
between males and females that justifications for sex separation public 
spaces have become acceptable. What did not conform to this separation 
was prone to creating social anxiety and to deem women’s bodies a threat 
to patriarchal safety. The representation of gender in public, accordingly, 
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became stripped apart from its sexual connotations and repressed by a 
model of  ‘gender purity, its intelligibility and segregation by type of 
genitals”,62 and public toilets have become the spaces which allow bodies 
(and gender) to be object of scrutiny and inspection. 
 
The desire to be out as a transsexual and share a trans-status with other 
transsexuals on the one hand, the fearful uncertainty of what can be seen 
and what must remain covered on the other, shape the transsexual 
experience within space, “what should be visible and what should not, who 
should occupy space and who should not”.63 As Valentine notes, people 
with diverse sexuality or gender “feel out of place because of the 
orientation of these places towards heterosexual[ity]”.64 Social participation 
and recognition are two fundamental moments in the battle for validation. 
Trans subjectivities who have their own bodies questioned, abused, deemed 
inferior and often denied because they are not represented by the range of 
possibilities that fall under the umbrella of normativity, are forced to live 
marginally, to negotiate their space between the two unmovable mountains 
of gender and ultimately to articulate their own individual subjectivity 
using somebody else’s language, using a dictionary which does not even 
include their name. Derrida’s shift from translation to transformation is 
subtle but crucial, and offers the possibility to map out a new ethical 
approach to the problem impurity and difference which is so present in 
trans narratives. What Derrida says is that if we consider translations as the 
evident difference between languages65 then we must also accept that 
difference is already carried within the very idea of language and brought 
into translation by language. If we accept that the ideal of purity is an 
impossibility insofar as language exists, then we would allow the notion of 
transformation to break through and allow for an inclusive and meaningful 
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exchange rather than a sterile ‘transportation’ of meaning.66 
 
Trans bodies are in the middle of a matrix of binary challenging possibilities 
and cannot embody a linear translation, their presence in the strictly-
gendered toilet rituals is impure and highlights the notion of unprivileged 
body. Peggy McIntosh67 sees the conscious and diffused tendency to 
consider ethical minorities disadvantaged without willing to admit that if 
there is a disadvantaged body there must also be a privileged one. She 
argues that while we are ready to recognise unprivileged minorities and 
their struggle, we are not willing to see ourselves as privileged, and goes on 
to list a series of privileges from the ‘weightless backpack of special 
provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools and blank 
checks”68 arguing that the daily routine of unprivileged bodies is affected 
by an infinite series of micro-level interactions, assumptions and 
negotiations which totally alter their experience within the social space. 
While body privilege enables individuals to appropriate spatiality 
comfortably and safely according to personal inclinations and needs, the 
hierarchy of the unprivileged is characterised by social stigma and destined 
to be mediated by layers of intolerance, discrimination, judgement, 
avoidance and neglect. The space between unprivileged and privileged is a 
space in the trenches, a space of mediation and compromise, where the 
othered body is called to perform a constant renegotiation of its subjectivity 
in the attempt to render its body pure enough to gain recognition and 
respect. 
 
The question of visibility can often be twofold in trans narratives: While 
‘passing’ well69 can be seen as an accomplishment - an assurance for one’s 
peace of mind and the most effective way to avoid social anxiety and 
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harassment - the state of being invisible can be perceived as a state of void: 
it crosses out the core of the individual and blanks out one’s presence in 
space.  In Look! No, Don’t70 Jamison Green’s claim is that the more a 
transsexual is successful in their transition, the more invisible they become, 
“to the extent that one reveals a transsexual life course to others, one risks 
undermining the achieved gender status”.71 The individual enters the 
public toilet and paradoxically becomes invisible, and it is this invisibility 
which makes him/her victim of the ‘gaze’ of surveillance. This second kind 
of invisibility, perceived as neglect of one’s specificity, is then the 
countereffect of an excess of visibility provoked by the exposure of that 
same specificity. Indeed, as noted by Brighenti, visibility is not 
“monodimentional or dichotomic”,72 and it operates in an indissoluble 
relationship with power and recognition. The highly regulated space of 
toilets both constraints and exaggerates the visibility of trans people. In 
either cases, it makes them bodies out of space. The term ‘constrain’ is here 
drawn from Foucault and suggests a subtle but systematic force – often self-
imposed – through a mechanism whereby one avoids a series of enactments 
in order to meet dominant expectations.  
 
The stigmatisation of trans in public toilets has been aggravated by ever-
growing awareness of personal and public hygiene as well as the problem 
of the management and disposal of human waste means that notions of the 
unclean, of filth, of impurity which has entered collective consciousness 
collide with the ideal of what Julia Kristeva calls the “ideal and proper 
bodies”73 and make its surfaces and boundaries unclear, improper. The 
focus on and around the body, its genitals, its representation, its symbolism, 
its perception still govern the experience of public toilets and are both self-
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producing and self-managing, and are there to generate normative 
discourse and identification, or judgement on whatever does not remain 
caught in its web. The spatiality of the bathroom becomes the territory 
where meaning is constructed and taken into the world. In this reiterated 
practice of taking meaning into the world lays the power of sex-segregated 
spaces such as public toilets: the individual is no longer alone within the 
stall or facing the wall while using the cubical, but he/she is in fact 
identifying with the people who went before him/her and with those who 
will follow and, in doing so, he/she is projecting this discourse onto the 
world: “what was covert becomes overt, what was cryptic becomes 
limpidly clear”.74 If in the Victorian age public toilets policies were obsessed 
with the sanitisation of the body, today’s preoccupation revolves around 
the sanitisation of gender.  
 
As Cavanagh explains, the ‘architectural design’ and the ‘gendered code of 
conduct mandated in the lavatory all support the illusion that there are two 
binary genders – male and female – both of which are visible, identifiable, 
and natural”.75 Trans subjectivities that do not identify with ‘Ladies’ or 
‘Gents’ are then constantly mediating their identity to fit into the public 
space which, as it appears, is only public for those who conform to its rigid 
shape. ‘Not having a door (or a sign) is a pertinent metaphor for those who 
have their gender identities rendered invisible, subject to erasure, or 
expunged from the social field’.76  
 
The architecture of today’s public toilets is still maintained as a locus of 
control that functions as a microscope. Every aspect of its organisation is 
designed so that people are scanned and categorised: the lights and colours 
of the walls, so bright and sterile; the cubicles and the stalls as crucial spots 
of validation; and the space from the stalls to the sinks with their mirrors 
and reflections doubling up space and bodies within as spatial moments of 
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truth where the individual tests how aligned self-image and visual 
representations are. Cavanagh writes: “to be out of spatial bounds in a 
gendered lavatory, for instance, is to be caught in a visual crossfire 
animating a lack of synergy, or synchronicity, between the body and its 
image”.77 Trans individuals in public spaces are constantly called to reduce 
that dislocation. This exercise in public toilets becomes more dramatic 
because it takes places within a confined space where the domination of 
normativity is potent and where the trans body is not only an intrusive 
body, but also an altered, non-identifiable body.  
 
A crucial moment in the politics of public toilets is the encounter with the 
mirror, as “gender and race are both consolidated in public mirrors; internal 
and external others are subject to visual surveillance”.78 The mirror, usually 
haunting that ‘moment of truth’ just before leaving the bathroom, is a 
potent element of scrutiny which contains within itself both the self-portrait 
of the trans individual and the visual representation of the body, but it can 
also contain the third eye, that of the non-trans individual who, through the 
mirror, can express transphobic judgement, condemnation, hostility. “The 
split of the mirror captures the definitive splitting of the transsexual subject, 
freezes it, frames it schematically in narrative. The differences between 
gender and sex is conveyed in the difference between body image 
(projected self) and image of the body (reflected self). For the transsexual 
the mirror initially reflects not-me: it distorts who I know myself to be”.79 
This expresses well what Grosz suggested at the beginning of this chapter.  
 
The mirror is the ‘constant other’. It is that phenomenological presence 
which deprives the subject of exactly that which constitutes its alterity. 
What the self knows of itself precedes consciousness and “necessarily 
invokes and provokes the subject before any genuine questioning can 
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begin”.80 The mirror moment that poses the transgender subject into a 
position of ‘being other’ than itself is the paradigm for all relations to the 
other. The alterity of the subject is then a visible presence of what cannot be 
seen, what doesn’t exist. Ultimately, the mirror image poses the transgender 
individual to face a double mode recognition: recognising one’s body 
through one’s body image and being recognised by the third eye of the non 
transgender body. This specific moment, as we will see in the next chapter 
through the life narratives of some transgender individuals themselves, is 
loaded with huge significance. It constitutes a make or break test upon 
which one’s relations with the outside world are shaped. 
 
Derrida goes behind the mirror itself and investigates the structure that 
allows that reflection. This implies a “breaking through the tinfoil of the 
mirror of reflection, demonstrating the uncertainties of the speculum”.81 So 
here, the presence of the other is nothing other than the presence of the self, 
it is an expression deriving from the other and returning to the other. 
 
Some accounts of trans embodiment by activist scholars on the frontline, 
such as already cited Prosser and Halberstam82, report the difference 
between the two sites and seem to concur that women’s toilets tend to be 
more hostile than men’s. The bathroom is still an extension of home for 
women, of femininity in its most domestic way, ‘a sanctuary’83 governed by 
gender codes, and the vigilant eye of normativity focuses on the fulfilment 
of those codes. The codes that govern men’s bathrooms, on the other hand, 
are sexually charged. Men tend to be less vigilant, their relationship with 
the mirror is more controlled because it cannot be justified by vanity 
(associated with femininity): to be seen checking oneself out in the mirror is 
to risk to be considered gay. Similarly, checking each other out can cause 
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trouble as well, it can provoke homophobia as ‘hetero men do not want 
their penises subject to homoerotic looks”.84 On the contrary, in women’s 
toilets the level of scrutiny is higher because women are more alert of 
intruders, symbols of femininity violators. It is interesting to note how 
feminine appearing females that look proper are those who mostly feel 
entitled to judge different kinds of femininity, empowered by their 
ostentatious ‘normality’. A MtF in the ladies’ toilets would be subjected to 
all sorts of surveillance and, if the subject would not be willing to second 
that level of scrutiny, it would not be inappropriate to expect the 
intervention of security.  However, this does not mean that a male-
identified gender deviant in the men’s toilets would have an easier time 
than a female-identified gender deviant in the women’s toilets. It only 
denotes a difference in the ways gender is intended by the two.85 Cavanagh 
argues that such differences may indicate that men’s toilets politics actively 
oppose the panoptic gaze.86 I disagree with this analysis and feel more 
inclined to believe that the lack of this element of participation in men’s 
toilets is to be attributed to the generally believed unperformative nature of 
masculinity.87 The assumption according to which femininity lends itself to 
being artificial (and therefore performative) whereas masculinity is more 
solid and real could be the reason why Drag Kings pratices struggle to 
reach any mainstream validation. Halberstam sees ‘performance anxiety” - 
the heterosexual fear of impotence in front of sexual demand - as a possible 
cause. This particular anxiety is usually ironically referred to as ‘thinking 
about it too much’ or ‘thinking instead of doing’88 thus denoting that the 
“performance anxiety emerges when masculinity is marked as performative 
rather than natural, as if performativity and potency are mutually exclusive 
or at least psychically incompatible”.89 For this reason, it is possible to guess 
that the little participation of men within the space of their toilets - which 
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remain sites of highly sexually charged interactions of dominance and 
violence - is due to fear of weakening that solidity and inevitability from 
which masculinity derives its power.  
 
Sanders, however, believes that the successful performance of masculinity 
relies on “the obsessive, even hysterical ways that men relate to the objects 
that surround and define them”.90 According to his views, masculinity is 
enforced by the disposition of certain objects within the toilets without 
which that performed security would be lost, “the urinal itself is just such a 
culturally weighted sign, a brace for the erection and support of male 
subjectivity. By facilitating the manly posture of upright urination, the 
urinal illustrates the capacity of objects to function as foils against which a 
performing body assumes its gender. But objects not only supplement the 
body, they also metaphorically stand in for it”.91 Interestingly, Sanders 
points out that ‘visual control’, that is, the gaze, is a disturbance to 
masculinity because “masculine subjects endowed with visual authority can 
be dispossessed of the gaze through changing configurations of spatial 
boundaries, while even the most traditional masculine environments are 
capable of encouraging a transvestite logic of viewing, inviting men to be 
both subjects and objects of the gaze”.92   
 
Heterosexuality and gender binaries have a fully committed and self- 
validating relationship. They both serve as institutions securing gender 
polarisation, reproduction and growth of population. So how do minorities 
such as queer/trans destabilise this order? The notion of gender purity is 
central. The obsession with sanitisation, the fear of contamination of the 
body and the spasmodic preoccupation with divisions, spatial boundaries, 
separations and so on is a cover for the fear of being contaminated by 
desire: heterosexuality’s prosperity relies on its sense of solidity and fixity, 
and the presence of differently-gendered subjectivities in a space that is 
                                                
90 J. Sanders, Stud: Architectures of Masculinity, op. cit. p.19 
91 Ibid. 
92 J. Sanders, Stud: Architectures of Masculinity, op. cit. p.22 
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traditionally a temple of sex-segregation disregards its solemnity and its 
predicaments, ‘it can incite ways of being together, loving, desiring, and 
identifying that are at odds with the normative regime”.93  
 
4.4 An Ethics for Public Toilets 
Recent formulations on spatiality show that the relation of bodies with 
space can no longer be understood within the restricted configurations of 
geography but must be considered through an optic of relationality and 
affectivity.94 The materiality of our surroundings (space), the conceptual 
understanding of what is at our proximity (space), the atmosphere, the air, 
the light, the smell, the energy produced by bodies and objects (space) are 
“no longer the context of the background, but an active factor in the 
construction of subjectivity and social presence”.95 The concept of spacing 
put forth by Derrida96  - an action, a movement, the doing of space - 
contains within it the flows (rhythm, intervals, waves of space) of space and 
it shows how space is a process, a force that acts upon a body and generates 
other forces on other bodies. It is as material as physics and as ethereal as 
the air, its composition cannot be unified for the only principle by which it 
is governed is différance. Subjectivity is thus formed within this shapeless 
openness, it exists and manifests itself through movements, changes of 
direction, absences and presences, and its irreducible spatiality “is the 
ultimate expression of the claim to one’s unique spatial position which by 
necessity excludes all others”97. Spatial contingency - from the macro of the 
universe to the micro of the singular, from open-space fields, mountains, 
landscapes, urban developments to the most remote of public toilets - is a 
constitutive element of subjectivity. Not only is it a space where one 
becomes oneself, but it is also a space where one becomes other. There is 
here a Deleuzian idea of folding spaces to the rhythm of a movement that is 
                                                
93 Cavanagh, Queering Bathrooms, op. cit. p. 171 
94 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Spatial Justice: Law and the geography of 
Withdrawal’ in International Journal of Law in Context, 6, 3 (2010) 
95 Ibid. p.6 
96 J. Derrida, Acts of Literature, op. cit. 
97 Ibid. p.2 
 172 
‘continuous’ and infinite, and a sense of becoming which is not 
encapsulated by one change which marks a before and an after, but rather, 
a change which is manifested through an ongoing series of nuances of 
shape and meaning, motives, positions, directions, folds.98  
 
The demand for spatial justice – the ideal that each body occupies a specific 
space at a specific time 99 - is something that originates in a perceived 
solidity of the law - which is not questioned here. At the same time, 
however, it stretches out of the law and reaches the materiality of bodies 
that move in and with space. The presence of the subject in that space at 
that moment, surrounded by those bodies (and objects), observed by those 
people is the expression of a uniqueness that cannot be reduced to mere 
regulation of bodily fluids. Rather, it contains within itself something 
greater and excessive: a demand for justice that, while passing through the 
law, carries - or even, proposes to carry - a legitimation which cannot only 
come from the act of enforcing the law. 100  The excessive nature of justice 
with regards to the law, at the same time as squarely emplaced within the 
law, needs to feed on a different level, on an ideal and practice of justice 
which responds equally to a multiplicity as well as to singularity. With this 
in mind, then, the configuration of public toilets assumes a significance 
which goes well beyond the logic of male/female, of acceptance and 
refusal, of difference and sameness, it becomes the centre of an economy of 
mediation between subject and subjectivity in the ongoing process of their 
mutual and ongoing constitution.  
 
We can understand how the disciplinary boundaries imposed in the 
spatiality of public toilets deny the supreme principle of justice and reveal 
fear for what crosses the horizon of the law and what it can account for. 
There is also an expressed anxiety for a new emerging language moulded 
on difference, the language of movement, which is not translatable, for it is 
                                                
98 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold (London, New York: Continuum 2006) 
99 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice. Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere, op. cit. 
100 Ibid. 
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not a carrier of meaning but it itself constitutes meaning precisely because it 
signifies for itself and, while rejecting all assumptions of relevance it 
threatens to shaken the static structure of the law and even occupy the 
voids it cannot fill. Public toilets, with their tight connection to the material 
side of bodies, their unwillingness to compromise, their defined boldness, 
force the law to face that corporeality and be aware of its spatial element 
and of the simultaneity of its action.101 The spatiality of public toilets retains 
a certain radical force which is emblematic: there is an obvious element of 
embodiment which determines an urgency to be and signify in that very 
space and at that very moment. Simultaneously, there is a counteracting 
force which resists this demand for movement - justice - and reaffirms the 
impossibility for justice to emerge. The conflict between these two agents 
leads to a politics of mediation which while it helps contain the chaos of 
movement, it also determines a stagnation which systematically closes all 
possibilities for advancement.  
 
The pattern that has emerged from this analysis shows a shared assumption 
that women and men – especially women – need or seek privacy, safety and 
hygiene in public toilets: in this shared order constructed upon unspoken 
rules and reiterated conventions, trans individuals are but a point of 
disruption, that element whose mere visibility and presence alter the 
configuration of public toilets forever, thus creating anxiety and a sense of 
insecurity expressed through discrimination. The attempt to rationalise the 
existence of public places where individuals can be discriminated against 
on the basis of their appearances had so far been explained102 through a 
predominant and commonly shared belief that men and women have two 
different ways of understanding privacy, safety and hygiene and therefore 
their experience within public toilets is legitimately different and needs the 
required differentiations. In this scenario, trans - largely thought of as man 
                                                
101 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage, 2005); A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Law’s 
Spatial Turn: Geography, Justice and a Certain Fear of Space, op. cit. 
102 O. Gershenson, B. Penner, Ladies and Gents: Public Toilets and Gender, op. cit.; S. L. 
Cavanagh, Queering Bathrooms, op. cit. ; Molotc and  Norén, Toilet: Public Restrooms and 
Politics of Sharing, op. cit. 
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and woman together, or even, as neither man nor woman - belongs 
nowhere. Along the same line goes the allegation that men and women 
have different biological needs that need to be protected by sex-divided 
toilets. Clara Greed, for example, argues that ‘women visit the toilet more 
frequently because of pregnancy, periods and cystitis; to check on worries 
about vaginal discharge (or to check ‘constantly’ on one’s ‘whites’ if one is 
using natural birth control to determine fertile days), and simply to check if 
one’s knickers (pants) or tights are about to fall down, or if one’s period has 
actually started; because they feel ill, are about to give birth or die; to pray; 
to cry and to get away, to think and be quiet; to escape from the city of man; 
or for baby-changing, breastfeeding (as a last resort) or to assist the elderly, 
children and disabled people.103 This suggests a somewhat degrading 
image of women as defenceless, frail creatures in search of protection and 
refuge in public toilets. It is true that many women may use public toilets to 
carry out one or more of the above activities, but this does not mean that 
they cannot do so in public spaces that allow the presence of differently 
gendered individuals. Again, the presence of trans individuals in this 
instance would not be justified biologically.  
 
There is, moreover, a latent notion of contamination that has emerged from 
this research: for (illogical and unproven) reasons that can be attributed to 
safety, privacy, hygiene, biology, etc., the bottom line of all arguments pro 
sex-segregated public toilets suggests a common anxiety connected to a 
potential risk of contamination of the body. I have already said that the 
flowing of desire may be considered a dangerous possibility by 
heterosexual men who refuse to look at and be looked by other men, this 
becomes more dramatic when it comes to trans presence in the public toilet.  
Moreover, the term contamination calls for an act of sanitisation. But once 
we have realised that the contamination does not involve physical diseases 
or mental conditions, when we have understood that privacy, hygiene and 
safety are only cover excuses, we need to seriously analyse the issue for 
                                                
103 Clara Greed, Inclusive Urban Design: Public Toilets, (Architectural Press, 2003) p.97 
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what it really is: it is sanitisation of gender, which means to refuse 
recognition – and consequently equality – to all those individuals who are 
not represented by the female and male categories and it means to allow a 
social and cultural reiteration of genderphobia.   
 
What is evident is a strong essentialism in the construction of space inside 
public toilets. Its conceptualization in terms of body/mind, private/public, 
visible/invisible, male/female collides heavily with the inclusiveness and 
pluralism trans subjectivity demands. Such strict binarisms seem to call for 
a sense of stability and ‘authenticity’ and trans is thought of as unfulfilling 
of both. What we need to focus on is not only the negotiation of identity 
inclusions, but it is a new way of theorizing the self. It is in Grosz’s reading 
of Nietzsche - passing through Deleuze - that it is possible to find the map 
for a new set of ethics which instead of conceptualizing the subject as either 
an acting agent upon an object or as the victim of another agent, “it marks 
the subject as such is its capacity to act and be acted upon, to do rather than 
to be, to act rather than to identify”.104  
 
Trans subjectivity can be thought of as surface for action which moves in 
space and transforms space, for “space makes possible different kind of 
relations but in turn is transformed according to the subject’s affective and 
instrumental relations with it”.105 Indeed the body is shaped by the subject’s 
movement through space, and this becomes constituent of the self as well as 
it determines the temporal changes of that specific spatial moment. The 
relation between space and body is determined by the proximity of the two 
agents which translate their encounter into meaning and so determining 
material change.  Space – be it social or material construction – is a motion 
of actions and passions , it encompasses relations of order and disorder, and 
it is the final ring of a chain of political and legislative operations which 
cannot be reduced to simple object, however tangible, visible, touchable 
                                                
104 Grosz, ‘A Politics of Imperceptibility’, op. cit. p. 466 
105 Grosz, Space, Time, and Perversion op. cit. p. 214 
 176 
and concrete.106 The notion of space is understood through the notion of 
time and the body inhabiting space is also the body passing through time, 
for space and time cannot be disassociated in this journey to selfhood: the 
body moves and its movements expand not only through space but also 
through time, it occupies time and space equally. A body which only sits in 
space is not a moving body but only an object, for without movement the 
trajectories of desire which induce motions and motivate movement will 
not unfold. The element of ‘present’, is particularly important in the new 
politics of becoming selfhood; the ‘now’ gives ground to the journey and 
lifts the idea of utopia off desire: bodies inhabiting space and moving 
through time is a matter of materiality, it is indeed projected to the future – 
the unknown – and therefore not entirely controllable, but it is especially 
the outcome of present interactions, it is a work-in-progress process that is 
happening now which makes this an ontology of becoming as opposed to 
an ontology of being. Moreover, the appropriation of a sense of self which 
current politics of identity and recognition regard as ‘authentic’ can only 
account for the authenticity of the one and not of the many, for the unique 
sense of self which we embody – our desire – which constitutes subjectivity 
through this process of resistance and mediation with space cannot 
constitute a mode applicable to everyone (this would be creating more 
categories). Within this intersection of bodies of force the element which 
confers tangibility to identity is desire, a flux which not only moves 
alongside the appropriation of space, but it constitutes identity itself in the 
politics of self expression and (self) validation. “If politics constitutes itself 
as the struggle for recognition, the struggle for identity to be affirmed by 
the others who occupy socially dominant positions and among peers for 
mutual respect, it is a politics that is fundamentally servile … Instead of a 
politics of recognition, in which subjugated groups and minorities strive for 
a validated and affirmed place in public life, [we] … should …now consider 
the affirmation of a politics of imperceptibility, leaving its traces and effects 
everywhere, but never being able to be identified with a person or an 
                                                
106 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, op. cit. p. 73 
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organization. It is not a politics of visibility, of recognition and of self-
validation, but a process of self-marking that constitutes oneself in the very 
model of that which oppresses and opposes the subject. The imperceptible 
is that which the inhuman musters, that which the human can sometimes 
liberate from its own orbit but not control or name as its own”.107  
 
Many trans communities, queer theorists and equal rights campaigners 
have called for unisex toilets as a possibility of resolving the sex segregation 
of public toilets. Although this could be a considerable improvement from 
the current situation, the focus of the matter runs deeper than this: the 
presence of unisex toilets may resolve the problem on a superficial level but 
the men and the women who use them will still fundamentally feel unsafe 
and violated each time they see a trans individual – or indeed any gender 
challenging subject - in the queue behind/in front of them. Although, as we 
have seen, the architecture of the space plays a very important role in the 
bodily experience of the individual, a more radical change should firstly 
affect cultural norms.  
 
There are some evident limits in the way both the clinical industry and the 
law have theorised gender. Although they are constantly trying to catch up 
with reality, their producing yet new categories that define differently-
gender individuals and widen the umbrella of possibility cannot be seen as 
a permanent solution because it can only cater for a here and now demand, 
whereas gender is moving force which is always generating new 
subjectivities that often take time to surface. As long as we try to include 
new significance to the signifier gender, we will continue to exclude all 
those individualities that are not evident, or not yet formed. By zooming 
into the space of public toilets and their unspoken codes of practice and 
norms, this chapter has demonstrated precisely that gender – like toilets -  
reflects a principle of rigidity which often stands for exclusion: those who 
feel they hold it right will feel entitled to look down on those who appear to 
                                                
107 Grosz, A Politics of Imperceptibility, op. cit. p.471 
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be at odds with it; it represents and protects its faithful representatives and 
denies validation to all the others, and it is only by refusing to negotiate 
with it or seek its recognition that trans subjectivities can gain 
appropriation of social space. Looking at public toilets has further 
emphasised the present incompatibility between a clear-cut definition of 
gender – pure and uncompromised – and the multi-faceted and chaotic 
subjectivity of transgender that, as we have seen, requires tools and modes 
of understanding that go beyond the limits of a monolingualism. Public 
toilets can nonetheless offer interesting ideas on developing new ways of 
thinking about gender; what we know is that there is no truth about gender 
and there is no truth about the body. The spatiality of public toilets needs to 
be remodelled on a less rigid and more fluid model, their economy needs to 
lose rigidity and offer an accessible possibility to differently-ordered 
individuals. 
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The Diary Sessions, II 
On Public Toilets 
 
 
 
“The issue of trans people and restroom use  
is about as sticky as a public-toilet seat,  
but the arguments against equality in public accommodations  
are as flimsy as the toilet paper in those same facilities.”1 
 
 
 
 
“Are you going to use the girls’ toilets? This is not meant to be rude. I’m just 
interested”.2 Every trans person has at least once been faced by this question. 
Many have gone through worse.  As we have seen in the last chapter, the 
‘bathroom problem’, as it is commonly referred to, is a shared experience that 
occurs daily in the lives of most transgender individuals. Schools, workplace, 
social spaces, such as restaurants, bars, gym; these are only some of the 
places – places of quotidian reality – transgender people are called to face 
this problem.  Some recent positive events - such as the Equality Act 20103 in 
the UK which expressively opens up to the issue of discrimination towards 
transgender people in public spaces,4 California’s School Success and 
                                                
1Matt Kaileys http://tranifesto.com/transgender-faqs-and-info/five-points-for-non-trans-
people-about-public-restroom-use/ 
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNXQBDDWikk 
3The Equality Act 2010 brings together over 100 separate pieces of legislation into one 
single Act and provides a legal framework for the protection of individual rights and the 
promotion of equality. The main themes that are represented by the Equality Act 2010 are: 
equal pay, sex discrimination, race discrimination, disability discrimination, employment 
equality on the base of religion, sex and age and sexual orientation. To read the full text of 
the Equality Act 2010, see: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/8500
8/business-quickstart.pdf 
4 The Equality Act 2010 makes it unlawful in Employment & the provision of Goods, 
Services, Housing, and Facilities to discriminate or harass a person because they ARE 
intending to undergo, are undergoing, or have undergone gender 1) Direct 
Discrimination: when a person, rule or policy discriminates against a person solely because 
they are transsexual 2) Indirect Discrimination: when you have a rule or policy that applies 
to everyone but disadvantages a person with a protected characteristic. 3) 
Harassment: behaviour deemed offensive by the recipient. Employees can claim they find 
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Opportunity Act5 which ensures that transgenders do not have to opt out of 
playing sports at school or using the changing rooms in the gym, will have 
unisex bathrooms – suggest that discrimination and violence against 
transgender people occupying public spaces is slowly becoming, in some 
parts of the world, part of the international political agenda.  
 
The previous chapter has explored this discomfort through a theoretical 
analysis of the rigid spatiality of public toilets, stuck in their own monologue, 
unable to engage with a dialogue which facilitates difference. Here, more 
than considering the issue of sex-segregated spaces theoretically, I would like 
to focus on the personal and psychological experience of using such spaces as 
it is perceived and told by the protagonists. 
 
Although recent study6 by Jody L. Herman published by the Williams 
Institute, UCLA School of Law, in the Journal of Public Management and 
Social Policy has highlighted that the three most common situations for 
transgender people when using a public toilet are: verbal harassment (68%), 
denied access (18%) and physical assault (9%). The study highlights that 
more than 25% of respondents have experienced problems using the toilets at 
work. This has often resulted in leaving or changing job. The situation does 
not look more encouraging when it comes to schools: almost 10% of those 
who participated in the survey declared experiencing trouble at school with 
consequences that span from excessive absences to drastic drop-outs.  
 
Though this study focuses on the urban area of Washington D.C., it 
underlines a general widespread pattern that constitutes a dramatic 
occurrence for gender non-conforming individuals.  More and more often the 
                                                                                                                                   
something offensive even when it's not directed at them. 4) Harassment by a third party: 
employers are potentially liable for the harassment of staff or customers by people they 
don't directly employ, such as a contractor. (this is called Vicarious Liability. 5) 
Victimisation: discrimination against someone because they made or supported a 
complaint under Equality Act legislation  
5 http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB1266 
6http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Herman-Gendered-
Restrooms-and-Minority-Stress-June-2013.pdf 
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media feature stories of transgender subjects who are victims of 
discrimination, violence, harassment, in some extreme cases, murder. 
Recently in Scotland, for example, a teenager trans female was denied access 
to a shopping centre toilet. The security guard checked her ID and said “you 
are a man and you always will be a male”7. Similarly, John Kavanagh, 
Republican member of the Arizona House of Representatives, proposed an 
amendment to bill S.B.1432 that would allow police to stop anyone they 
suspect is not using the ‘right’ toilet. The amendment, which classifies 
disorderly conduct, reads: “A person commits disorderly conduct if the 
person intentionally enters a public restroom, bathroom, shower, bath, 
dressing room or locker room and a sign indicates that the room is for the 
exclusive use of persons of one sex and the person is not legally classified on 
the person's birth certificate as a member of that sex”8. These are only a 
couple of examples – one, the mundane occurrence of using a public toilet, 
the other coming from policing authority - of the extent of hostility and 
danger that every day, in various sectors of public life, transgender people 
who do not conform can encounter. 
 
Dylan D.: “Psychologically, you go for the most part of your life, I 
mean, I’m making a generalisation here …trans people go through 
periods of their lives feeling they don’t fit, they want a marker of being 
normal and being able to choose which bathroom they go to is kind of 
that marker for them. Normal is not the best way of putting it, but they 
want to be treated like everyone else, they want to be treated like the 
people they identify with, they want you to see them as people and they 
want to be allowed into spaces like everyone else … People getting 
checked to see if they have a penis or a vagina, people getting harassed 
… it happened to me, it happened to a friend of mine … someone 
yelling from outside the stall telling you’re not supposed to be there, 
asking you if you’re a boy or a girl … these things, they hurt. Because 
of what we’ve gone through psychologically as trans people, because of 
how important that symbol can be to us…that is your life … you’re 
becoming, becoming what you want to be and to have that taken away 
from you …can stand you back so far”.9 
 
                                                
7http://www.deadlinenews.co.uk/2013/08/22/hate-crime-probe-as-transgender-woman-
barred-from-shopping-centre-toilets/ 
8 http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/51leg/1r/proposed/h.1432-se-kavanagh.doc.htm 
9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dlYhCs6ZLU 
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What emerges from these accounts is a story of anxiety and turmoil which 
stretches far beyond the mere walls of a public toilets and highlights a 
problem which is not simply that of accessing a hostile space or even 
breaking through the symbology imbedded in the material and cultural 
structure of public toilets, but involves the foundation of one’s self-image 
and therefore of oneself. When entering the public toilet, the transgender 
subject is called to face and engage – at various degrees depending on the 
level of ‘passability’ - with insecurity, vulnerability and to seek validation – 
recognition as it were – and to remain suspended in that moment of truth 
which demands constant consideration because it is not a given, but 
something to work for and conquer each time. This has enormous 
implications on the perception of space and consequences in the way in 
which individuals experience themselves. As Dylan D. said earlier: that is 
your life … you’re becoming, becoming what you want to be and to have that taken 
away from you …can stand you back so far”10. The reflections that follow below 
will be especially useful to non-trans people to understand that unsettling 
sentiment of anxiety that walks side by side with all those individuals who 
do not conform to the hegemonic ideals female and male dictate. 
Dramatically expressed at times, other times hidden behind a façade of 
sarcasm and self-irony, but either way, it is the struggle of people who need 
to be accepted and lifted from the constraints of heteronormativity.  
 
The differences between how feminine and masculine is performed within 
public toilets have been explored in the previous chapter: we have seen how 
generally femininity lends itself more to be embodied by a variety of 
subjectivities. By this I mean that femininity is traditionally more exposed to 
representations and interpretations. Masculinity, on the contrary, appears to 
be more impenetrable, harder to break through and less willing to be 
explored. A good example of this, as the work of Judith Halberstam  and 
Julie Hanson have underlined, may be the difference between how Drag 
Queens and Drag Kings are perceived collectively. The former - theatrical, 
                                                
10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dlYhCs6ZLU 
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ostentatious, exaggerated, comical, loose – widely accepted, are considered 
almost a theatre genre of its own. Rarely are Drag Queens seen dangerous or 
unsettling today. The latter, on the contrary, are much less popular, confined 
to the underground scene, their performance mainly focuses on the 
expression of solid and uncompromising masculinities. Little room for 
comedy because comedy may lead to a dispersion of that dramatic tension 
on which Drag Kind performances generally rely11. Though this section does 
not intend to further engage with such theoretical considerations, nor does it 
wish to make distinctions between performative masculinities and 
femininities, it may be useful to keep these observations in mind as they may 
add extra insight into the abstracts presented.  
 
The arguments against transgenders using gendered toilets usually develops 
around the same themes: safety, hygiene, sense of property, fear. It is an 
argument that is usually played out in terms of oppositions, that is, it places 
transgender and non-transgender in opposition against each other picturing 
the non-transgender as the natural occupier, the one who retains the 
primordial right to use that gendered space, and the transgender as the 
intruder, the deceitful subject who aims to disrupt that natural order of 
things. Transgender people are in the public toilets – or in any toilets, for that 
matter – for the same reasons as any other person. It is the same 
physiological need. This is the motivation that leads people to public 
washrooms.  
 
Jennifer (MtF): “When people talk about transgender folk they always 
bring up the bathroom… Look, nothing happens in the bathroom when 
you’re transgender except from number 1 and number 2. That’s all that 
happens. You wash your hands, let me see … You might check your 
make up. Oh my God, how terrible! And you may even chit chat with 
somebody … What else do you do when you’re in there?.”12 
 
Zan (FtM): “It’s a toilet! What do you do when you’re in the toilet 
…You’re going in to excrete. You go into your stall, close the door, you 
                                                
11 Halberstam, Female Masculinities, op. cit.; Julie Hanson, ‘Drag Kinking: Embodied Acts 
and Acts of Embodiment’ in Body and Society 2007; 13; 61 
12 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2XlL06PLLEM 
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do your business and you leave.”13 
 
Dylan D.: “We’re not scary, we’re not freaks and when we go to the 
bathroom that’s all we really want to do, go to the bathroom, just like 
everyone else.”14 
 
There is still a great deal of confusion when it comes to general knowledge 
about transgenderism and a lack of understanding about what the real issue 
is: it is often lumped together with sexuality or, worse, misunderstood for as 
a choice, a new lifestyle, a bit of a change. Deborah says: “I didn’t choose to 
transition. This isn’t a lifestyle thing”15.  Layla agrees: “Let me make this clear, if I 
could choose, I would choose to be a straight guy, I would not choose to have these 
issues”16. The experience of using public toilets can be so unpleasant that 
some transgender individuals try to avoid it for as long as possible. Deborah 
(MtF) and Dylan (FtM) express that same discomfort: 
 
Deborah: “When I started going out I was terrified of going into the 
Ladies’. So terrified that I wouldn’t drink anything. I would rather 
dehydrate than go into a public loo.”17 
 
Dylan: “ Years ago when I started living my real life experience, I had 
decided I didn’t want to go to the Ladies’ anymore and I didn’t feel 
comfortable enough to go to the Mens’, I remember needing to use the 
toilet and getting so worked up about it that I cried. That was not a 
very nice experience.”18 
 
Dylan D.: “The bathroom is so important and so terrifying because … 
these are spaces for men and for women and now it’s time to choose, 
and now it’s that breaking point, that first step … It can make some 
people cry, it can make people decide not to use the bathroom, it can 
make people run away and scream.”19 
 
 
This also emerges from the UCLA survey cited above: 54% of the participants 
have declared some sort of physical problem due to the fact that they would 
                                                
13 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q69bCbubNLI 
14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dlYhCs6ZLU 
15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8npbBn1LKHU 
16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HN_pt2qGnLw 
17 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8npbBn1LKHU 
18 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4z8xiRfV38 
19 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dlYhCs6ZLU 
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rather avoid the bathroom moment altogether and ‘hold it’ rather than face 
its potential consequences. The study reports that dehydration, urinary tract 
infections and kidney infections are amongst the most common issues.20 
 
Certainly the level of ‘passability’ - or the ‘passability factor’, as a young 
transsexual once explained to me - plays a huge role in the amount of 
confidence – or lack of – when entering a public toilet.  Aeries, young MtF, 
reflecting on her own experience says: “If you pass then you don’t have to 
worry”21. But what about those who do not pass, or do not pass well? The 
materiality of the body is nowhere as dramatically significant as within a sex-
segregated space where everything from social dynamics and personal 
interaction, to physical spatiality (i.e. furniture) and subtext depend so 
tightly on the one or the other gender and its embodiment. And it is 
especially in these instances that the ideal of the purity of gender is pursued.   
 
Dylan: “Because I looked kinda masculine and I dressed masculine 
anyway, I’d have incidents where I’d be told I shouldn’t be in the ladies 
toilets, but I didn’t have the confidence to go to the Mens’ because I 
thought everyone would notice. There were a couple of times when I 
went in and I did get some strange looks so I went through this phase 
when I’d keep an eye on men’s toilets to see if I could go in and then try 
to get in and out without anybody seeing me, which was quite difficult. 
Because I transitioned and stayed in the area, I’ve always lived in and I 
to go places where people that I know from school go to, I initially found 
it very very difficult to start using the Men’s toilets. Even now [many 
years after transitioning], when I go to a toilet around people I know 
I’m usually very nervous.”22 
 
Dylan thus confirms what was said earlier regarding vulnerability and 
insecurity, and how these provoke a state self-consciousness about one’s 
body image which one must constantly confront and come to terms with. A 
narrative of vulnerability related to the othered body will be discussed in the 
next chapter, where I theoretically engage with the disobedient body and the 
                                                
20http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Herman-Gendered-
Restrooms-and-Minority-Stress-June-2013.pdf 
21 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kzvStBPCiM 
22 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4z8xiRfV38 
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marginal and vulnerable position it occupies. Sensations of inadequateness 
are clearly emphasised in public toilets wherein gender represents the big 
divider, and not to match those requirements means to unsettle that division 
and become exposed to scrutiny. Here the transgender is seen as the body 
that does not belong, the outsider. 
 
Rebecca: ‘What I hear most of the time is: ‘I’m sorry but I don’t think 
you should be allowed to use the toilets because you look so bisexual, 
you like girls too so don’t you think that the other girls at school feel 
uncomfortable changing in front of you?’ So, basically, anyone bisexual 
cannot get changed in any toilets belonging to either gender because 
they’d be attracted to them … Something else I hear is ‘Don’t you think 
that using the girls’ toilet is out of order? I mean, you’re still a boy, you 
still have a penis. Not all girls are comfortable with you being in the 
girls’ toilets?”23 
 
Dylan D: “ Don’t stare! Even if you think that nobody is gonna notice 
you when you’re washing your hands at the sink staring.”24 
 
Deborah: “The one time I did have a bit of a problem was in a 
supposedly trans friendly bar in Blackpool. There was only one Ladies’ 
loo in there and there were two women in it. They were somewhat rude 
about my choice of bathroom… Some people might be appalled and 
horrified that I use the Ladies’ and they might sight safety reasons why 
I should be going to the Gents’. To these people I would tell you now, 
that there has never been a case of a trans woman assaulting a cisgender 
woman in a toilet. Never. There have however been numerous cases 
when a transgender woman has been assaulted in the Gents.”25 
 
 
I will adequately explore the transgendered body as the othered body in the 
next chapter, where I provide an analysis that maps out the theoretical 
limitations through which the monstrous body has often been configured. It 
is however important to also note how this dissonance emerges in the context 
of public toilets. Sometimes, violence and verbal abuse are not necessary in 
order to establish a conflictual atmosphere because often scrutiny is all it 
takes. As Rebecca said, a simple question such as “Are you going to use the 
                                                
23 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNXQBDDWikk 
24 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dlYhCs6ZLU 
25 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8npbBn1LKHU 
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girls’ toilets? This is not meant to be rude. I’m just interested”26 is not just that, 
but it carries a heavy subtext of judgement which aggravates a division. That 
failed identifications with the other, which as we have seen in chapter 3 is the 
very principle of recognition, is somehow a failed identification with that self 
one knows to be but cannot (always) be.  
 
Dylan D., FtM, eloquently explains that the bathroom is such an important 
factor for trans people because it holds a strong symbology of their journey: 
 
 “It’s something that in our society is so rigidly defined between gender. 
You make that transition from one bathroom to the other and that 
represents a very large piece of transitioning …represents coming into 
that space that they know they’ve always been a part of, wanted to have 
the right to belong to for such a long time, that they should have 
accessed to from the day they were born and it represents that social 
circle of whatever gender they identify with.  That symbol … is very 
important.”27  
 
The issue of safety introduced by Deborah is another major common 
argument that goes against the rhetoric of transgender people in gendered 
public toilets.  Two things are important here: firstly, well-known cases such 
as those of Brandon Teena, Venux Xtravaganza, Rita Hester, Gwen Araujo 
and other transgender people, fatal victims of transphobia, underline that 
safety is a far more important issue for transgenders than it is for non-
transgenders.  A shocking study published in 2009, The Trans Murder 
Monitory Project28 - reports that every three days the murder of a 
transgender individual is reported. The cases are reported from across the 
world and map a desolating trajectory of intolerance, violence, hate and 
cruelty.  
 
Jennifer: “I have to also bring up something. Think about sheer 
statistics: how many transgender people are there? Without the evil 
propaganda type of assumptions that all trans people hurt, let’s be real 
                                                
26 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hNXQBDDWikk 
27 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dlYhCs6ZLU 
28http://www.liminalis.de/2009_03/TMM/tmm-englisch/Liminalis-2009-TMM-
report2008-2009-en.pdf 
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… If the reported transgender community is, I believe, 3.4% …Think 
about the probability of those that are immoral in that people group of 
such a small number. It is ridiculous!”29 
 
Jenna “We all knew before we even came out that there were going to 
be people out there that think that we are going against what society 
expects of us…When we come out we think that the hard part is going 
to be to come out to our family, children or friends, co-workers… and 
you wonder what kind of response you are going to get from those 
people you are around daily… but that’s not it. 30 
 
Secondly, as Jennifer points out, fear is nourished by the way in which 
transgenders are traditionally portrayed in the media. Though in the last 
years we have seen a wider presence of transgender subjectivities and 
transgender issues on TV and across a variety of media, such as music, arts, 
journalism, the most common paradigm for transgender representation is 
either caricatural – and therefore neutralised of its political significance and 
subversive force – or criminal and pathological and therefore dangerous, 
something to fix or fight. 
 
DentedBlue:“There are a lot of tactics used to increase public fear 
about creating gender neutral spaces. Tactics describing trans people as 
sex predators, child predators, molesters.”31 
 
Jennifer: “Come on, change the topic … It’s nothing more than 
propaganda scare tactics where they usually have the innocent little 
child and they have the perverted guy next to the child, and they pick 
the most stupid looking picture just for propaganda.”32  
 
DentedBlue:“Instead of flying under the radar, I think sometimes it’d 
be very important to fight to make it safe. Some people can’t fly under 
the radar, some people are just starting off and they can’t pass, which 
isn’t their fault. It’s just the way the system is, sometimes some people 
don’t have access to any resources until they have lived a year or so in 
the role … You know, you need the resources to pass to be able to live 
… We need to stand up and push for that, and dismember these myths 
about trans people … you know, how transwomen are just faking it and 
how they are just getting into women’s spaces… This is not to gain 
privileges  or access spaces that the opposite gender has access to. It is a 
                                                
29 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2XlL06PLLEM 
30 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQ_copThESU 
31 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lz49l_wiL-s 
32 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2XlL06PLLEM 
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very personal thing that is all about feeling happy and good and safe 
and right in your own body. It has nothing to do with social gains or 
picking in on ladies and their changing rooms.”33 
 
The workplace, too, presents a set of challenges: the obvious difficulties 
connected to transitioning from being a known male colleague to a female 
colleague or vice versa. This means presenting a new version of oneself and 
facing the implications this shift has within a closed environment of people 
that present different views and react differently, as well as the anxiety 
linked to the ‘new choice’ of toilets to use.  
 
Aeries: “At work it is a different story because everyone knows … If 
you started, like I did, as a guy and then turned into a female. How that 
worked was: we naturally agreed that as I was starting my transition, I 
would use the disabled toilet, which I did for maybe one or two months, 
until I felt the time was right and I felt uncomfortable being in a 
disabled toilets … That gave everyone a chance to get their head around 
it.”34 
 
What becomes evident is that those who identify with the birth gender, and 
therefore possess pure gender, are those who retain a privileged position over 
transgender individuals who spend their entire lives trying to catch up with 
an ideal of purity which is denied to them from the beginning on the basis of 
simply being transgender. The only way to shorten that distance and get 
closer to purity – though knowing it is a title they will never ben bestowed – 
is by passing better, that is, by reinforcing that impossibility that sets them 
apart in the first place. “If you pass then you don’t have to worry.”35 
 
However, within the workplace, and indeed within public toilets, not 
everyone is hostile. Sometimes, it is a matter of education and exposure: the 
more transgender people are part of the spatiality of public spaces, the more 
their assimilation will increase.  Dylan D. reckons that education is the most 
important element in the process of making people understand that there is 
nothing to be scared of. 
                                                
33 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lz49l_wiL-s 
34 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kzvStBPCiM 
35 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kzvStBPCiM 
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Dyland D.: “A lot of the things that happen to transgender people … 
beatings, harassment, start from some level of ignorance and that level 
can be pretty extreme in a lot of cases.”36 
 
Aeries: “A lot of companies don’t know how to deal with this and all 
the HR policies they have, so it’s up to us to educate them as much as it 
is for them to educate themselves. This means that sometimes you go the 
extra mile in helping them understand your world.”37 
 
Layla: “One of the things that I did was, I tried to talk with everyone 
myself, because I figured they [my colleagues] thought I was some sort 
of freak. So after they meet me and realise I’m a human being, then 
things might change … You can’t win them all, you’re always going to 
have those people who have a problem with you and I think this is 
what’s hard to get over.”38 
 
This is why, though unisex toilets are a valid alternative to the rigidity and 
segregation of gendered public toilets, for they release partially the tension of 
the gender divider, if only on a symbolic level, the root of the problem runs 
deeper than the materiality of space itself. Sex-segregated spaces certainly 
promote a set of unlawful behaviours that can make the experience of using 
a public toilet for transgender people traumatising , but I fear that unisex 
toilets, without a political determination to educate people and make 
transgenders known for what they really are, cannot resolve the problem of 
violence and discrimination, for these would just move on to different spaces 
taking up different forms.  
 
Deborah: “Where Unisex toilets exist I’m quite happy because it 
removes one of the perceived problems. I mean, other people’s 
perceptions.”39 
 
DentedBlue: “The bathroom advice form me is to be active in the 
community, standing up against these hordes ignorant, fundamentalist, 
nationalist types of people who are so terrifyingly dumb. It’s scary but 
it’s very important. It’s something that we need to do so that we don’t 
have to hide or make videos on ways to sneak into the bathroom and not 
                                                
36 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-dlYhCs6ZLU 
37 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kzvStBPCiM 
38 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HN_pt2qGnLw 
39 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8npbBn1LKHU 
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be caught out and clocked.”40 
 
Ultimately, what transgender people desire is only to be treated equally, not 
to be discriminated against on the basis of her gender identity. For this to 
happen in public toilets, there needs to be a commitment to break in the 
convention of gender roles and understand that often, it is our cultural 
limitations that make for the most rigid laws. I want to conclude this section 
with Deborah’s thoughts, which I think best depict the complexity of the 
issue itself and the significance it holds for trans people, but it also so 
candidly shows the sheer simplicity in which such a dramatic issue may be 
resolved if we just let people know they are OK.  
 
 “There is no law in the UK that says which toilets people should go in. 
It’s all conventional. Even knowing this, it took a very full bladder to 
get me to go into the Ladies’ for the first time. When I went into the 
toilet there was a woman washing her hands, she looked at me and 
carried on washing her hands. That one little moment of acceptance 
changed everything for me. It let me know that I was OK.”41  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lz49l_wiL-s 
41 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8npbBn1LKHU 
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Chapter Five 
Marginal Bodies 
 
 
 
“Beware that, when fighting monsters,  
you yourself do not become a monster...  
for when you gaze long into the abyss.  
The abyss gazes also into you.”1 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter focuses on disobedient bodies that unsettle normative 
imaginary, and reflects on their controversial position within the binary 
structure of the western logos. The question of the body often recurs in this 
thesis, and this chapter has the ambition to develop following two different 
but interconnected trajectories: on the one hand, it provides an account on 
the ways in which the body has been theorised in the history of critical 
theory in relation to the construction of subjectivity and identity. In 
particular, I am here concerned with a part of the more recent history of 
philosophy which, beginning with Nietzsche, has questioned the long-
believed notion of the supremacy of the mind over the body. On the other 
hand, while it focuses on the body, this chapter seeks to expose the figure of 
the monster and investigate that space in which the monster has been 
relegated. I also wish to highlight the ethics that govern the monstrous 
body in the negotiation of its subjectivity, the dynamics of its embodiment 
and the appropriation of a sense of self which, as it appears, is forged on a 
crucial balance between contrasts: right/wrong, female/male, 
inside/outside, body mind. In doing so, I propose a reconsideration of the 
monster not in terms of oppositional pairs, but as integral part of that 
                                                
1 Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (Vintage 
Books 1989) 
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indissoluble relationship through which both self and other are mutually 
and equally defined. 
 
The monstrous body is something that has been present in literary and 
popular culture for centuries. It is an extraordinary example of the economy 
of fearwhich it creates with its threat to the equilibrium of the non-
monstrous body; the production of deviant subjectivity on one side and, on 
the other, its aligned counterpart: the normal, the healthy, the white, the 
heterosexual. The monstrosity of bodies has changed over time in 
combination with the changes of the social attributes and sensibilities that 
determine its definition. It is however safe to say that the defining traits in 
common between every monster are its fundamental difference - that is, 
difference in race, gender, class - between itself (the other) and a self.2  
 
It is important to clarify that this chapter is not theorising transgeder in 
terms of monstrosity. Rather, it is drawing a parallel between transgender 
and the figure of the monster to highlight a narrative of dissonance. The 
term monster in this chapter relates to transgender because it suggests 
disobedience on the one hand and, on the other, it lends itself well to the 
observation of that normative intent to naturalise the monster and its 
impurities into something clean, recognisable, easily identified and 
therefore less scary. A different, more spatial aspect of such naturalisation 
was treated in chapter 4, here I will focus on the implications of the 
unsettling body and the way in which its contradictions are mediated. 
Finally, in this chapter, the monster should not be envisioned only in literal 
terms but, more widely, as an othered and estrangered that sits outside of 
normativity and, because of its monstrosity (diversity), challenges the 
relations that take place around it. Finally, the symbolism of the monster 
will highlight a certain marginalisation which complements well the notion 
of marginal as understood by Deleuze, which I will duly revisit in this 
chapter. 
                                                
2 Judith Halberstam, Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the Technology of Monsters (Durham: 
Duke University Press 1995) p. 8 
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Although it is not my interest nor is it useful for the purpose of this thesis to 
trace back a history of the monster in ancient Greece and Rome, it is 
important to remember that attention to monstrous bodies - expressly 
hermaphrodites and cross-dressers - is deep-rooted and has been present at 
various degrees in ancient and classical imaginary as well as it is present in 
the modern.  
 
It is also important to clarify that I understand bodies to be discursive, 
socially-constituted products of a combination of affects that stretch from 
culture and history to sexuality and race, and that their materiality reaches 
out the physical boundaries of their skin to entwine with a series of 
contingent inscriptions which constitute the body no less than flesh and 
bones. It is from this post-modern perspective that I approach my analysis. 
Concurring with Elizabeth Grosz that bodies “are materialities that are 
uncontainable in physicalist terms alone”3, and that “require quite different 
intellectual models than those that have been used thus far to represent and 
understand them”.4 This chapter intends to explore and rethink the 
relationship between the abjected body, - the disobedient, the marginal , the 
outsider, the unnatural, the abnormal, the monster -  and the domain which 
attempts to contain it. In the context of this thesis, my analysis signals the 
emergence to decode the transgender body and its constitutional difference 
(Derrida’s diffèrance) within frameworks made of power, desire, social 
practices and interpersonal relations that are in constant becoming and are 
constitutive of the monster as much as they are constitutive of the self. As 
Judith Halberstam notes, “monstrosity (and the fear it gives rise to) is 
historically conditioned rather than a psychological universal ... monsters 
not only reveal certain material conditions of the production of horror, but 
they also make strange the categories of beauty, humanity, and identity that 
we still cling to”5. For this reason, the monstrous body is not only a case of 
                                                
3 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Allen & Unwin 1994) p.xi 
4 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, op. cit. p.xi 
5 Halberstam, Skin Shows, op. cit. p.6 
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difference - that is, difference other than the self - but it is a figure on which 
the self is tightly dependent as integral part of its being and not as an 
oppositional referent.  
 
The image of what I call the disobedient body - and to which in the second 
part of this chapter I will refer more specifically as the transgender body in 
all its declinations, such as hermaphrodites, cross-dressing, transsexual, 
inverted, intersex - has been present in the collective imaginary since 
ancient times.6 The transsexual body, a marginal body - a mediation 
between medical technologies and legislative conquests - is largely 
considered monstrous: not only does it refuse to conform to all the other 
normal bodies, but it contains various elements of danger, anxiety, fear, 
signs of mutability that are difficult to depict and grasp, and which 
contribute to creating a certain level of skepticism, as well as it allows to 
imaginative fabrications and simplifications.  
 
Over the last decade in particular, through a process of social and media 
exposure, transgender has emerged as an independent figure and has 
attracted a great deal of interest.7 This has undoubtedly contributed to a 
shifting in the attitude in which transgender is approached: from the theory 
books it is slowly entering a broader arena and exposing itself to the general 
public. Consequently, it is true that the perception of trans subjectivity and 
transgender as an identity is heavily mediated by culturally constructed 
images. It is equally true that its increasing popularity has not discharged 
trans bodies from the claim of monstrosity. Often such representations have 
been useful to people in order to gain some degree of understanding - if 
                                                
6 Laura Lunger Knoppers, Joan B. Landes (eds) Monstrous Bodies/Political Monstrosities in 
Early Modern Europe (Cornell University Press 2004) 
7 TV drama and sitcom representations, reality TV, tabloids and magazines, TV 
documentaries: in 2005, UK Big Brother 5 was won by trans-woman Nadia Almada,  
Channel 4 has recently launched a reality TV programme entirely dedicated to the real life 
stories of a group of transgender youths. Various performers, such as Lilly Savage, have 
reached public success with their cross-dressing roles on-stage and in the cinema. 
Transgender musician Antony Hegarty gained global success and won the Mercury Music 
Prize, Drag Queen Conchita Wurst, winner of Eurovision 2014. These are only some of the 
examples of the presence of transgender in the public domain. 
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only on a superficial level - in terms of life conditions and challenges trans 
individuals face up on a daily basis. Other times these representations have 
produced false ideas: they have invested trans identity with moral 
responsibility not only suggesting their conduct is questionable, but also 
creating social anxiety which has proven to be dangerously against that 
process of social and political acceptance and equality trans individuals 
demand.   
 
The transsexual body that undergoes medical treatments in the hope of a 
socially-accepted second skin is a monster. Through the medications, the 
manipulation of the body - surgery or hormone therapy - the flesh goes 
through changes that become more and more visible: some parts of the 
body swell, others take up a different shape, the voice breaks or deepens 
and these significant changes in the morphology of the body dramatically 
collide with the natural asset of what that body should look like, thus 
making it not only a physical abnormality but also a cultural monster. The 
emergence of the transsexual, like the emergence of the monster, is held on 
a principle of projection of the negative and dehumanizing traits from the 
subject onto the subjected. A principle reinforced by Freud’s intuition of the 
otherness within the organisation of the self. More banally, the repulsion for 
the other’s aberrations coincides with the repulsion for ourselves and our 
own monstrosity. These inner demons and the chaos they create, as 
Tomothy Beal writes make it so that “by demonising monsters, we keep 
God on our side”.8 
 
I will sketch out the image of the dissident body, the monster, with the 
intent to delineate a cultural model and a tendency that have been 
predominant in society when it comes to the engagement with 
transgendered bodies. In particular, I refer here to the ways in which  
‘figures of difference”9 have been represented culturally and collectively 
pushed to the margins and, in this context, I will analyse how the 
                                                
8 Timothy Beal, Religion and its Monsters (New York: Routledge 2002) pp.4-8 
9 Margrit Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self (Sage 2002) p.1 
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transsexual body is deemed monstrous by feminist essentialism. The 
condition of the abjected body is one of weakness and vulnerability. 
Margrit Shildrick’s outstanding analysis of human monsters shows how 
vulnerability is an existential state exposed by the embodied other in which 
we seek confirmation for our own secure selfhood, “what we see mirrored 
in the monster are the leaks and flows, the vulnerabilities in our own 
embodied being”10. The eroticisation of the transgendered body and the 
often associated sense of disturbing and exciting danger11, the general 
confusion in the media between transsexuals, transvestites, drag-queens, 
drag-kings, hermaphrodites - all deemed deviant - as well as the general 
ignorance on the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, all this contributes to the chaos 
and anxiety when relating to trans subjectivity and trans bodies. This 
attitude not only creates dichotomies that relate on mere representation 
thus producing huge distance and prejudice, but it proves risky because it 
makes it hard to distinguish between the real and the imaginary. 
Furthermore, in this chapter these uncontrollable bodies are contextualised  
within a theoretical debate which attempts to position itself away from the 
Cartesian articulation which has the body and the mind as two distinct 
planes in the journey that constitutes subjectivity.  Instead, I will exorcise 
that dualism by positioning the body inside the mind, that is, rethinking a 
relation which, as I see it, cannot be structured in terms of parallel psychic 
and corporeal patterns, but it needs to be reformulated through a 
dimension of convergence which allows subjectivity to be fundamentally 
constituted of the substance of both . 
 
I wish to make clear that my engagement with the monster is intended as a 
way of engaging with the othered body, and it is precisely through 
examining the other that I examine the monster. For this reason, it is not my 
interest to provide a genealogy of the historical development of monsters in 
                                                
10 Ibid. p.4 
11 Anne Phillips, ‘It’s my body and I’ll do what I like with it: bodies as objects and property’ 
in Political Theory, 2011, 39 (6) pp. 724-748.  
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society. As Sharpe’s book, Foucault’s Monsters and the Challenge of Law, 
demonstrates the figure of the monster is a template through which it is 
possible to zoom into all subjectivities which, at all levels, do not subscribe 
to normativity. It is in this optic that this chapter should be interpreted. It is 
equally clear that the notion of otherness goes beyond the corporeal or 
psychic irregularities and, in the context of this chapter, the monster is not 
strictly pinned down to any classifications (legal, medical, moral or 
physical), rather, in approaching the othered transgender body, my sole 
prerogative is a condition of disruption in relation to the normative order.  
 
In sum, in this chapter I aim to establish three things: The first is that the 
body has within itself the ability of being (simultaneously) both subject and 
object – and therefore of being self - and the two roles do not depend on one 
another, but are capable of coexisting, and often they do. Second, that the 
body of the monster is made of the same matter and affectivity as the 
subject, and that its force exceeds its corporeality. Third: that the condition 
of being monstrous, that is, of being other, depends on cultural norms more 
than it depends on the subject, for the subject is always somebody else’s 
monster and the collision between the two has primarily to do with issues 
of self-acceptance, vulnerability and insecurity more than with conscious 
ambitions of supremacy and colonisation. 
  
 
5.1 The Monstrous Body 
The monster is a site for conflict, symbolism and morality. It produces 
assumptions which rely on contrapositions - and yet more conflict - in the 
relationship between person and monster. The symbolic strength of the 
western logos relies on the polarisation of bodies: to define the other, and 
against the other define oneself, is that principle of recognition we have 
seen in chapter 3, through which human knowledge has developed for 
centuries. The primordial polarization has regarded the body which, in 
philosophy, has largely remained theorised on a bifurcation body-mind. 
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Descartes offers the first systematic account of the body-mind relation: he 
sees the nature of the mind (res cogita) to be different from the nature of the 
body (res extensa) and believes that the two can live disconnected from each 
other.12 The mind is a thinking substance connecting with the soul to 
consciousness while the body has its foundation in the natural world and 
finds its completion in its physicality. Descartes places the mind on a 
hierarchical higher level than the body, this hierarchical order has been the 
primary way in which philosophy has approached the understanding of the 
body. Such polarized thinking automatically generates not only boundaries 
and categories to identities but, most dramatically, it creates 
“inappropriate/d others”, 13 unprivileged bodies that are placed right up 
against their privileged counterparts in the process of self-identification 
which, as it happens, is always informed by the identification of the 
ambiguous other. The more the other resists normative identity, the more 
becomes excluded and marginalised.  
 
The concept of monstrous has been present in popular culture since the 
times of Greek myths, in travellers’ and gothic tales, the Renaissance, the 
classical age, the advent of medical theory and later with bio-medical 
science.14 It is not necessary to immerse ourselves in the history of 
monstrosity, but a quick peek in history is nevertheless useful in order to 
draw some analogies which may help me define the boundaries - or lack of 
- today’s monstrous bodies. The various images of monsters - especially 
those coming from ancient times - are iconic, not realistic representations of 
hybrids and unnatural bodies. As culture evolved and geographical limits 
broadened, the monster was more and more associated with the unknown 
and its morphological traits were those of other races. Shildrick sees the 
monster “occupy[ing] an essentially fluid site”15 and highlights a 
                                                
12 This is often referred to as ‘radical dualism’, expressed in Carter’s Principiae Philosophiae 
(1644) 
13 Donna Haraway, ‘Ecce Homo, Ain’t (Ar’n’t) I a Woman, and Inappropriate/d Others: 
the Human in a Posthumanist Landscape’ in Feminists Theorize the Political (Routledge 1992) 
14 Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self, op. cit.; Sharpe, 
Foucault's Monsters and the Challenge of Law, op. cit. 
15 Sharpe, Foucault's Monsters and the Challenge of Law, op. cit. p.16 
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codependence between its presence in culture and the definition of man 
himself:16 “The monstrous is not thereby the absolute other, but rather a 
mirror to humanity: on an individual level, the external manifestation of the 
sinner within”.17 Because the logos is articulated according to the binary 
opposition that is what constitutes knowledge, by marking the boundaries 
between self and other it is possible to also mark the defining boundaries of 
self-identity.  
 
Historically, monsters were produced as a reaction to the belief that the 
body contained a soul  - “the soul is the prison of the body”18 -  and any sick 
soul was represented by a monstrous body. Victorian monsters became 
soon associated with deviant sexuality and since then the association 
between monstrosity and gender deviance has been a staple: the 
monstrosity of certain figures was often visually rendered by the co-
existence of male and female attributes within the same body. Foucault’s 
analysis traces back a preoccupation with a bestial human in the Middle 
Age displaying human and bestial elements, with the conjoined twins in the 
Renaissance to a concern over the hermaphrodite in the Classical Age.19 
Thus, for Foucault, from  “both man and beast”, to the “one who is two and 
two who are one”, 20 we finally get to the ambiguity of the sexed body, the 
abnormality which from physical deformation becomes moral deviance. 
This passage is crucial because it marks the shift from the legal to the moral 
and, as we will see, “the template of the monster proves important to an 
adequate understanding of the abnormal individual and therefore regimes 
of normalisation.21 At first this happened through symbolisms: unnatural 
traits would determine divinities and supernatural beings, but later on, 
with the advancement of medical knowledge, the figure of the monster 
emerged from deformed to abnormal; and it was indeed in the field of socio-
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. p.17 
18 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Pantheon Books, 1977) p. 30 
19 Sharpe, Foucault's Monsters and the Challenge of Law, op. cit. p. 45 
20 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974-1975 (Picador, 2004) 
p. 66 
21 Sharpe, Foucault's Monsters and the Challenge of Law, op. cit. p. 45 
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medical discourse that the abnormal body has gained the status of legal 
category. Alex Sharpe’s compelling analysis of Foucaultian’s monsters fully 
demonstrates that “the distinction between deformity and monstrosity, 
articulated in 13th century law, represents and attempts to distinguish the 
human from the non-human. That is, deformity marks limits of human 
being [...] In other words, the deformity side of the divide serves to 
highlight corporeal forms of human difference that the law can recognise 
and accommodate. 22 In marking the split between the disabled and the 
monster, Foucault went as far as saying that the former “may well be 
something that upsets the natural order”23, concerning morphological 
irregularities; the latter is a body which collides with the law as well as with 
nature, it is a body located outside of the law which combines “the 
impossible and the forbidden”24, “the kind of irregularity that calls law into 
question and disables it”.25 Foucault sees a shift from body to soul, “as the 
object of legal concern”26, that is, from irregular bodies to deviant identity 
“capable of describing interiority”.27   
 
It is interesting to note that, in Foucault’s account, the figure of the 
hermaphrodite and the way it was theorised through history incarnates 
perfectly this passage from monstrosity to monstrousness. In “a process 
that develops between 1765 and 1820-183028, the “hermaphrodite is no 
longer defined in medical discourse as a mixture of sexes”29, that is, for its 
monstrosity, but it becomes irregular and is “located in desire”30 in the form 
of “perverse tastes”.31 Representations of gender deviance within the 
paradigm of the monster have been oscillating between the cross-dressing 
comedy character stereotype  - what Serano calls the ‘pathetic transsexual’ - 
                                                
22 A. N. Sharpe, 'England's Legal Monster' in Law, Culture and Humanities (2009) 5, 1 p.106 
23 Foucault, Abnormal, op. cit. p. 64  
24 Foucault, Abnormal, op. cit. p. 56 
25 Ibid. p. 64 
26 Sharpe, Foucault's Monsters and the Challenge of Law, op. cit. p. 45 
27 Ibid. 
28 Foucault, Abnormal, op. cit. p.74 
29 Ibid. p.72 
30 Sharpe, Foucalt's Monsters and the Challenge of Law, op. cit. p.45 
31 Foucault, Abnormal, op. cit. p. 64  
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and the psycho-trans stereotype - the ‘deceptive transsexual’.32 The former 
comes from an ancient tradition of art, theatre and literature regular in Italy 
and France33 where cross-dressing was practiced and accepted as an 
amusing entertainment. Even when visually unsettling, it rarely represents 
a threat to femininity or masculinity because its caricatural mannerism 
usually operates within the safe boundaries of comedy and its intent is 
perceived to be ridiculing that which it is temporarily embodying34. The 
latter model presents a deviant trans subject that displays elements of 
perversion, psychosis and monstrosity35, it is deemed mad and therefore 
not taken seriously because the danger it represents is neutralized by its 
pathological condition which automatically makes it impermeable to 
legitimation and serious consideration.  
 
Historically, cross-dressing was permitted in certain cultures during rituals. 
It was in fact present in a several tribal religions, such as Masai, Nandi, 
Nuba.36 Although it may have sometimes displayed erotic elements which 
were not entirely tolerated, it was mainly considered to be a performance 
and, as such, something fictional. In 1885 when the Criminal Law Act made 
sexuality illegal in the United Kingdom, cross-dressers became easily 
associated to homosexual practices and for this reason it soon became 
targeted as an equivocal practice.37 The work of sexologists such as Richard 
von Krafft-Ebing and Magnus Hirschfel38 was important in order to 
                                                
32 Julia Serano, Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of 
Femininity (Seal Press, 2007) p.36 
33 Jan Clarke, ‘Female Cross-dressing on the Paris Stage, 1673-1715’ in Forum for Modern 
Languages Studies, XXXV (3), 1999, 238-50 p. 238 
34 For an in-depth analysis on the use and abuse of Transgender in the media, see John 
Phillips, Transgender on Screen (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 
35 A common film cited to explain the Psycho-Trans model is ‘The Silence of the Lambs’ 
(Phillips, 2006; Hamberstam, 2005; Prosser, 2002) 
36 Vern L. Bullough, Cross-dressing, Sex and Gender (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993) 
p. 17 
37 Phillips, Transgender on Screen, op. cit. p. 44 
38 See Charlotte Wolf, Magnus Hirschfeld: A Portrait of a Pioneer in Sexology (London: Quartet 
Books 1987) and Hertoft, Preben, ‘Psychotherapeutic treatment of sexual dysfunction—or 
from sex therapy to marital therapy’ in Ugeskr. Laeg. (Oct 7, 2002) 164 (41): 4805–8 
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distinguish cross-dressing from homosexuality, until that moment blurred 
together under the same category of perversion. 
 
Although a rare phenomenon, the symbolism of the hermaphrodite - best 
known and extreme case of gender ambivalence - is significant because its 
perception was immediately that of something which could not be 
assimilated into society’s norms and did not fit into any social model.39 This 
attitude persists throughout the middle age where the figure of the 
hermaphrodite seemed the figure of extreme monstrosity and regarded as a 
bad sign of the gods.40 As Graille, Delcourt and Phillips41, the 
hermaphrodite was perceived as a threat to the binarism intrinsic in human 
society and its diversity was considered to be a source of danger, a feature 
which could contaminate the human species42 and based on this, many 
children were killed because their sex was ambivalent at birth.43 
 
As Foucault argued in 1978, society’s trends in the areas of sexuality as well 
as rigid understanding of gender derive from the medical and legal 
terminology which came into existence in mid-nineteeth century. The 
circumstances may certainly vary in 2012, but the general tendencies in the 
way transgendered subjectivity is presented in the media today is largely 
unchanged. We can generally say that the two different roles played by the 
two dominant trans models present are tightly connected and mutually 
reinforcing: if on the one hand cross-dressers fulfilled the need in society of 
a figure outside norms who could function as a means through which 
ridicule homosexuality, on the other hand the dark presence of the 
hermaphrodite served as a reminder for the limit of what was acceptable, 
and helped contain its tolerated counterpart within certain limits. 
According to Marjorie Garber, the majority of cross-dressing narratives are 
                                                
39 Ibid. p.35 
40 Marie Delcourt, Hermaphrodite (London: Studio books 1961) p. 44 
41 Patrick Graille, Les Hermaphrodites aus VVII et XVIII siècle (Paris, Les Belles Lettres 2001); 
Marie Delcourt, Hermaphrodite: Myths and Rites of the Bisexual Figure in Classical Antiquity 
(London: Studio Books 1961); John Phillips, Transgender on Screen, op. cit. 
42Phillips, Transgender on Screen, op. cit. p.39 
43 Delcourt, Hermaphrodite, op. cit. p. 45 
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fail to be progressive and prove unconvincing and ideologically 
problematic: ‘unconvincing because they ignore the complex and often 
unconscious eroticism of such self-transformations and masquerades [...] 
and because in doing so they rewrite history of the transvestic subject as a 
cultural symptom. Problematic, because the consequent reinscription of 
‘male’ and ‘female’, even if tempted (or impelled) by feminist 
consciousness, reaffirms the patriarchal binary of the transvestite, the figure 
that disrupts.44   
 
 
5.2 Othered Bodies 
The Othered subject has often been theorised by a certain part of feminism 
and post-modernism in terms of opposition: the stable integrity on the 
“bodies that matter”45 versus the confusion of the “leaky boundaries”46 of 
the monsters: the former seen in tune with the order of the western logo, the 
latter still immersed in that order but occupying a “precarious place” 47. 
Such duality in looking at bodies has undoubtedly helped maintain that 
balance whereby normative majority made of “identity, system and 
order”48 is self-defined and defining. The fascination mixed with horror that 
the abject other provokes is for Kristeva the proof that the monster’s force 
lies in the capacity to unsettle rules and, at the same time, stabilize that 
order by failing to recognise the boundaries between self and other. 
Interestingly, what makes a monster to Kristeva is not so much the physical 
difference, unhealthy state or the threat it represents, but it is the potential 
to contaminate, that is, the possibility that their otherness can cross physical 
boundaries and stir “a sense of our openness and vulnerability that western 
discourse insists on covering over”49. Accordingly, the emotional response 
directed to those who embody otherness is not based on physical repulsion 
                                                
44 Marjorie Garber, Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety (Viking/Penguin, 
1993) p.70  
45 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (Psychology Press  1993) 
46 Margrit Shildrick, Leaky Bodies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism and (Bio)ethics 
(Routledge 1996) 
47 Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self, op. cit. p.48 
48 Julia Kristeva, Power of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (Columbia University Press 1982) p.2 
49 Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self, op. cit. p.81 
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but, rather, on tension and anxiety, a visual reminder of the denial in our 
own unconscious. As Shildrick puts is: “our ambivalent response to the 
external manifestation of the stranger, of the monster, is an effect of the gap 
between our understand of ourselves as whole and separate, and the 
psychical experience of the always already incorporation of otherness”50. 
For Kristeva, then, it is this duality that may offer “an ethic of respect for 
the irreconcilable”51. In other words, this ethic needs be based on respect for 
what is ‘uncertain’52 and ‘irreconciliable’53, and must pass through the act of 
recognition towards those abjected subjectivities. Kristeva’s theory is one 
based on an analysis of the process of abjecting the female body in what she 
defines ‘sociosymbolic order’, which is organised in a way such that the 
other is sacrificed, that is, incorporated by the norm and thus eliminated. 
According to Kristeva, abjection of the other is to be attributed to historical 
processes that naturally tend towards the ‘social order’, a sort of 
naturalisation of everything that does not comply and which owes its 
existence on the sacrifice of the other. In Kristeva’s analysis, the social order 
is a whole that does not only include women’s   bodies (women’s bodies 
which she understands as a primary site for otherness) but also the sacrifice 
of other others. The only way to challenge this order is, in Kristeva’s view, 
through a process of ‘negativity plus ethics’, 54 that is, locate and oppose to 
this sacrifice and fight in order to avoid the mistake of reproducing that 
sacrifice by projecting these othered others onto other others. This passage 
in Kristeva is crucial because it highlights how change can only occur 
through an act of responsibility, an “ethical commitments to accepting the 
vulnerability that its sacrificial form enables us to avoid”55.  
 
Following this logic which can be summed up in the need to internalise 
difference as a political and ethical act thus taking in the other’s alterity 
                                                
50 Ibid. p.83 
51 Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves (Columbia University Press 1991) p.182 
52 Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self, op. cit. p.132 
53 Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, op. cit p.182 
54 Julia Kristeva, Women Can Never Be Defined (New York: Schocken 1981) 
55 Patricia Elliot, Debates in Transgender. Queer, and Feminist Theory (Ashgate 2010) 
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instead of projecting it onto another, one could envision a non sacrificial  
other that is constituted by and through the act of accepting and 
incorporating difference. This way, by accepting the other (the difference, 
the excluded), one refuses the sacrificial constitution of the social order. 
Transgenders whose subjectivity goes through a similar process of abjection 
may however find that Kristeva’s theory puts them in the position of 
incorporating the neglected parts that other others have been encouraged to 
give up in themselves, thus sacrificing or subjecting to change their natural 
being by assimilating parts of other coherent or incoherent selves. This 
operation would be impracticable and problematic because trans 
subjectivity strongly relies on the embodied reconciliation of otherness and 
self. To open up to the potential assimilation of others’ incoherence   parts 
would through that equilibrium in disarray. Moreover, it seems plausible to 
believe that within a social order as theorised by Kristeva, some subjects 
receive more sacrificial pressure than others according to their degree of 
normativity, and the results is that some identities are secured through the 
sacrificial process of those who are willing to incorporate them, whereas 
others - arguably the least coherent - face exclusion. This is something that 
Judith Butler addresses in Bodies that Matters.56 She asks how identification 
works “when we consider, on the one hand, hegemonic subject-positions 
like whiteness and heterosexuality and, on the other hand, subject-positions 
that either have been erased or have been caught in a constant struggle to 
achieve an articulatory status?”57 In the affirmation of one’s identity, Butler 
sees the need for a disavowal “as a political necessity to specify... identity 
over and against its ostensible opposite”.58 Disavowal is not to be seen as 
the moment of constitution of the identity, although it can be 
“fundamentally enabling... and indeed, certain disavowals function as 
constitutive constraints, and they cannot be willed away”.59 When it comes 
to trans identity or any identity that is so fundamentally incoherent, the 
                                                
56 Butler, Bodies that Matter, op. cit. 
57 Ibid. p.112 
58 Butler, Bodies that Matter, op. cit. p. 113 
59 Ibid. p.116 
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problem with incorporating difference into unity, “transforming all 
excluded identifications into inclusive features”,60 is that one has the 
impression that acceptance (or recognition) comes only through a process of 
sameness and this raises a set of issues that suggest identification cannot 
afford the existence of abjected others, nor is it ready to legitimize 
complexity. This is an act of refusal which leads to a Hegelian dialect 
between categories which can only esclalate in violence because it is based 
on the unacceptable principle that social order can be maintained only 
insofar as it complies with hegemonic social norms. More importanly, this 
Hegelian synthesis that takes for granted the so-called “natural attitude”61 
of the ‘social order’ is based on the assumption that gender is bipolar: there 
is a ‘natural’ gender that incorporates the ‘unnatural’ with the intent of 
making it natural.  
 
An ethic of recognition, in my view, cannot be located at the level of the 
personal and cannot rely on the act of the single, but must necessarily act 
upon a collective transformation of those structures that support hegemonic 
norms. As we have seen in chapter 3, this is precisely the problem that 
occurs with the structure of the GRA. Namely, a closed dialectical 
negotiation developed on a master/slave logic. 
 
 Naomi Scheman offers an alternative way of deconstructing this opposition 
made of natural and unnatural and proposes to ‘queer the centre’62 through 
a process whereby the marginalised identity is centralised through an 
operation which places the marginal other in the centre together with the 
natural centred other, thus stimulating acceptance and contributing to a 
fundamental change of the structures which characterise the normative 
centre. Accordingly, instead of vivisecting the margins and placing 
emphasis onto the irregularities of certain irreconciliable identities and 
                                                
60 Ibid.  
61 Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Prentice-Hall 1967) p.61 
62 Naomi Scheman, 'Queering the Center by Centerung the Queer: Reflections on 
Transsexuals and Secular Jews' in Feminists Rethink the Self (New York: University Press 
1999) p.61  
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work to make them reconciliable, it is more logical to highlight ‘normative 
incoherence’ thus shortening the distance between margins and centre. This 
would be in the interest of both parties because, the desire to belong to the 
centre, that is, being normal, and the desire to still maintain that outside 
position - the disavowal - concur in a mutual greater desire to make this 
operation work.63 Provided it is true that irreconciliable selves wish to 
maintain a position of outsiders, and provided that the ultimate aim of 
marginal identities is to occupy the centre, the problem with this prospect is 
that it is still based on a univocal understanding of what is natural and 
what is unnatural. Regardless of the subject itself, this amalgamation of 
coherent with the incoherent - the migration of the outsiders towards the 
queered centre - suggests the illusion that the privilege is always located in 
the centre and automatically imposes, or at least endorses, a unidirectional 
migration (that towards the centre) which, if it is not embraced, results in 
failure.  
 
Deleuze identifies ‘being minor’ as an ethical choice. The movement 
towards a privileged centre, that process of incorporation we have seen in 
Butler, is based on the assumption that what is marginal comes second to 
what is central. For Deleuze this movement towards the centre does not 
occur, for the middle does not have a direction or an orientation. As we 
have seen in chapter 3, the middle is a space of chaos not defined by 
direction as such, but by speed and intensities.  “Where are you going? 
Where are you coming from? What are you heading for? These are all 
useless questions. Making a clean slate, strting or beginning again from 
ground zero, seeking a beginning or a foundation – all imply a flase 
conception of voyage and movement (a conception that is methodical, 
pedagogical, initiatory, symbolic…).”64 
 
                                                
63 Scheman, 'Queering the Center by Centerung the Queer: Reflections on Transsexuals and 
Secular Jews', op. cit. pp. 66-67 
64 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, op. cit. p. 27 
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Marginal spaces, minor spaces, are in the middle of movement. Their being 
marginal does not only mean marginalised, but it also (and especially) 
means different. Spaces of differentiation. “A minor literature doesn’t come 
from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within 
a major language. But the first characteristic of minor literature is any case 
is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of 
deterritorialisation”.65 Marginal bodies (minor bodies), then, are deemed 
marginal not by their lack of relevance, but by the subordinate position they 
occupy in relation to dominant power. Their position may be marginal, but 
their force is major. It is crucial to understand that these are non-subject-
centric subjects and therefore nothing in marginal bodies is ideological or 
representational, but everything is “irrevocably, absolutely”.66 In their view, 
they are characterised by four elements: they are highly political bodies, 
“everything in them is political”.67 They are collective bodies in the fact that 
“activate solidarity in spite of scepticism”.68 They are revolutionary because 
their marginal positioning and the hostility around them prompt the 
formation of new sensitivities. They are spatial, because encapsulate 
deterritotialisation and maps new territories. 
 
Such implications become all the more relevant when trans subjectivity is 
involved. Transgender is located directly opposite to this ideal of ‘natural’ 
and therefore, according to Scheman, one would feel legitimised to cast 
trans in the unnatural realm, the non-human. Moreover, this semi-imposed 
migration towards the lucky centre creates yet another polarised alley 
whereby trans does not only find itself amongst the unnatural margins - 
which already constitutes a segregation in a space of unhappiness, 
vulnerability and anxiety - but it also experiences the violence of having to 
trade that initial unhappiness with a greater sense of vulnerability which 
stems from knowing that that place it is trying to reach and occupy will 
                                                
65 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, op. cit. p. 16 
66 Ibid. p. 21 
67 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, op. cit. p. 18 
68 Ibid. p. 17 
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demand a constant mediation of its unnatural subjectivity which, even from 
a more privileged location, will nonetheless be treated as unnatural.  
 
In Deleuze and Guattari’s views, by contrast, the marginal body ceases to 
imitate or represent an ideal of centrality. It does not need to rely on 
representation or symbolisms because it operates through intensities. We 
have seen the importance of the notion of intensities earlier when I 
explained the key concept of affects in the. Intensities are always different 
and always multiple insofar as they are not representational: “difference is 
not and cannot be thought in itself, so long as it is subject to the 
requirements of representation”.69 So, in this configuration, marginal bodies 
oppose to the models propelled by being major and push 
“deterritorialisation to such an extreme that nothing remains but 
intensities”.70 In this process of becoming, marginal bodies express their 
outmost utopian force – a revolutionary force, Deleuze would say – of 
“creat[ing] the opposite dream: …becoming minor”.71 There is a centrality 
(a political relevance) to these spaces and in these bodies that is far more 
reproductive than the hybrid space we have seen earlier in chapter 3. It is a 
centrality that is not conferred by the centre, but it is drawn from the radical 
reorganisation of a system of values where “The grass becomes wind and 
moves along the wind’s breath, the wind becomes grass and spreads itself 
on the ground: becoming itself is pushed deeper in the middle, as it were. 
This is the space where the audience becomes the stage, and where any 
ontic counting, categorising, calculating becomes absorbed by an all-
embracing, self-absorbing ontological singularity”.72 Vulnerability now is 
almost a necessity, not longer something to fear. It is the capacity to 
influence and be influenced, the encounter with the other who is never my 
other, but is the other who reunites me with my desires. “My desire passes 
through others, and through others it received an object. I desire nothing 
                                                
69 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, op. cit. p. 330 
70 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, op. cit. p. 18 
71 Ibid. p. 27 
72 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas, ‘…the sound of a breaking string’, op. cit. p.6 
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that cannot be seen, throught, or possessed by a possible other. That is the 
basis of my desire. It is always others who relate my desire to an object.”73 
 
The “gap between our understanding of ourselves as whole and separate, 
and the psychical experience of the always already incorporation of 
otherness”74 is dissolved. We fulfil ourselves only through the encounter 
with the other. When Butler says that the exclusion (disavowal) “produces a 
constitutive outside to the subject, an abjected outside, which is after all, 
‘inside’ the subject as its own founding repudiation”75, she automatically 
traces a trajectory whereby the subject’s encounter is per se filled with 
negative expectation. With Deleuze, the encounter is understood as a 
possibility, namely the possibility to “express a possible world”.76 Possible 
here is not to be mistaken with the temporal possibility, pre-condition of 
virtuality, we have seen in chapter 1. ‘Possible world’ in this instance 
merely refers to the Deleuzian belief that subjects are not fully formed, 
never reach a state of fulfilment, but they are characterised by “the capacity 
to become different”77 than what it is. So possible world means multiple 
world. 
 
Shildrick’s view is that, if the encounter with the unstable other provokes 
sense of instability in me, I will feel it is my right to protect my body and 
reject what makes me vulnerable. With Deleuze, the other is made of the 
same intensities as me (the Self), the only differentiation is given by the 
duration or capacity of those intensities. The other is understood precisely 
as “on the basis of the effects of Others”,78 not as and othered other. It is 
through the encounter with this possibility that, for Deleuze, we advance in 
our own individuation. In other words: the encounter with the other shows 
us possibilities that will ultimately increase our capacities.  
                                                
73 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, op. cit. p. 345 
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 “The part of the object that I do not see I posit as visible to Others, so that 
when I will have walked around to reach this hidden part, I will have 
joined the others behind the object, and I will have totalized it I the way that 
I had already anticipated. As for objects behind my back, I sense them 
coming together and forming a world, precisely because they are visible to, 
and are seen by, Others.”79 We understand that the encounter with the 
other does not lead to disavowal or prevarication, it is rather the exchange 
of affects through which subjects perpetuate their differentiation.  “When 
one complains about the meanness of others, one forgets this other and 
even more frightening meanness – namely, the meanness of things were 
there no Other”.80 
 
So, we have a situation where the law and indeed biomedical practices fail 
to recognise that Shildrick calls the “existential state”81 of vulnerability of 
the other, where  “each man is considered to be the master of his own 
body”82, and the emotionality which comes with the encounter of two 
bodies is not even contemplated as a mode of the body, “but as a contingent 
physical dependency”83. So, in other words, in order for Butler’s theory (that 
sees disavowal as constitutive of the self) to be practicable, the ethics of 
respect should account for that vulnerability differently. As long as the 
body is theorised as a box (in a Derridean sense),84 as self-protected and 
self-protecting container whose essence resolves around the protection of 
the psyche, then the possibility of a smooth, trauma-less passage between 
bodies remains problematic. There is more: To discourage that passage not 
only rehabilitates the monstrosity of the other and suggests that it be 
emphasised and invoked by the sameness (counterpart) who looks down 
from a stable position, but it also - and more dangerously - opens up to a 
(wrong) legitimate sentiment of anxiety and repulsion whenever any bodily 
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contact is involved. Keeping in mind that the violence generated by that 
moment of anxiety does not only manifest itself physically, but it also 
operates on an allegorical level, by association, this passage would be all the 
more troublesome because in order to get rid of that sense of repulsion one 
would automatically be inclined to seek out for the clean body, a body that 
does not contaminate. This presents of course racial issues that cannot be 
underestimated.   
 
Moreover, if as Butler notes the construction of subjectivity is discursive 
and performative, 85 that is, it needs a mode of repetition to take place and 
affirm itself in discourse, there is no guarantee that each single act of 
repetition is the same as the one before or the one that follows. (The 
‘utterances’ as Butler says are not fixed movements but indeed they retain a 
degree of stability made such by the reiteration, “iteration is not simply the 
repetition that ‘fixes’ what is performed, but the scene of its difference for 
itself). 86   Derrida expresses an analogous view when he says that signs 
work through repetition and reteirability and always stand for something 
other than themselves (primordial substitution) so, what the sign does is 
merely supply (supplément) for the things it is fails to represent.87 And that 
supplément always depends on context. For this reason the reaction of the 
body in the moment of the encounter with the other is first of all not fixed, 
but depends on context, and secondly, it is not constituted by that 
disavowal, but it is altered by it; “iterability alters, contaminating 
parasitically what it identifies and enables to repeat ‘itself’”88 (and in this I 
read something positive which one ought to welcome and embrace). The 
moment of disavowal and the anxiety generated by it is then a limitation, 
not a productive encouragement in the making of subjectivity, it “limits 
what it makes possible, while rendering its rigour and purity impossible.”89  
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It is precisely on the inclusive essence of possibility that we should focus: 
the theory of ‘being minor’ not only offers legitimation to a marginalised 
minority but it goes far beyond: it gives ‘the minor’, free from ideology,  the 
possibility to become based on the capacity to affect and draw new 
sensibilities. 
 
 
5.3 Different Bodies 
Derrida reminds us that contaminations are more productive than purities 
and that, as I have previously mentioned, one ought to operate “effective or 
active [...] interventions”90 that contaminate and transform the ambiguities 
that surround the monolithic logocentric organisation of knowledge in 
favour of an interest in the margins91. We can note a disparity in the manner 
margins are being envisioned between Derrida and Deleuze. For Deleuze, 
as we have seen in section 5.2, a marginal space owns a centrality that is 
enough to itself and needs not engage in processes of assimilation, but it 
itself assimilates. By contrast, Derrida’s argument is developed on the 
polarised method of pairing opposite systems which establishes the ins and 
outs of any given field, what is acceptable and what unacceptable. Let me 
explain this further: For each definition there is an other produced to cast its 
alterity and reinforce that same/difference dichotomy. This oppositional 
pair system contains the primary term which is “positive or present”92 and 
the second term which is negative and incomplete, “treated as it’s impure, 
lacking, negative double.”93 Derrida’s claim that the Western logos is only 
concentrated to being understood as a presence (ontotheology) of universal 
nature implies the assumption that knowledge is deductive, that is, that 
knowledge has a beginning and an end and traces a trajectory which 
excludes everything that does not fit in that chain of rationality. Against the 
constitution of a polarized binary, Derrida’s understanding of logocentrism 
                                                
90 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (University of Chicago Press 1982) p. xix  
91 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, op. cit. 
92 Elizabeth Grosz, 'Derrida and the Limits of Philosophy' in Thesis Eleven (1986) 14, 26 p.27 
93 Ibid. 
 215 
sits on the belief that logocentrism is based on a misunderstanding between 
signifier and signified, that is, that a sign always represents its 
correspondent signified adequately. Such a polarized view of the world 
automatically positions speech over writing, “the privilege of the phone”,94 
presence over absence, identity over difference. These oppositional pairs are 
for Derrida the product of a hierarchical vision that constitutes identity on 
the basis of the difference between each of the two elements.  
 
“the play of difference, which, as Saussure reminded us, is the 
condition for the possibility and functioning of every sign, is in 
itself a silent play. Inaudible is the difference between two 
phenemes which alone permits them to be and to operate as 
such. The inaudible opens to the apprehension of two present 
phonemes such as they present themselves [...] The difference 
which establishes phonemes and lets them be heard remains in 
and of itself inaudible, in every sense of the word.”95 
 
 
So, the difference between the pairing terms is their identity, which means 
that their identities are terribly dependent on one another, it means that 
difference is sameness. The real différance (not difference) is that which precedes 
the binary pair and escapes the sameness of difference, “it is both their 
condition and surplus, their grounds of possibility, and their unacceptable, 
transgressive rupturing limit. Différance becomes one among a number of 
emblems Derrida develops to explore the transgressive borders or margins 
of conceptual tolerance between philosophy and ecriture.”96 Through the 
concept of différance, Derrida demonstrates that the hierarchical dichotomies 
that dominate logocentrism can be subverted and that their hierarchical 
structure is arbitrary: The primary terms that occupy the privileged position 
within the binary do not retain any logical dominance, for their primacy is 
only historical and therefore political (and therefore removable or, at least, 
inverted). 
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“We will designate as differánce the movement according to 
which language, or any code, any system of reference in general, 
is constituted ‘historically’ as a weave of differences (comme tissue 
de différences).97 
 
Différance is then not a method or a principle, but it is exactly the opposite: 
the lack of the Neo-Platonic notion of an origin and a destination, the non-
principle and the non-method, it is a “casuality” 98, a “process of scission 
and division which produce[s] and constitute[s] different things or 
differences99 and “emblematises the primacy of writing as opposed to 
speech [...]; it heralds the primacy of absence over the presence [...]; and 
primarily of the material over the material over the conceptual [...]. 
Différance is thus the condition of logocentrism, which seeks to deny or 
disavow its subversive play; yet différance at each moment also threatens to 
undermine or exceed logocentrism.”100 
 
The monster in this context is articulated in different terms, through 
différance: The monster is a hybrid, “a composite figure of heterogeneous 
organisms that are grafted onto each other”.101 Its monstrosity is such 
because we do not possess the categories to decode and constitute it (to 
understand it differently) and therefore we fill this deficit by investing in its 
monstrosity. 
 
“As soon as one perceives a monster is a monster, one begins to 
domesticate it, one begins, because of the ‘as such’ - it is a 
monster as monster - to compare it to the norms, to analyze it, 
consequently to master whatever could be terrifying in this 
figure of the monster”. And the movement of accustoming 
oneself, but also of legitimation, and, consequently, of 
normalization has already begun”.102 
 
“Faced with a monster, one may become aware of what the norm 
is and when this norm has a history—which is the case with 
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discursive norms, philosophical norms, socio-cultural norms, 
they have a history—any appearance of monstrosity in this 
domain allows an analysis of the history of the norms. But to do 
that, one must conduct not only a theoretical analysis; one must 
produce what in fact looks like a discursive monster so that the 
analysis will be a practical effect, so that people will be forced to 
become aware of the history of normality. But a monster is not 
just that, it is not just this chimerical figure in some way that 
grafts one animal onto another, one living being onto another.”103 
 
 
What Derrida means is that monstrosity is such only until the moment it 
reveals itself. Once it has been unveiled it also ceases to exist. It is precisely 
now that a new configuration of the monstrous other can take place, a 
configuration that is enabling and that signals the possibility of a radically 
new ethics of responsible identification (not ethics of recognition). “Rather 
than the encounter being the moment of a recuperation of alterity, the 
violent occasion - both in actual practice and symbolically - of inclusion in 
the identity of the selfsame, it is a confrontation with what is both a 
‘constitutive outside’ and an impossible, irreducible excess.” 104 To explain 
this in practical terms: for the encounter between the subject and the other 
to be mutually and equally constitutive, two things are necessary. The first 
is a demand that I (the subject) decentre the focus from my own identity 
towards the realisation that I am not the primary term in this negotiation. 
Secondly, I need to be aware that the monstrosity of the other may appear 
familiar and elude the monstrosity in myself. There is here a Heideggerian 
sense of Aufeinander-hören, of being with others, being with the other. Only 
on the basis of a complete openness towards the other - and not through 
assimilating abjected others to dominat selves, for it is not crucial to know 
the other in order to accept it - can an ethics of responsible identification 
take place. It appears clear then that the non-principle of différance 
explained above (that non-methos that deconstructs difference/sameness) is 
nothing other than an affirmative response to the call of the monster. 
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A monster is always alive, let us not forget. Monsters are living 
beings. The monster is also that which appears for the first time 
and, consequently, is not yet recognized. A monster is a species 
for which we do not yet have a name, which does not mean that 
the species is abnormal, namely, the composition or 
hybridization of already known species. Simply, it shows itself 
[elle se montre] - that is what the word monster means - it shows 
itself in something that is not yet shown and that therefore looks 
like a hallucination, it strikes the eye, it frightens precisely 
because no anticipation had prepared one to identify this figure. 
One cannot say that things of this type happen here or there.”105 
 
“Always alive”, where this always overcomes the polarised dialect of 
knowledge, the ‘metaphysics of presence’, the presumption that the present 
captures the ‘real moment’. In this, Derrida sees a Cartesian attempt to 
make present intuitions valid and discredit everything that is not in the 
realm of the now and which disturbs the a priori unity of meaning. In his 
famous quote “the future is necessarily monstrous: the figure of the future, 
that is, that which can only be surprising, that for which we are not 
prepared, you see, is heralded by species of monsters. A future that would 
not be monstrous would not be a future”.106 Derrida not only opens up to 
the possibility of the monster, but he expressively sees in the monster the 
(only) experience of the possible. The monster is the expression of the 
future. I read here almost a request for pedagogical responsibility towards 
the opportunities of the future/monster. Derrida’s monster is the arrivant, 
literally, “that which or the one who arrives”, but also that who is not 
expected, “surprises the host”107. Our instinct of domestication, of colonising 
the arrivant, soon leaves space to the realisation that its monstrosity does 
not lie in its difference but in its diffèrance, that is, its force to fundamentally 
alter the topos and to make us part of this change.  The presence of the 
arrivant alone is able to complicate the dialectical opposition and make 
possible the existence of an irreducible singular self while preserving the 
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singularity of the other (and so displacing the One). The mere presence of 
the arrivant is a guarantee of the survival of the other and, at the same time, 
the celebration as well as the deconstruction (or destruction) of the One. 
“As soon as there is the One, there is murder, wounding, trauma-tism. 
“L’Un se garde de l’autre” 108 where, in that guard one keeps some of the 
other within the self and yet, while accepting the other, always holds on to 
oneself. Shildrick’s notion of vulnerability, then, does not (only) belong to 
the monstrous corporality of the other, but it is part and parcel of being 
human, the monster is in all of us.  
 
Derrida’s limitation in the above account lies in the way in which he 
envisions the confrontation with the other: the moment of supplement we 
have seen in section 5.2. This encounter can go either way because the 
subject is not directly responsible for itself, but always depends on the 
representational sign which may or may not deliver the desired meaning 
(reaction). And as we have just seen, Derrida’s disposition towards the 
monster, although open, reflects that element of uncertainty generated by 
the condition of the possible in which he places the monster. The possible, 
as we have seen in chapter 1, is not virtual (real) but only possible. This 
means that its existence is a non-existence, it cannot be accounted for. 
Derrida himself specifies that the monster is the expression of the future. In 
other words: it stands for something other than itself in a temporality that is 
possibility and therefore outside of the virtuality of the now.  
 
Following a Deleuzian logic, one can conclude that Derrida’s encounter 
with the arrivant is not an encounter after all, for it is mediated and pre-
representational and therefore eludes “free or untamed states of difference 
in itself …this element is intensity, understood as pure difference in itself, 
as that which is at once both imperceptible for empirical sensibility which 
grasps intensity only already covered or mediated by the quality to which it 
gives rise, and at the same time that which can be perceived only from the 
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point of view of a transcendental sensibility which apprehends it 
immediately in the encounter”.109 As we have seen earlier, with Deleuze, 
the marginality (or minority) of the monster is both constitutional in that 
fact that it roots in the subject and sufficient to itself, that is, it is the essence 
that enables the subject to create new sensibility. Moreover, because it does 
not rely on representation or mediation, which means it operates in a mode 
of difference, it never faces the moment of fear (the disavowal) that is 
shared by the accounts of the othered body presented in this chapter. It is a 
spatial monster in an affirmative field of marginality that occupies and is 
occupied by space imperceptibly.  
 
 
5.4 Perverse Bodies 
Frankenstein can be seen as a queer subjectivity, as the deconstruction of the 
body and the construction of the monster, “an uncanny anticipation of 
transsexual surgery”.110  In Gyn/Ecology,111 Mary Daly writes: “Today the 
Frankenstein phenomenon is omnipresent not only in religious myth, but in 
its offspring, phallocratic technology. The insane desire for power, the 
madness of boundary violation, is the mark of necrophiliacs who sense the 
lack of soul/spirit/life-loving principle with themselves and therefore try 
to invade and kill off all spirit, substituting conglomerates of corpses. This 
necrophilic invasion/elimination takes a variety of forms. Transsexualism is 
an example of male surgical siring which invades the female world with 
substitutes”112, to which Janice Raymond adds that “the problem of 
transsexuality would best be served by morally mandating it out of 
existence”113. This statement echoes Victor Frankenstein’s feelings towards 
the monster when he says: “Begone, vile insect, or rather, stay, that I may 
trample you to dust. You reproach me with your creation”.114 As Judith 
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Halberstam explains in her study of the gothic horror, the literary monster 
of the romantic tradition is “a by-product of embodiment rather than a trick 
played upon the body by the mind... the story of a conflict between 
Frankenstein and his monster, and author and his creation”115. 
Frankestein’s monster is then his own double, that other that embodies all 
that he cannot accept in himself, “my own vampire, my own spirit set loose 
from the grave”.116  
 
Frankenstein is a monster, the failure of that mediation of the progressive 
culture of the Enlightenment and the contemporary moral , a non-subject 
who claims his right to be and his position as a viable subject through 
mastering the ars oratoria through which he could verbally enact that 
subjectivity that was denied to his body. Similarly, the transsexual monster 
is caught up in a constant mediation between in and out, stigmatisation and 
fear, appearances and authenticity. Its monstrosity is not the effect of a 
cause but it is the perpetual condition of its being, the primary and 
irreducible element through which its existence is negotiated day after day. 
Like Frankenstein’s, transsexual monstrosity is one that manifests itself 
through the body and makes itself visible to everyone. It is not ethereal but 
tangible and real, and  “not only gives form to the dialectic of monstrosity 
itself and raises questions about the pleasures and dangers of textual 
production, it also demands rethinking of [it] in terms of who rather than 
what is the object of terror”.117 Yet, in its being real and manifest, it expands 
and stretches out the limits of its corporeality reaching everyone else 
indistinctly, those who are willing to engage with it as well as those who 
decide to neglect its presence. “By focusing upon the body as the locus of 
fear, Shelley’s novel” - as well as the body of the transsexual -  “suggests 
that it is people (or at least bodies) who terrify people, not ghosts or gods, 
devils or monks, windswept castles or labyrinthine monasteries. The 
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architecture of fear in this story is replaces by physiognomy, the landscape 
of fear is replaced by sutured skin.118 
 
The monstrosity of the transgender is not produced by the failure of science 
experiments as it happens for Frankenstein, but it is nonetheless connected 
to another kind of failure, the combined intervention of the law and clinical 
technologies: hormonal therapy and sex reassignment surgery, both 
legitimate techniques, promise the resolution - if only partial - of that 
original inner condition of unalignement. This is however a broken 
promise, as that initial sense of monstrosity is only transformed (never 
resolved) into a new and more articulated monstrosity which is not 
exclusively the fantasy of a perfectly crafted body, but it is, above all, the 
inability to socially and culturally account for that diversity that it being 
produced and released into a world. The transsexual remains something 
other, and its monstrosity is a life trait which can be made more or less 
acceptable, it can be embraced or fought against, but it will nonetheless 
remain an irreducible element, a focal point of their existence. “Though 
medical techniques for sex reassignment are capable of crafting bodies that 
satisfy the visual and morphological criteria that generate naturalness as 
their effect, engaging with those very techniques produces a subjective 
experience that belies the naturalistic effect biomedical technology can 
achieve - says Stryker - Transsexual embodiment, like the embodiment of 
the monster, places its subject in an unassimilable, antagonistic, queer 
relationship to a Nature in which it must nevertheless exist”.119  
 
The monstrosity of Frankenstein is presented as a perversion, it 
“delineate[s] an image without resemblance”.120 By the same logic, the 
otherness of transgender is a disturbance. Deleuze claims that “Lacan and 
                                                
118 Ibid. p. 28-29 
119 Susan Stryker, 'My words to Victor Frankenstein Above the Village of Chamounix: 
Performing Transgender Rage' in GLQ (Duke University Press 1994) 1(3) p.5 
120 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, op. cit. p. 357 
 223 
his school”,121 namely psychoanalysis, are to be held responsible for the 
association of perversion with disturbance. They “insist profoundly on the 
necessity of understanding perverse behaviour on the basis of a structure, 
and of defining this structure which condition behaviour”. Lacan’s notion 
of desire derives from lack, it is “the relation of being to lack. The lack is the 
lack of being properly speaking. It is not the lack of this or that, but lack of 
being whereby the being exists.”122  But for Deleuze and Guattari “desire 
does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that 
is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed 
subject unless there is repression.”123 So, decentering the object of desire 
from the subject only results in the subject losing force. Instead, what they 
are doing is displacing lack from the object to the subject.124 It is the subject 
that lacks, not desire.  “For me – continues Deleuze - desire implies no lack; 
neither is it a natural given. It is an agancement [arrangement, organization’ 
of heterogeneous elements that function; it is process as opposed to 
structure of genesis; it is affect as opposed to sentiment, it is haec-eity (the 
individuality of a day, a season, a life) as opposed to subjectivity; it is an 
event as opposed to a thing or a person”.125 So, for Deleuze the pervert is 
not someone who desires the wrong way, but is somebody who uses desire 
as a process and not as a structure. It is a ‘transgressor’, in the Foucualtian 
sense:126 somebody who goes beyond the limits of what is constituted,127 
“not defined by the force of a certain desire in the system of drives”, says 
Deleuze, but “somebody who desires, [and] introduces desire into an 
entirely different system and makes it play, within this system the role of an 
internal limit, a virtual center or zero point (the well known Sadean 
                                                
121 Ibid. p. 358 
122 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II: The Ego in the Freud’s Theory and in the 
Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955  (CUP Archive 1988) p. 233 
123 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, op. cit. p. 26 
124 Tim Dean, Beyond Sexuality (University of Chicago Press 2000) p. 247 
125 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Desire and Pleasure’ in Arnold I. Davidson, ed. Foucault and his 
Interlocutors (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1997) p.189 
126 Michel Foucault ‘A Preface to Transgression’ in Donald F/ Bouchard, ed. Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 1977) 
127 Edward Kazarian, Deleuze, ‘Perversion and Politics’, in International Studies in Philosophy 
30 (1):91-106 1998 p. 97 
 224 
apathy).128 Could the perversion that is associated to transgender be, as 
Deleuze suggests, a question of non-activated desire? And could it be that 
their transgression of the limits of what is acceptable requires forms of 
regulation and containment, namely, the narrative of the wrong body 
(which we will see in the next section), or fabricated threats of perversion 
that neither the law or medicine can fully account for. 
 
There is another aspect of the Frankenstein-transsexual parallel which 
demands attention: it is the notion of the body as an inscriptive surface and 
the ways in which body image or bodily representations come into play in 
the construction of the sense of self. Elizabeth Grosz (through Deleuze) 
understands the body as a three-dimensional site of interconnections 
between mind and contingency (culture). No longer the dualism of 
mind/body and inner/outer, the inscriptive surface of the body becomes an 
intersection in 3D between the body and the mind, the inner and the outer. 
“The body is thus not an organic totality which is capable of the wholesale 
expression of subjectivity, a welling up of the subject’s emotions, attitudes, 
beliefs, or experiences, but is itself an assemblage of organs, processes, 
pleasures, passions, activities, behaviors linked by fine lines and 
unpredictable networks to other elements, segments, and assemblages”.129 
So bodies are immersed in history and power, and the experience of the 
skin (the body’s contours) is absorbed by the flesh and constitutes 
subjectivity. “There is nothing natural or ahistorical about these modes of 
corporeal inscription.  Through them, bodies are made amenable to the 
prevailing exigencies of power”.130 
 
Susan Stryker, who is a trans-woman, writes:  
 
“These are my words to Victor Frankenstein, above the village of 
Chamounix. Like the monster, I could speak of my earliest 
memories, and how I became aware of my difference from 
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everyone around me. I can describe how I acquired a monstrous 
identity by taking on the label "transsexual" to name parts of 
myself that I could not otherwise explain. ... I live daily with the 
consequences of medicine's definition of my identity as an 
emotional disorder. Through the filter of this official 
pathologization, the sounds that come out of my mouth can be 
summarily dismissed as the confused ranting of a diseased mind. 
Like the monster, the longer I live in these conditions, the more 
rage I harbor. Rage colors me as it presses in through the pores of 
my skin, soaking in until it becomes the blood that courses 
through my beating heart. It is a rage bred by the necessity of 
existing in external circumstances that work against my survival. 
But there is yet another rage within.” 131 
 
The engagement and identification with the monster is not only symbolic 
but becomes corporeal. The experience expressed - the rage that presses 
through the pores of the skin, the sense of emotional disorder, the 
pathologisation - are forever inscribed on the skin and are constitutive of 
that subjectivity.  The corporeality of the transsexual, the dissonance of the 
body image, the identification with monstrous representations or indeed 
the physical enactment of a certain monstrosity are inscriptions which not 
only affect the mind, but they alter the configuration of the body, “they help 
constitute the very biological organization of the subject—the subject’s 
height, weight, coloring, even eye color, are constituted as such by a 
constitutive interweaving of genetic and environmental factors”.132 
According to Grosz, then, there is not such a thing as a natural norm, but  
“only cultural forms of body, which do or do not conform to social 
norms”133, so every individual is engaged with modes of identification and 
self-production which pass through the direct experience of the flesh. 
 
But how does this experience of self-production and identification work? 
Rosi Braidotti argues that “social and cultural norms or normative models 
are external attractors, stimulants” and “they act like magnets that draw the 
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self heavily in certain directions and stimulate the person accordingly”.134 
This would suggest a Foucaultian reading of the body as an object at the 
mercy of power techniques - regimes, to use a Foucaultian term- which 
determine its advancement and heavily influence its force. That is, as a 
body whose materiality is only a canvas upon which power operates to 
mould and imprint knowledge.  However, both Grosz and Braidotti cut 
through this sense of Foucaultian inevitability and, through the work of 
Deleuze & Guattari and Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, recognise full 
autonomy to the body. 
 
The (non)affirmation of the truth in Foucault is tied to the notion of 
knowledge which is always something fabricated by culture and therefore 
is never true knowledge but  merely an instrument through which power 
reaches out and extends its supervision. Every form of knowledge is 
formed by a multiplicity of interconnected relations and passes through a 
network of power, discourses and technologies (apparatus) which functions 
as a mode of government thus compromising its fulfilment. 
 
By power, I do not mean “Power” as a group of institutions and 
mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a 
given state... I do not have in mind a general system of 
domination exerted by one group over another... Power must be 
understood ...as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in 
the sphere in which the operate and which constitute their own 
organization: a the process which, through ceaseless struggles 
and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses 
them,...thus forming a chain or system, or on the contrary, the 
disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one 
another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, 
whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied 
in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the 
various social hegemonies.135 
 
In this framework painted by Foucault, the body is immersed in history 
because created by the same agents that determine knowledge, but it is a 
                                                
134 Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Toward a Materialist Theory of Becoming (John Wiley & Sons 
2002) p. 40 
135 Michel Foucaul, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 (Penguin Books 1978) p.92 
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“body [that] is molded by great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by 
the rhythms of work... it is poisoned by food or values...Nothing in man - 
not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as a  basis of self-reflection 
or for understanding other men”.136 Moulded, and broken down, Foucault’s 
body is the object of power and it passively follows the pre-constituted 
agenda imposed by discourse.  
 
For Nietzsche, on the contrary, the body from ‘molded and broken down’ 
rises and actively participates to the production of power. In ‘Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra’ Nietzsche writes:  
 
“Body am I, and soul”—thus speaks the child. And why should 
one not speak like children? But the awakened and knowing say: 
body am I entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a word for 
something about the body. 
The body is a great reason, a plurality with one sense, a war and 
a peace, a herd and a shepherd. 
An instrument of your body is also your little reason, my 
brother, which you call “spirit”--a little instrument and toy of 
your great reason. 
 
Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a 
mighty ruler, an unknown sage—whose name is self. In your 
body he dwells; he is your body. 
There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom. 
And who knows why your body needs precisely your best 
wisdom?137 
 
 
The body for Nietzsche is then not the external layer designated to protect a 
sovereign interiority, but rather, an organism which plays actively a role in 
the construction of subjectivity.  In sharing Spinoza’s skepticism towards 
the dualistic structure of the western logos, Nietzsche sees the body as a 
complex multi-faceted organism dominated by forces that determine its 
growth and affirmation through the relation of those constitutive forces 
with others. An organism governed by contradictions of political and social 
                                                
110 Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, Ed. 
Donald Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell Universty Press 1977) p. 153 
137 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit. p. 1 
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forces that are produced by the body itself and with which the body is also 
in conflict. Such forces are active and their interconnection determines the 
power to stimulate expansion and movement. The difference in which the 
terms force and power are employed is absolute.  The ‘will to power’ is then 
for Nietzsche that drive which keeps that movement going. Nietzsche does 
not deny the interconnection between mind and the body and notes how 
certain movements of the body may seem responses to the demands of the 
mind, but, in his view, what looks like the interior acting upon the exterior 
is in fact only the demonstration of the power of the body as a unity, and 
ultimately its strength over the psyche.  
 
Like Spinoza, Nietzsche does not see a beginning and an end to the capacity 
of what the body can reach, nor does his philosophy allow for a pre-set 
ideal of ‘being natural’. Different people, different motivations, different 
forces determine different outcomes and each produce a different way of 
being. This capacity cannot be known in advance but the chaos of reacting 
forces it produces is the condition for consciousness. For Nietzsche 
consciousness is a convention, “on one hand useful for life, a convenient 
fiction, and on the other an effect of the inwardly inflected, thwarted will to 
power or force that, instead of subduing other bodies and other forces, has 
sought to subdue itself.”138  
 
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn 
inward - this is what I call the internalization of man: thus it was 
that man first developed what was later called his ‘soul”. The 
entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched 
between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, 
acquired depth, breadth and height, in the same measure as 
outward discharge was inhibited.139 
 
 
So consciousness (psyche) is the product of the interaction of the forces of 
the body and seeking to find it looking inward is illusory because the psyche 
                                                
138 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, op. cit. p.124 
139 Friedrich W. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals II (Oxford Paperbacks 2008) p. 520 
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is a category of the body.140 It is the inscription of those forces onto the 
surface of the body that constitutes subjectivity. And the ways in which 
these forces act upon the body are not imposed by society and accepted 
passively by the individual, but they are the result of an active choice that is 
made at the level of consciousness. “They are commonly undertaken 
voluntarily and usually require active compliance of the subject”141. Such 
choices for Grosz are not ideological and cannot be deemed natural or 
unnatural, for they are all cultural choices that may or may not conform to a 
given normativity.  
 
The Freudian unconscious, as we are used to understanding it, is that 
invisible motion of actions that, although often in contradiction, defines and 
indicates the true core identity of the subject and keeps it together. 
Following the anti-Freudian theories of Deleuze and Guattari in relation to 
the unconscious, Braidotti argues that those contradictions and 
idiosyncrasies which constitute the unconscious are not only furtive 
movements and random connections, but they are constituent elements of 
subjectivity itself.142 If, as Grosz notes, norms are culturally constructed and 
the subject cannot oppose to them but can only identify and reproduce (or 
refuse to), then Braidotti’s analysis sees the unconscious’ contradictions and 
irregularities as a chance against the unity of the subject, for unconscious 
has the possibility to always change and always redefine the subject. “By 
opening up intervals...these in-between spaces, these spatial and temporal 
points of transition, are crucial to the construction of the subject and yet can 
hardly be rendered in thought and representation...The intervals, or in-
between points and processes, are facilitators and, as such, they pass 
unnoticed, though they mark the crucial moments in the whole process of 
becoming a subject”.143 It is precisely in the irregular motion of the 
unconscious that Braidotti sees a possibility to elude the ‘appeal’ of social 
                                                
140 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, op. cit. p.124 
141 Ibid. p.143 
142 Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Toward a Materialist Theory of Becomin, op. cit. p. 39 
143 Ibid. p. 40 
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roles and recede that process of identification - to dis-identify - of the 
subject. This space, a space of resistance to social roles and norms, is the 
space for affirmative kinds of subjectivities, forces, dissonance and power 
(as in potentia not potestas), a space of flows and desires. The internalised 
fear and anxiety (here I want to be clear on the fact that anxiety doesn’t 
equal vulnerability which I see as a human trait more than specifically a  
condition of being monstrous) of being the monster - and indeed by all 
resistant identities - which is internalised by the othered subject and 
inscribed on its subjectivity is not something that the subject must accept 
tout court, for the dissonance of the non-unitary subject is the very 
condition, that reactive force, for breaking through regulatory essentialism.  
 
 
 
5.5 Nomadic Bodies 
The Cartesian distribution of elements of Being delivered in fixed categories 
and boxed each in their own compartment is a method to which Deleuze 
opposes since his very early essay Nomadic Thought. 144 Deleuze sees in 
Nietzsche the negation of dialectical negotiations and binary oppositions, 
the force of movement and the affirmation of becoming over being.  
Nietzsche’s will to power is an active force which resists and acts against 
the sedentary moral of codification (law) enabling the subject with vitality 
and movement. He finds “a completely other distribution, which must be 
called nomadic, a nomad nomos, without property, enclosure or 
measure”.145 The nomad thinks through a state of being that resists the 
hierarchical centralisation of logos, his subjectivity is smooth not striated, its 
action is close-range, not long-distance, his mode is tactile, not optical. It is a 
kind of subjectivity which becomes such in the very moment while it is 
happening, in a constant movement of waves and flows, but never defined 
                                                
144 Gilles Deleuze, 'Nomad Thought' in The New Nietzsche, trans. D. Allison 1973 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977) p.142–149; see also Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, op. cit. p.351–423. 
145 Deleuze, Differenze & Repetition, op. cit p.36 
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by those waves and flows. Nomads have “no points, paths, or land”146, their 
location “is always between two points, but the in-between has taken on all 
the consistency and enjoys both an autonomy and a direction of its own. 
The life of the nomad is the intermezzo:147 With no designated geographies, 
the nomad, unlike a migrant, is never deterritorialized because he lives in 
space but apart from its organic organisation (State-apparatus), so he 
always maintains a state of constant deterritorialization and his existence is 
one of resistance. From the perspective of the State, the nomadic being is 
destructive and violent as it collides with its segmented and hierarchical 
structure. Similarly, the nomadic subject resists the law, or even, the 
apparatus constituted by law, seen as an organism that seeks to ‘confine’ 
life. So, the smooth space of the nomad is a space of vibrations, flows, 
constant variations and, in order to create life, the nomadic subjectivity 
must remain faithful to this mode of becoming, to this immanence, the only 
possible life. 
 
Monsters, excluded from the systems that produce them, keep reason and 
anxious liberalism on their guard, policing their boundaries and defining 
themselves within the limits of self-created monstrosity because “it is not 
the slumber of reason that engenders monsters, but vigilant and insomniac 
rationality”.148 Frankenstein remains a monster, retaining the monstrous 
capacity to undermine and interrogate the inherent instabilities and 
dangerously necessary differences that sustain all forms of authority.149  
However, the monster that attempts to enter norms and to adopt measures 
that make its monstrosity less monstrous (in the example of the transsexual, 
for example, this would be an advanced degree of interventions on the 
body and the adoption of a series of enactments so to make the new 
representation as accurate as possible), it would no longer be considered an 
anomaly, but rather, its diversity would be read in terms of mere biological 
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error and therefore unloaded of the moral aggravation which determines 
perversity. For this reason, the condition of being monster is such only 
when there is no intention of entering a process of naturalisation which 
may purify the individual of its perceived monstrosity. The transsexual 
who ‘passes’ well and enacts the opposite gender credibly is less of a 
monster than the one who refuses to ‘pass’ or maintains elements of both 
genders. 
 
Braidotti’s nomadic ethics work towards promoting a radical 
transformation, a shift from the focus of dialectical ethics of negation to 
ethics of affirmation and difference.150 The nomadic ethics, for Braidotti, are 
sustainable and propose real political change151 because they rely on 
resistance - endurance - as a way of “double learning to last in time, but also 
to put up and live with pain and suffering”.152 
“This implies a differential type of ethics, which clashes with 
dominant morality but contains criteria for the section of the 
ethical relation and a regard for the limits. These need to be set 
by experimentation with the collectively shared intensities of 
community that longs for the activation of affirmative forces and 
hence require careful negotiations”.153 
Is it fair to ask monsters, or indeed any marginal individuals, to undergo 
such a level of struggle? Is any negotiation of the monster to be considered 
a compromise? Can monsters who seek to undergo a process of 
humanization be thought of as individuals who give up and bend to the 
extortions of powers? Or even, is the aim of monsters to be un-monstrous? 
Beyond the essentialism of being, the moralistic ethics of acceptance and the 
prerequisites for recognition, like the nomad, the monster’s geographies 
take place at the margins of society, its embodiment is precarious, volatile. 
It does not participate in organisms of power or, when it does, it always sits 
on the side of the repressed, of the objected individuals. Unlike Deleuze’s 
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nomad, however, the monster never becomes animal, it never finds that 
strength it takes to transform into a beast. Nor does he remain human, but it 
keeps roaming in the ‘in-betweens’, what Deleuze calls the “zones of 
indiscernibility or undecidability”.  
Braidotti ensures that “a micropolitics of resistance can be seen as a web of 
emancipatory practices. Localized and concrete ethical gestures and 
political activities matter more than grand overarching projects. In this 
respect, nomadic theory is a form of ethical pragmatism”.154 While I agree 
that pragmatism is important and any such change can only happen 
beyond theory and at the level of the individual, in the microcosm of 
everyday life and well distanced from those organisms and spaces 
designated to formally or institutionally produce it, I also believe that 
Braidotti’s nomadic ethics rely too much on a too essential nomadism 
which cannot find full correspondence in the life or real people who, day 
after day, find themselves in the condition of otherness. Marginalised, 
disengaged from discourse, exploited by industries of consumption that 
turn the other into sameness.  
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The Diary Sessions, III 
On Wrong Bodies 
 
 
 
 
 
“[‘Women trapped inside men’s bodies’] was so clearly 
 coined not to encapsulate all of the intricacies  
and nuances of the trans female experience,  
but rather as a way of dumbing down our experiences  
into a sound bite that cissexuals  
might be better able to comprehend.”1 
  
 
 
 
 
Of the three diary intersections that have accompanied and supported my 
theory throughout this PhD, the present one proven to be the most difficult 
to think through and compose. The difficulties are linked to impossibility to  
pin down on paper the different nuances expressed in these diary 
fragments.  The ways in which the transgender body is normally presented 
by everyday socio-political discourse, always in terms of dissonance against 
a general common idea of so-called normality presents countless problems 
for transgender subjectivities, and to conceptualise it differently creating 
room for another perspective to emerge is a challenge – a mission at times – 
in the accounts that follows. It is precisely this ideal of normality – and with 
it the impossibility to fulfil its requirements, the pressure, the anxiety, the 
legal and medical hegemony – that, in many ways, have inspired this 
research. I have explored earlier in this thesis the legal constructs through 
which transgender is understood and regulated. The Gender Recognition 
Act 2004, I have concluded, is unable to account for the ever-changing 
subjectivities which many trans-identified individuals embody every day. 
Their lives, identified beyond the binary, already find new ways of self-
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identification and fill the absence of a space of their own with new forms of 
embodiment and identity, thus proving to be already materialised utopias 
happening here and now, different subjectivities that have broken the 
mould of the gender binary.  
 
Charles (FtM): “Resisting the gender binary and resisting the sex 
binary I think is politically important but for me it’s really important to 
internalise it because I really am not male or female, I’m not feminine or 
masculine, and that [as much as it is political] is not always a choice, 
it’s just who I am.”2 
 
That notion of gender stability and the lack of compromise signal, as I have 
already highlighted in chapter 3 (and the empirical contributions have 
confirmed), a paradox in the way in which the law requires a ‘real life test’ 
to declare transgender individuals fit for recognition. At the same time, that 
same law is not able to put those same individuals in the conditions to carry 
out that test safely. The gender policing in public toilets proves exactly that 
transgender people are not fit for those spaces. Their bodies are not normal. 
And it is not a coincidence that the ultimate purpose of the GRA, as it 
appears, is not to recognise transgender people for what they are - 
transgender people - but it exists to make transgender people normal. By 
this I mean, to ensure that they conform to what is recognised as normal: 
female or male.  
 
Jamie (FtM): “If I want to live a normal life in this society it kind of 
forced us to go one way or the other… It’s a personal choice for us to 
transition, but it’s not a personal choice for us to be transgender 
because whether you transition of not, you [can] still be transgender, 
but our culture doesn’t recognise that.”3 
 
It should be also clarified that just like some transgender individuals find 
themselves perfectly fit for the GRA model, they may also understand their 
own life experience as transgender subjects through the narrative of 
‘trapped in the wrong bodies’, but it is also important to understand that 
                                                
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_JCfTzbXPo 
3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQZyUIAlEo0 
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this narrative is not for everyone, nor, however, is the metaphor of the 
‘wrong body’ just that, a metaphor, rather, it is a persuasive strategy 
employed to ‘correct’ the image of a disturbing body,4 looked at through 
the lens of heteronormativity and used to normalise something that uses a 
language radically different to define itself and which, in order to control is 
“materialized as somatic feeling”5 and transformed the into something that 
heteronormative discourse understands. Not surprisingly, then, the ‘wrong 
body’ stands on the assumption that every trans person experiences 
dysphoria because they feel they were born or trapped in the wrong body, 
and that transition, and therefore embracing and enacting gender, is a 
journey towards freedom, towards the right body. 
 
Jamie (FtM):“I’m a transgender and I was not born in the wrong body. 
I was born in the wrong culture. When I tell people they look at me like 
I’ve said some inherently contradictory statement…That line, ‘born in 
the wrong body’… it’s become a definition for transgender, it’s become 
one quick line that people can cling onto very quickly [when they think 
of transgenders]. I think that a lot of trans guys, or of trans people in 
general say it without even thinking about what it means. There are 
some issues with it: for one, there’s people like me who don’t believe it. 
Second of all, there’s people who choose to physically transition, not to 
medically transition and so… what does it say about them, they’re not 
trans because they decided they’d rather stay in the ‘wrong body’? ... 
We [need to] stop presuming that everyone feels this way.”6 
 
Charleston (FtM): “A lot of people use the expression …‘born in the 
wrong body’ when explaining what it is like to be trans. I’ve heard both 
cispeople and trans people use this term…I’m not saying that people 
shouldn’t use that term if that’s how they feel. Personally, I have 
problems using it for myself ‘cause I feel uncomfortable…It makes 
[trans] like it’s some tragic accident. I don’t think that’s true.”7 
 
We have seen how this is certainly the direction in which the GRA with the 
complicity of the medical industry pushes, but it is also the way in which 
the media articulate and present transgender.  This is an expression of what 
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Foucault would refer to as the ‘docile body’, a site disciplined by power, 
“one that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved, and that this 
docile body can only be achieved through strict regiment of disciplinary 
acts”8. In Foucaultian terms, the political field that constructs and mediates 
the transgender body disciplines the individuals who define beyond the 
heteronormative, accepted, disciplined binary male/female through that 
web of power that, in this case, is constituted by the GRA 2004 and the 
clinical industry. The right body must fit in that bracket female-
feminine/male-masculine. The wrong body is everything that sits beyond, 
besides, above or below that scheme, and wrong bodies must be made 
right. Genital surgery then becomes a necessity to align that body so 
dramatically wrong. “A tactile politics of reproduction constituted through 
textual violence. The clinic is a technology of inscription”9. An inscription of 
gender normativity for the “desired treatment” to match the “desired 
gender” and produce the “desired body”. By doing so, trans finds itself in 
the paradoxical position of keeping the clinical/legal discourse going. To 
break out of it is equally troubling.  Erin, MtF, expresses the discomfort 
which stems from that mismatch between what she feels to be – “my queer 
self, my transgender body”10 - and what is demanded of her: to conform to the 
gender she has chosen. I don’t really want to look at ciswomen as an example of 
what I should be, I feel like that isn’t so productive for me because I don’t want to 
change myself to blend in.”11  
 
Erin (FtM): “The idea of transgender people using cisgender people as 
an example or as a goal of what they want to reach or to look exactly like 
them…You know, I just wanted to be born a woman, I wanted to be 
born a ciswoman… for a long time I didn’t even want to transition 
because I was ‘there’s no way I can reach that goal, I’m born in the 
wrong body’… Now I want to spend more time embracing my queer 
self, my transgender body and embracing that I think is a lot more 
healthy for me. So [now] I don’t really want to look at ciswomen as an 
example of what I should be, I feel like that isn’t so productive for me 
                                                
8 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, op. cit. p. 136 
9 Stone, The Empire Strikes Back, op. cit. p. 164 
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because I don’t want to change myself to blend in with ciswomen…I 
would rather they changed to accept my transgender existence… I don’t 
want to work so hard stressing over whether I’m blending in. I want to 
make people uncomfortable, I want that to change. I want people to 
actually feel uncomfortable trying to pass and I don’t think that 
transgender people should feel uncomfortable anymore… I think that 
things just need to change, I don’t want to be looking to ciswomen as 
what I should be, this unreacheable thing… I want to be empowered by 
my own body and my own self.”12 
 
 
The pressure to conform, however, is strong. The political agenda to 
eradicate diversity leads some to feel that there is no other possible way. 
“The medicalized and pathologized notion of transsexuals - says Cooper - 
pre-supposes that one must be very uncomfortable with one’s body in 
order to seek out sex reassignment surgery so that one is in fact ‘rewarded’ 
for their psychological pain and discomfort. Many transsexuals fear that if 
they do not register the appropriate amount of discomfort with their bodies 
they will not be approved for surgery.” 13 This is something that emerged 
clearly earlier in the context of the GRA, where it was suggested that the 
prime requirement of gender stability made potential applicants feel that 
they needed to overdo themselves in order to prove the authenticity of their 
embodiment. Adrian (FtM), as we have seen, was concerned that not liking 
football or not necessarily disliking the colour pink was not going to make 
him enough of a male. Adrian’s anxiety that he might be judged unfit to be 
what he feels himself to be - that he might be a wrong body - is something 
that many transgender individuals experience daily in their lives.  
 
Charles: “I have never identified with women and I’ve never identified 
with males. You know I can identify with females in the some ways and 
I can identify with males in other ways, and I can identify with some 
trans people but not as much with other trans people… Having some 
changes in my genitalia has been really great because I definitely had so 
much discomfort with my genitalia. But on the other hand I’m like not 
really fixated on having clitoral growth or calling it a dick. I like the 
changes but I see it as something that’s just mine. What is it supposed 
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to be? I feel more confortable with it.”14 
 
“I had this situation where I went to the movies and these two women 
turned around: ‘Are you a boy or a girl? Because if you’re a boy, you’re 
the most beautiful boy’, which was a kind of weird question because … I 
honestly didn’t really know how to answer that question. That question 
is so problematic in so many ways because the gender binary is totally 
made up. Some trans people would immediately be ‘I’m a male’… but I 
actually can’t even answer that question for myself.”15 
 
 
This is a significant point and arguably the biggest challenge when it comes 
to transgender bodies: to find a space for individuals that do not settle in 
those parameters that the legal and medical professions have set up for 
their identities. As Charles notes: some trans people will promptly define 
themselves in one way or the other, others cannot do so. For these marginal 
bodies life can be extremely challenging.  
 
Charles (FtM):“A lot of people when they realise they are trans they 
feel an incredible amount of pressure to become hyper masculine - I’m 
talking about trans guys here – and to start pursuing all the steps 
necessary to become and embody complete male sex. While it is totally 
fine for some people , it is totally not fine for other people, and all those 
choices are totally ok, but it’s really hard because there’s a lack of 
vocabulary out there.”16 
 
While – as the accounts below suggest - the narrative of the wrong body 
proves inapplicable for many subjectivities who indeed feel in the right 
body, but in the wrong society, it is nevertheless important to say that 
politically- tailored terminology such as ‘trapped in the wrong body’, or 
‘queer’, or ‘transgender’ is very much subject to constant change due to the 
need to always be inclusive of new subjectivities and, for this reason, it 
lends itself to misinterpretation: it may hold significance to some, but other 
do not feel comfortable to be represented by such loose terms because, they 
feel, this makes their own particular experience invisible. Likewise, the 
sensation of being ‘born in the wrong body’ may not be only a case of 
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political simplification, but a real state in which they find themselves. This, 
usually, does not depend on whether or not the individual is a binary 
identified woman or man, for some binary identified trans people do not 
feel rightfully represented by it, but has to do more with the specificity of 
that experience, the way in which the body is mediated and what it needs 
to give up or acquire to be recognised, and this is a unique experience in 
every human being, only more emphasised in trans subjects due to their 
inherently difference – at various degrees - of living gender. This is the 
reason why the specificity of each individual is fundamental when dealing 
with transgender: each experience needs equal validation for what it is and 
any attempt to encapsulate such a multi-faceted and fluid identity in a 
binarised scheme will not be helpful in understanding the challenges these 
subjectivities present. 
 
In a context where - as Charles expressed earlier - rules are made by 
“straight white dudes”17, the narrative of the ‘wrong body’ is just another 
way for heteronormativity to colonise a space and a body that resist its 
conventions. “Our queer lives – Charles continues - are acts of resistance, we 
are resisting what our society has told us about sex, romance, gender”.18 The 
privileged standpoint from which certain bodies are deemed ‘wrong’. The 
existence of media propaganda against transgender people is something felt 
amongst transgender communities. The video diaries in the previous 
section suggested that some trans people feel that public spaces are 
governed by so much prejudice because of general ignorance about 
transgender and also because of fear tactics perpetuated by the media that 
systematically portray transgender people negatively. The narrative of the 
‘wrong body’, too, is part of the commonality of contextualising 
transgender issues against a magna idea of normality retained by non-trans: 
by associating trans with negative terms such as ‘wrong’, “trapped” the 
message conveyed is that non-trans is ‘right’ and free from the negativity, 
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the anguish, the torment, the pain, the mistakes, the problems trans people 
appears to have.  
 
Sally Hines’ compelling research on transgender identity suggests that the 
existence of female and male attributes within the same physicality would 
be significant for those who identify beyond the binary and would certainly 
allow for a completely different story to unfold19.  Keeping these 
considerations in mind, it is useful in this section to concentrate on what it 
means, then, to identify differently. What are the challenges of a differently 
ordered subjectivity and what is the other story that we are not allowed to 
tell?  
 
Charles: “As I change into a man more and more, I feel more in my 
body. There is no question for me, no doubt whether going on T 
(Testosterone) and having surgery and transitioning was the right 
thing to do… I feel so in myself, it’s great! …[but] I start to realise that 
I don’t identify as male…If I was to describe my sex based on male or 
female, then I’m more male than female, but I actually don’t even see it 
as a linear thing anymore… I always used to say Female towards Male, 
but I don’t think anymore that I have to find where I am in that 
spectrum. I just need to feel more comfortable. I feel less inclination to 
have to succinctly define who I am. I think that I am just a transperson. 
I’m a transsexual. I don’t need to say I’m a trans man. I’m a 
transgender and I’m transsexual, I’m gendered in many ways and it’s 
kind of cool to feel totally ok with that.”20 
 
 
The ‘wrong body’ narrative takes us directly to the core of the problem. It 
shows perfectly how LGBTQ politics are stuck in the mould of 
heteronormative privilege and how transgender is only an amorphous 
identity that needs reshaping into acceptable forms. Now, what some 
individuals demand is to be considered for what they are: Charles explains 
he is a transperson, a transsexual. He is not a man. He does not want to 
spend his life trying to fit into the manhood society has proclaimed 
acceptable. He does not feel that any of those ready-to-wear identities fit 
                                                
19 Sally Hines, TransForming Gender: Transgender Practices of Identity, Intimacy and Care  
(The Policy Press 2007) p.188-189. 
20 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_JCfTzbXPo 
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him. He is a transsexual and as such he wants to live his life. His body is not 
wrong, because wrong needs right to affirm its wrongness and Charles will 
not accept to have his subjectivity reduced to a competition between what 
sits in and what sits out of the boundaries of the gender binary.  
 
Erin (MtF): “I feel that ciswomen and transgender women are two 
different genders, that being a transgender woman is such a different 
experience. A lot of transgender people…can pass in society looking like 
a woman so they don’t want to even identify as transsexual or 
transgender anymore. They just want to identify as women and not let 
anyone know they’re trans… good for them, they’ve blended into 
cisgendered society which I have issues with…there are also those 
women who can’t pass as women…you know…I just feel that the 
transgender experience is so different”. 21 
 
This difference Charles and Erin express, and in particular the pressure to 
suppress and direct it towards either of the two genders, is exactly what the 
previous accounts on the GRA lamented. There is a felt pressing political 
agenda that works to neutralise trans and make it as safe and normativised 
as possible. Dysphoria is considered by some to be almost a fabricated 
instrument through which the legal and medical industries control those 
wrong bodies and make them right.22 
 
Jamie: “Why do people become dysphoric? You don’t think that society 
and the way that things have been ingrained in your mind since you 
were little about what’s male, what’s female and who is the provider in 
the family, and all these stereotypes, like what male and female mean, 
what kind of behaviour male and female identify with? That’s all based 
in your society and your culture… Don’t you think this makes you feel 
bad about yourself because you don’t fit that definition physically, but 
you feel you might fit that definition mentally? It’s the same way as 
girls who look at pictures of skinny bitches in magazines and they feel 
bad about their bodies…they feel like maybe there’s something wrong 
with them because they feel very beautiful but still they don’t fit this 
image…of what they’re supposed to be.”23 
 
                                                
21 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PcF3OJ9VpgI 
22 Anna Vitale, ‘Implications of Being Gender Sysphoric: A Developmental Review’ in 
Gender and Psychoanalysis, An Interdisciplinary Journal, 212-141, Spring 2001 
23 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQZyUIAlEo0 
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According to the binary model, people like Charlie, Erin and Jamie who 
position themselves beyond the binary model are wrong bodies, mistaken 
subjectivities not only because they are transgender, but also because their 
self-identification does not fit in the politically accepted transsexual model 
which is that of a female born who identifies as a man or a male-born who 
identifies as a female. Wrong bodies beyond repair, as it were.  
 
Charleston (FtM):“The problems I have with transitioning is not the 
actual transition, but it’s the social stigma… that’s how I feel 
dysphoria… If society respected trans people I probably wouldn’t have 
many issues.”24  
 
Jamie: “So if I didn’t have to worry about, you know, if I wanted to 
date a female…if I didn’t have to worry about what she’s gonna think 
when I take off my clothes, yes, I’d probably be less dysphoric…I’d 
probably so things differently, I think there’s a high probability that a 
lot of us would do things differently if we were born in a culture where 
we weren’t seen as outcasts.”25 
 
Feeling part of a community, for some, can alleviate the sense of hostility of 
a society that refuses to come to terms with what cannot be promptly 
decoded and classified.   
 
Charles: “When I was isolated and didn’t have lots of trans people 
around me I wanted to be able to find the exact right words to define 
myself and now I’m just so excited to be comfortable in my body.”26 
 
 
The comfort in feeling a sense of belonging and the presence of a group of 
people who go through life experiencing the same challenges is far more 
than this, it can sometimes be the only outlet for sharing emotions, 
frustrations, fears. This is why, I suspect, the presence of online blogs and 
video blogs is so prolific: people reaching out for people with mutual life 
experiences from whom to draw a sense of legitimation which is often 
denied elsewhere. What seems particularly significant in the context of the 
                                                
24 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSO_ds2v6Gw 
25 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQZyUIAlEo0 
26 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_JCfTzbXPo 
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material body is the inherent pressure to display a body surface that, 
insofar as it is visible, it is also recognisable.   
 
It is important to make a distinction here: there is often a fine line between  
be recognisible and make oneself recognisible. I will explain it better: 
vulnerable minorities often run the rick of isolation and misrepresentation 
in a fast-paced world made of leading majorities. Identification with one 
such minority can be a way of acquiring a sense of belonging and social 
legitimation. Transgender identity – representations of queer embodiment 
more generally – are depicted and portrayed as flexible, changeable, 
temperamental. The post-modern misinterpretations of a theory of gender 
fluidity has certainly contributed to help this trend. “Flexibility has become 
a powerful commodity, something scarce and highly valued that can be 
used to discriminate against some people.”27 Halberstam concurs that 
“promoting flexibility at the level of identity and personal choices may 
sound like a post-modern or even queer program for social change. But it as 
easily describes the advertising strategies of huge corporations…who sell 
their product by casting their consumers as simultaneously all the same and 
all different”28. Vulnerable subjectivities such as trans run a higher risk of 
simulating embodiments and identities that are not necessarily their own, 
but that might help achieve a higher sense of acceptance and social 
reassurance. Such a risk is also manifested and aggravated by the fast 
changes their bodies undergo and the level of satisfaction with the outcome 
of those physical manipulations. Social pressure, anxiety, strive to be 
accepted may alter the true sense of oneself. 
 
Erin: “Honestly…just the idea of being looking to yourself and not 
really measuring your transition with anyone else, to not be in a hurry 
because transition is a process and it has to do with you. It shouldn’t 
have to do with other people.”29 
 
Charles: I think it’s totally ok to say I’m a transgender, I don’t need to 
                                                
27 Emily Martin, Flexible Bodies  (Beacon Press 1995) p. xvii 
28 Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Space, op. cit. p.18 
29 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PcF3OJ9VpgI  
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say trans male or gender variant and all of that sort of stuff. I’m just 
transsexual and it feels good to say it and believe it”.30 
 
By resisting such patterns, these individuals are embodying what Sandy 
Stone twenty years ago called for: resisting passing as a way to disrupt old 
patterns of desire and rewrite oneself outside of the dissonance that the 
transgender body implies. In doing so, the people are demonstrating that 
the materiality of the lived experience immersed in the spatiality of the here 
and the now has abundantly surpassed the short-sighted and miniscule 
views set up by gender policing and indeed identity policing organisms. By 
this I do not only refer to the GRA, but also to all those structures – cultural, 
political, legal, moral - that work for the preservation of gender 
normativity, that imperative of gender purity that causes the existence of 
monsters and feeds off such production in order to constantly re-establish 
itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_JCfTzbXPo 
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 Conclusion 
 
“To become imperceptible oneself,  
to have dismantled love in order to become capable of loving.  
To have dismantled one's self in order finally  
to be alone and meet the true double 
 at the other end of the line.  
A clandestine passenger on a motionless voyage.  
To become like everybody else; but this, precisely, 
 is a becoming only for one who knows  
how to be nobody, to no longer be anybody.  
To paint oneself gray on gray.”1  
 
 
 
Concepts, for Deleuze, have no end. If they did, they would be mere ideas. 
The fundamental distinction between these is that ideas are self-contained 
structures, while concepts, like rhizomes, “can be connected to any other, 
and must be”.2 Indeed they can be fragmented or interrupted, but they will 
generate again as new processes leading to new concepts. Far from being a 
rhetorical definition, this is the indication of a specific modus operandi that 
traverses the whole of Deleuze’s philosophy. A methodology that enables 
and pushes us to act, to be active, activists, activators. To possess ourselves 
in the awareness that what might be of our lives is to be found in the 
actualisation of our unique difference. A difference that, while 
fundamentally constitutive of our specificity as singulars, reminds us of the 
totality that stretches out of the corporeal limits of our bodies, making us a 
body amongst multiplicities of bodies. In doing so, it positions pure being 
at the forefront of existence. Being is life. This is the ethical breath of 
Deleuze’s thought.  
 
This PhD has attempted to map out an ethics that relocates transgender 
subjectivity within a framework of present utopianism. It has indicated a 
                                                
1 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, op. cit. 
2 Ibid. p. 218 
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mode of looking at transgender specificity as an act of difference, one unity 
in a multiplicity of beings.  
 
Transgender politics are developed on a rigid understanding of the gender 
binary. A bipartition of life defined by masculine male and feminine female, 
nothing more than two tags with the ambitions to represent the most 
important element of our lives: the way we present ourselves, interact with 
other people, understand ourselves and affect those around us. Around this 
a structure of values was erected. Arguably, sex is the most definite 
indicator and definer of our lived experience as human beings. It is the first 
characteristic noted at the moment of birth, a clear direction of the kind of 
life one will lead. This research was animated by the ambition to imagine 
what might be of people’s lived experience and relations if gender 
imprinting divisions did not hold such social and political supremacy in the 
formation of our subjectivity. In this context, I have found transgender to be 
the most powerful example of the failure of gender the way it is 
traditionally understood. Not only at odds with clear-cut ideals of male and 
female, but in possession of a corporeality that dramatically challenges such 
essentialism. The way normativity has responded to the set of challenges 
presented by transgender has been characterised by the construction of 
outlets aimed to integrate those fundamental differences into a narrative of 
sameness. This has served, on the one hand, to contain the threat of gender 
disruption and, on the other, to secure a certain margin of gender 
reproduction.  
 
This is where my research originated. Namely, I have been concerned with 
exploring what might become of transgender subjectivity if it was not 
forced to express itself using a language that is not its own and if certain 
normative values of body and mind representations were not thrust upon 
it. I have found utopianism to offer a valid set of conceptual tools for a 
reconsideration directed to evaluate trans subjectivity as the expression of 
individuation, not identification.  
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In order to do so, a radical reformulation of the concept of utopia was 
necessary. I have started my discussion by asserting that, contrary to its 
traditional definition, utopia is a material mode of the present, not an 
expression of transcendence or a preview of the future. Far from being an 
ideology or a hopeful fantasy loaded with expectations of what will be, 
utopia is already, here and now. It is a condition of being that cannot (and 
does not) settle for anything outside of its most direct domain, nor does it 
lend itself to representations, for it draws its essence precisely in the 
affirmation of its present. It is a kind of materiality that does not feed from 
the future, it does not need a there and then to look up to or from which to 
draw validation.  It itself is futurity. Through the work of Deleuze I have 
then elaborated an original notion of utopia: not the fabricated fantasy of 
the no-where space of a future to reach or reproduce, but the actualisation of 
a virtuality (the present) that already contains elements of utopianism. 
These elements are revealed to us by the many expressions of affects and 
contaminations in the mundanity of an everyday life that is always more 
utopian than we imagine or are able to see.  To reframe the temporality of 
utopia and eradicate it from the limbo of the ‘not-yet’ and relocate it in the 
now of the present was the theoretical ambition of this research. However, 
how could such an ungraspable and immaterial notion as that of utopia 
account for the materiality expressed through the dramatic corporeality of 
transgendered bodies here and now? Further, how could transgender 
subjectivity benefit from such a reformulation? 
 
I have considered the ways in which transgender is mediated in various 
circumstances of life: the politics that govern it, the spatial compromises it 
undergoes in everyday practice, the essential political narratives that aim to 
decode its constitutive difference and assimilate its destabilising anti-
normative essence into an easy-accessible identity that does not upset the 
monolithic values of femininity and masculinity. What struck me was the 
overbridging, general attitude to construct a political narrative 
characterised by the underlying promise to tackle in the future issues that 
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were being caused by the short-sighted politics of the present. This is why it 
was imperative to reformulate the ground for new ethics and rethink 
transgender focusing on the pulsating of a present that can no longer be 
neglected or diminished in favour of the promise of a rosier future. 
 
Judith Halberstam, as I explained in my first chapter, sees the transgender 
body as a peculiar site of futurity.3 This is undeniable. Indeed, transgender 
encapsulates symbols that elude the canonical understanding of gender 
embodiment and are reminiscent of something extraordinary (out of the 
ordinary). I suggested that such sense of futurity serves transgender best 
when is considered in a condition of actualisation. The thought of Deleuze 
was paramount in articulating this shift. As we have seen, for Deleuze, life 
is a mode of the present that, because constantly becoming something other 
than what it is (thus, reaffirming itself over and over), does not know (or 
need) other temporal dimensions other than the now.  Chapter 2 was 
dedicated to the reformulation of the theoretical framework of utopia. I 
have rethought its temporality and suggested that utopia reaches its 
outmost generative force when it is framed in the here and now of the 
present. Through the close analysis of Deleuze’s immanence and the 
concepts of the virtual and the actual, I have set out the foundation of my 
theoretical framework. This theoretical framework  has created an ontology 
for utopia through which the potentialities of the transgender body have 
emerged. 
 
In chapter 3 I have undertaken an analysis of the Gender Recognition Act 
2014. Acknowledging its advanced outlook and the undeniable 
improvement it has brought into the lives of many transgender people who 
feel well represented by the gender binary, I have critically engaged with its 
rigidity. In particular, I have highlighted the fissure between its demand for 
stability and the unfixed and mellifluous manner in which some 
transgender individuals experience their bodies and subjectivities. The life 
                                                
3 Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Space, op. cit.  
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stories have confirmed this paradox. On the one hand, there is the desire to 
acquire legal recognition, and on the other the reluctance to let the law wipe 
out their personal histories and overwrite a new life story to establish a 
sense of self that, while aimed at coherence, it does not account for the 
specificity of their transgender experience.  
 
Chapter 4 explored the relationship with public spaces and the mediation 
with which transgender subjectivity is called to engage. Through the 
allegory of translations, I have drawn parallels with the sex-segregated 
spatiality of public toilets and their monolingualism. The impossibility for 
transgender to translate their meaning into a language that will not accept 
its terminology has delineated a univocal mode of spatiality – a dystopia - 
that will not lend itself to mediation. On the contrary, it will fight back, thus 
leading up to issues of control, safety, and violated intimacy.  
 
Chapter 5 was concerned with issues around the othered body, a site of 
contradictions where powerful inter-corporeal linkages emerge and remind 
us that the transgender body, however mediated by the medical industry 
and the legal profession, reaches out of the boundaries of its skin and 
identifies its own ways of social inscription. It is a body that sits on the 
margins, yet right in the middle of its very specific process of 
individualisation. 
 
Each of these last three chapters was followed by an empirical interlude 
that brought the key theories presented to life through the life narratives of 
the participants. They offered significant insight into the real experience of 
being transgender. They enabled this research to zoom into the specificity 
of bodies that, despite misrepresentation and hostility, do not intend to let 
their individuality be colonised and rewritten just in the name of 
recognition or ephemeral political action. Their quest is bigger and goes far 
beyond a name change.  This is apparent by the risks they take every day 
just to be present and leave a trace of themselves in a world that would 
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rather eradicate their subjectivities. Their presence reminds us that their 
lives cannot be reduced to political dialectics that are more concerned with 
normative control than creating an ethics of difference that allows these 
marginal bodies to exist through the many acts of differentiations that 
characterise their existence. 
 
≈ 
 
As the title indicates, these are the cardinal themes that have orientated this 
research: marginality, actualisation, utopia and body. Each term conveys 
both a sense of urgency and a specific concern with the materiality of being. 
The sense of urgency is given by the immediacy of a present that can no 
longer be conditional on the future, but is whole, active and now. A sense of 
materiality is given by the corporeal and spatial dimension of the marginal, 
which suggests struggle, turmoil, absence. An absence claimed and filled by 
the marginal body. Ultimately, these four terms point to the possibility of 
looking at utopia as a very concrete and active mode of understanding and 
possessing the present. 
 
 
The way the term marginal has been employed has offered two different 
perspectives of the transgender experience. First, faithful to its etymology, it 
has expressed the condition of being marginalised. Marginal subjectivities 
on the periphery of life. This has become particularly apparent in the life 
stories of those individuals who experience discrimination, hostility and 
violence in their lives. Spatial marginalisation, political marginalisation, 
social marginalisation. Marginalisation is also perpetuated by the law: the 
Gender Recognition Act 2014, as we have seen, fails to satisfy the 
emergence for true gender equality and actively promotes divisions and 
discrimination amongst the same communities. Second, the term marginal 
has become synonymous with potent. Bodies that do not succumb. Bodies 
whose force is expressed in and out of legalised recognition. These bodies 
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take up the right to signify for themselves by deciding everyday to create 
alleys for their individuality to unfold in spite of the absences they need to 
fill. Bodies infinitely minor in the normative and hegemonic logics of 
politics, yet immensely political for their ability to choose alternative and 
more creative ways of being. Their testimony is almost archaic in the way in 
which, bare of any representational support, only through the sheer force of 
its own determination, faces up to oppression and will not give up in the 
name of freedom. 
 
The notion of actualisation has allowed this research to shift from a 
dimension of wishful fantasy to a grounded dialogue with the constraints 
of reality. It has elevated my theoretical narrative to an ontology that 
reaches directly to the corporeality of bodies that matter far beyond the 
representational. Actualisation suspends the absence created by a future 
that is there and then and allows for that absence to become the ground 
upon which transgender individuals rewrite their story. It produces a 
generative force that validates the efforts of a present that is active, 
universal and is already happening.  
 
The term utopia has been the fil rouge of this research. Neither a fantasy nor 
hope, utopia in this PhD has been the expression of the autonomous 
materiality of a subjectivity that is too often suspended, neglected and 
trans-formed in favour of normative order. I started by saying that utopian 
is a mode of futurity totally immersed in the here and now of a present that 
is not provisional or temporary, but is a whole. Its unity is kept alive by its 
internally determined difference. The more it changes, the more it becomes 
something other than what it was a moment ago, and the more it reaffirms 
its unicity. This difference is both ontological and ethical. It is ontological 
because it is deeply tied up with being. We have seen this in chapter 1: 
difference is being, just like there is no being that is not difference. It is 
ethical because it is now. It does not concern itself with the abstraction of a 
future tense that shadows its expectations on the present but gives no 
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indication on whether or not it will keep its promise. It actively decides to 
be here and now, and calls for an urgent act of collective individuation.  
 
Finally, the body is “the ensemble of relations” 4 that makes it all possible 
through its capacity to meld with, affect and be affected by space and other 
bodies. “We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in 
other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into 
composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to 
destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and 
passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body.”5 In 
this research, through the compelling life narratives of the marginal bodies 
who every day conquest the right to be what they are through the sole 
determination of their being, we have had the opportunity to sample the 
extent to which a body can reach.  
 
This research has mapped out an original conceptual framework for 
transgender. The intricacies of transgender subjectivity and the specific 
social and political significance claimed by some transgender individuals 
indicate that representational assimilation is a concern for those who wish 
to celebrate the specificity of their own unique experience. The 
determination of marginal bodies is not so much the conquest of a centre of 
privilege, but the opportunity to make the specificity of their corporeal 
experience their own exclusive centre. To exist in their own right. I have 
suggested that in order to promote and sustain an ethics based on 
constitutional difference, it is essential to stop the sterile dialectics between 
a now and a then that do not inform each other, but only create a void that 
suspends (or delays) movement. Instead, this research indicates that the 
revolutionary force of bodies that become in the present can cater for a 
subjectivity that indeed, is mellifluous and heterogeneous, yet so steadily 
anchored in the matter of a body that is here and now.  
 
                                                
4 Cours Vincennes – January 24, 1978, op. cit. p. 7 
5 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, op. cit. p. 257 
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Away from identity politics, from intersectionality, relationality, 
essentialisms, from dialectical structures and from despotic systems of 
meaning, this research has suggested an alternative ethics that is really 
concerned with the demand for equality raised by the many marginal 
bodies that everyday see their own right to be sacrificed, belittled and 
vilified in the name of a normative ideal of existence that neglects their 
being. 
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